Korenak v. Curative Workshop Adult Rehabilitation Center

• Decision Date: 06 January 1976
• Docket Number: No. 607,607
• Citation: 71 Wis.2d 77,237 N.W.2d 43
• Parties: Joseph P. KORENAK and Marjorie M. Korenak, Respondents, v. CURATIVE WORKSHOP ADULT REHABILITATION CENTER, Appellant. (1974).
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 43

237 N.W.2d 43

71 Wis.2d 77

Joseph P. KORENAK and Marjorie M. Korenak, Respondents, v. CURATIVE WORKSHOP ADULT REHABILITATION CENTER, Appellant.

No. 607 (1974).

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 6, 1976.

Simarski, Goodrich, Brennan & Stack by James P. Brennan, Milwaukee, for appellant.

Goldberg, Previant & Uelmen, S.C. by Larry B. Brueggeman, Milwaukee, of counsel, for respondents.

DAY, Justice.

The order appealed from overrules the defendant's demurrer to two causes of action set forth in the plaintiffs' complaint. The question is whether the complaint sets forth facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The complaint alleges that Joseph Korenak, an adult, was a student at the defendant Curative Workshop Adult Rehabilitation Center ('Center'), a Wisconsin corporation located in Milwaukee. The Center held itself out to the public as an educational institution for the purposes of vocationally rehabilitating members of the public, and was engaged in the business of educating, instructing, and teaching occupations and job skills to enrolled members of the public. Also enrolled at the Center were two individuals, Edward E. Graun, and George S. McGowan, both of whom, the complaint alleges, 'had a bellicose nature' and 'a history and record of violent conduct, aggressiveness, uncontrollability, dangerous conduct, violent crimes, exhibiting dangerous proclivities, being argumentative and inflicting injuries on other people. . . .' The complaint further alleges that the Center knew or should have known of these activities when the Center accepted them as students; that while they were students they individually and in concert engaged in acts of violence and conduct injurious to others, including acts against Mr. Korenak in which they 'abused, harassed, tormented, taunted, insulted, threatened the life of, stole property from and destroyed property of' Mr. Korenak; that the Center had been informed by Mr. Korenak of these attacks on numerous occasions; and that on or about the 11th day of March, 171, Graun, in conspiracy with McGowan, struck Korenak with a pipe in the region of his left eye, causing Mr. Korenak to sustain severe injuries, including the loss of his left eye. The complaint further alleges that Graun has been criminally prosecuted, convicted, and incarcerated in connection with the assault.

The complaint sets forth two causes of action. The first alleges negligence on the part of the Center in accepting Graun and McGowan as students in view of their records; failing to warn Mr. Korenak of their records; allowing them to associate with Mr. Korenak after being informed of their previous attacks upon him; in failing to supervise Graun and McGowan, or provide protection for Mr. Korenak in view of their previous records and attacks upon him; and failing to provide a supervisory staff of sufficient size or skill to supervise the students enrolled in the course. The second cause of action alleges that the Center was a 'place of employment' within the meaning of the safe-place statute, sec. 101.11, Stats., and that Mr. Korenak was both an 'employee' and a 'frequenter,' as defined for purposes of the safe-place statute in sec. 101.01, Stats. In both causes of action, Mr. Korenak seeks damages for his medical expenses, lost earnings, pain and suffering, and permanent disabilities and disfigurements. His wife, Marjorie Korenak, seeks additional damages for past and future losses of society and companionship.

The overruled demurrer was to the entire complaint, and not directed at each cause of action separately. We, however, reach differing results in considering the two causes. Does the first cause of action state a claim in ordinary negligence? We conclude that it does, because the allegations make out a breach of the general duty of an owner or occupier of land to exercise ordinary care to prevent injuries on his premises. Does the second cause of action state a claim under the safe-place statute? We conclude that it does not, since the safe-place statute applies only to physical conditions of the premises, and does not contemplate negligence in permitting acts such as those complained of here to occur.

We have previously held that an educational institution handling adult students (Carthage College) owes a duty of ordinary care to protect those students from the known negligent conduct of other persons:

'. . . the invitor, while not an insurer, does owe a duty of ordinary care to an invitee not only as to the physical condition of the premises but also as to the known hazardous conduct of other persons upon the premises.' Stamberger v. Matthaidess (1967), 37 Wis.2d 186, 191, 155 N.W.2d 88, 91.

In this case we extend this principle to cover intentional torts committed by one student upon another.

In prior cases involving business establishments, we have held that the duty of the operator of the premises, with respect to intentional torts committed by one patron upon another, is a duty of exercising reasonable care to discover that tortious acts were being committed or about to be committed, and adequately warn his customers or restrain the attacker. Weihert v. Piccione (1956), 273 Wis. 448, 455, 78 N.W.2d 757 (restaurant); Radloff v. National Food Stores (1963), 20 Wis.2d 224, 235, 121 N.W.2d 865, 123 N.W.2d 570 (grocery store); Kowalczuk v. Rotter (1974), 63 Wis.2d 511, 513, 217 N.W.2d 332 (tavern). The present case does not fall within this class because the student-school relationship is not of the temporary sort that arises between, for example, a restaurateur and the customer who happens to be in the establishment when the disturbance occurs. The student-school relationship is both more extensive and more extended. It involves many factors, such as the history of warnings alleged here, which would not normally arise in the case of a typical business establishment.

There are significant questions of public policy raised in this case that cannot be decided on demurrer. The Center allegedly trains the occupationally disabled in job skills suitable to their abilities, but also apparently seeks to train those with records of violent criminal activity. The importance to society of channeling those previously convicted of crimes into useful and acceptable paths cannot be lightly cast aside. But where trainees with known and demonstrated tendencies to violence are mixed with other individuals, especially those who are suffering from occupational...