Korotki v. Goughan

• Decision Date: 28 September 1984
• Docket Number: Civ. No. K-79-1833.
• Citation: 597 F. Supp. 1365
• Parties: Abraham Paul KOROTKI v. Thomas J. GOUGHAN, etc., et al.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

597 F. Supp. 1365

Abraham Paul KOROTKI v. Thomas J. GOUGHAN, etc., et al.

Civ. No. K-79-1833.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

September 28, 1984.

Michael E. Marr and Marr, Bennett & Carmody, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Howard G. Goldberg, Laurie R. Bortz and Smith, Somerville & Case, and James N. Phillips, Baltimore, Md., for defendants Goughan, Barton, Cartwright and Town of Fenwick Island.

FRANK A. KAUFMAN, Chief Judge.

Plaintiff Korotki, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 and state based law, instituted this case seeking damages and injunctive relief against eleven defendants who may be grouped as the "Maryland defendants," the "Delaware defendants," the "Fenwick Island defendants" and one defendant, "Sussex County, Delaware."¹ Subsequently, plaintiff entered into a Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of his claims against all of the Maryland and Delaware defendants² and a Stipulation of Dismissal with defendant, Sussex County, Delaware, of his claims against that defendant.³ Accordingly, this case proceeded to trial only against the four Fenwick Island defendants who are the Town of Fenwick Island, Delaware ("Fenwick Island");⁴ the Fenwick Island Police Chief, Cartwright; a Fenwick Island policeman, Goughan; and a Fenwick Island Alderman, Barton. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that the Fenwick Island defendants subjected him to an unconstitutional arrest and to violations of his due process and equal protection rights and, inter alia, took such actions in violation of the Non-Resident Violator Compact⁵ in order to raise revenues for the Town's treasury. Subject matter jurisdiction in connection with plaintiff's 1983 and 1985 claims is present pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1343.⁶ Pendent jurisdiction exists over plaintiff's state law conspiracy claim because the latter arises from a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 1138, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966). After a jury trial was held and the jury returned special verdicts under Federal Civil Rule 49(a), which verdicts were largely favorable to plaintiff and entitled plaintiff, under applicable principles of law, to judgments herein against defendants Goughan, Cartwright and Town of Fenwick Island, defendants filed a number of post-trial motions. Plaintiff has also pursued in the post-trial period his quest for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988.⁷ The jury's answers to the special questions include awards of compensatory damages in the amount of $14,861.78 against each and all of the Fenwick Island defendants, punitive damages in the amount of $5,000 against each of the three individual defendants, and punitive damages in the amount of $100,000 against the defendant Town of Fenwick Island.

I. FACTS

The facts can be gleaned from the jury's answers to Federal Civil Rule 49(a) special verdicts⁸ and from the stipulations entered into by the parties.⁹ On October 1, 1976 at approximately 4:30 p.m. plaintiff, accompanied by a female companion, was operating his 1976 Corvette automobile in the area of Fenwick Island, Delaware, in a southerly direction, en route to his condominium at the English Towers, Ocean City, Maryland. Defendant Goughan, a uniformed patrolman on the Fenwick Island police force, was operating a police vehicle owned by the Town of Fenwick Island. Travelling behind plaintiff's vehicle, Goughan activated his siren and flashing lights and signaled to plaintiff to stop his vehicle by the side of the road. The jury found that plaintiff stopped his vehicle at "the earliest practicable opportunity"¹⁰ and that the stop occurred within the State of Maryland.¹¹ After the stop, plaintiff, at Goughan's request, handed his driver's license and registration to Goughan. Goughan informed plaintiff that plaintiff had exceeded the 35 mile per hour posted speed limit in Fenwick Island, Delaware, and ordered plaintiff to return to the Fenwick Island Town Hall to stand trial immediately. The jury found that plaintiff was not speeding in Fenwick Island and that Goughan did not act with "a reasonable good-faith belief that Korotki was driving carelessly in Fenwick Island, Delaware."¹²

Plaintiff, at the place of the stop, with knowledge that Goughan was a Delaware —and not a Maryland—police officer, refused to return to Fenwick Island and requested, instead, that Goughan return plaintiff's driver's license and registration and issue to plaintiff a citation. The Non-Resident Violator Compact,¹³ then in effect between Maryland and Delaware,¹⁴ provides, inter alia, that a traffic offender apprehended in a state other than the state of his residence shall be afforded the opportunity (1) to stand trial immediately in the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred or (2) to receive a voluntary assessment form, (e.g. citation),¹⁵ and (a) to pay a fine by mail or (b) to appear for trial at a later date in the jurisdiction in which the offense occurred. Goughan refused plaintiff's request and insisted that plaintiff immediately accompany Goughan to the Fenwick Island Town Hall. Plaintiff, after stating to Goughan that plaintiff was going to drive his companion to the English Towers and that plaintiff would then meet Goughan at the Ocean City Police Department, drove from the scene of the stop, without Goughan's permission, leaving plaintiff's license and registration in Goughan's possession, and headed toward the English Towers. The jury found that Goughan manuevered his vehicle in order to try to force Korotki to pull over to the side of the highway.¹⁶ The jury further found that Goughan "attempted to prevent the Korotki vehicle from turning into the entrance to the English Towers."¹⁷ The jury did not accept the testimony of plaintiff and his companion that Goughan, while the two vehicles were proceeding between the place of the stop and English Towers, pointed a gun at the Korotki vehicle.¹⁸

After plaintiff reached the English Towers, Goughan drove to the Ocean City Police Department and attempted to contact Ocean City Police Commissioner Treadwell in order to have a warrant issued for plaintiff's arrest. The Commissioner, upon the advice of the then State's Attorney for Worcester County, Maryland, Crawford, refused to issue a warrant for plaintiff's arrest. Thereafter, Goughan returned to the Fenwick Island Town Hall and contacted defendant Barton, then a judge of the Alderman's Court in the Town of Fenwick Island. Barton, who had jurisdiction over traffic offenses committed within the incorporated limits of Fenwick Island, Delaware, and who was empowered to issue arrest warrants for persons committing offenses within the Town,¹⁹ placed a telephone call to the Ocean City Police Department in an effort to speak with Treadwell.²⁰ This Court, pursuant to its reserved authority under Federal Civil Rule 49(a) and in general conformity with and in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, hereby determines that Barton placed the call in order (a) to ascertain the factual circumstances surrounding the incident and (b) to decide whether issuance of an arrest warrant was appropriate. It is to be noted that Barton did not reach Treadwell and did not issue a warrant for plaintiff's arrest.

Goughan next prepared two traffic citations against plaintiff. The first²¹ charged plaintiff with speeding in violation of Title 21, Section 4169(b) of the Delaware Code;²² the second²³ charged plaintiff with careless driving in violation of Title 21, § 4176 of the Delaware Code.²⁴ Goughan on October 1, 1976 also advised defendant Orr, then Chief Judge of the Justice of the Peace Court No. 2 in Nassau, Delaware, of the facts surrounding plaintiff's stop. Judge Orr issued two warrants for plaintiff's arrest, based upon the two traffic citations issued by Goughan and Goughan's report of plaintiff's failure to obey Goughan's order to accompany Goughan to the Fenwick Island Town Hall. Goughan caused a report to be filed with the Department of Public Safety of the State of Delaware, stating that plaintiff had failed to comply with the traffic citations. Pursuant to the Compact,²⁵ the State of Delaware notified the State of Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration²⁶ of plaintiff's failure to comply with the Delaware citations. Based upon that notification, the Maryland Administrator initiated, in 1977, license suspension proceedings against plaintiff. After an administrative hearing and two unsuccessful appeals, plaintiff's driving license was ordered suspended unless plaintiff promptly appeared in a Delaware court in response to the Delaware citations.²⁷

Thereafter, plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court, styled Korotki v. Intermann, B-77-1657, in which plaintiff, inter alia, sought relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for alleged violations of plaintiff's constitutional rights arising from the above-described traffic incident. Specifically, plaintiff therein sought to enjoin the Delaware and Maryland authorities from taking any action affecting plaintiff's driving privileges. In a Memorandum and Order filed on August 28, 1978, Judge Blair of this Court dismissed plaintiff's complaint, holding that pursuant to the principles of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) and its progeny, this Court would not enjoin the pending Maryland and Delaware state proceedings. In that connection, Judge Blair wrote: "The court finds that principles of comity and federalism require it to abstain from consideration of each of plaintiff's claims until he has had an opportunity to assert his rights in appropriate state forums."²⁸

Subsequently, plaintiff, appearing in the Justice of the Peace Court Number Two for Sussex County in November, 1979, and in the Superior Court of Sussex County, Delaware, in July, 1980,²⁹ was found not guilty of both the speeding and careless driving charges originally lodged against him. The Motor Vehicle Administration of the State of Maryland, upon...