Korab v. State

• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: ROSE, J.
• Citation: Korab v. State, 93 Neb. 66, 139 N.W. 717 (Neb. 1913)
• Decision Date: 31 January 1913
• Docket Number: 17,615
• Parties: WILLIAM G. KORAB v. STATE OF NEBRASKA

139 N.W. 717

93 Neb. 66

WILLIAM G. KORAB v. STATE OF NEBRASKA

No. 17,615

Supreme Court of Nebraska

January 31, 1913

ERROR to the district court for Boyd county: R. R. DICKSON, JUDGE. Reversed.

REVERSED.

W. T Wills and M. F. Harrington, for plaintiff in error.

Grant G. Martin, Attorney General, and Frank E. Edgerton, contra.

ROSE J. LETTON, J., not sitting.

OPINION

ROSE J.

In a prosecution by the state, William G. Korab, defendant, was convicted of receiving stolen property valued by the jury at $ 38, and for that offense was sentenced to serve in the penitentiary a term of not less than one nor more than seven years. As plaintiff in error he now seeks a reversal of his conviction.

The information was made by the county attorney of Boyd county, Nebraska, and charged: "William G. Korab, late of the county aforesaid, on the 14th day of March, A. D. 1912, in the county of Boyd and the state of Nebraska, aforesaid, unlawfully and feloniously did receive the personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of $ 48, then lately before stolen, taken and carried away, with the intent of him, the said William G. Korab, to defraud said John Lightfoot, he then and there well knowing the said personal property to have been stolen."

Defendant did not bring up a bill of exceptions. The only assignment of error available to him here is the overruling of a motion in arrest of judgment. "That the facts stated in the indictment do not constitute an offense" is a statutory ground for sustaining such a motion. Criminal code, sec. 493. Were the facts stated sufficient to charge a felony? The inquiry is directed to the description of the property. It is described in the information as "the personal property of John Lightfoot of the value of $ 48, then lately before stolen." The prosecutor intended to charge defendant with violating the following statutory provisions: "If any person shall receive or buy any goods or chattels of the value of thirty-five dollars or upwards, that shall be stolen or taken by robbers, with intent to defraud the owner, or shall harbor or conceal any robber or thief guilty of felony, knowing him or her to be such, every person so offending shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary no more than seven years, nor less than one year." Criminal code, sec. 116.

An information for larceny may contain also a count for receiving the stolen property. Criminal code, sec. 419. Since both offenses may be charged in the same information, the rules for determining the sufficiency of the description in charging larceny apply substantially in a prosecution for the single offense of receiving stolen property. In this state the law has been stated thus: "In an indictment or information for larceny the property alleged to have been stolen should be described with sufficient particularity to enable the court to determine that such property is the subject of larceny; to advise the accused with reasonable...