Kortobi v. Kass
| Decision Date | 06 October 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 0295, Sept. Term, 2007.,0295, Sept. Term, 2007. |
| Citation | 182 Md. App. 424,957 A.2d 1128 |
| Parties | M'Hamed KORTOBI v. Brian L. KASS, Personal Representative of the Estate of James Leach, Jr., et al. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Walter E. Gillchrist, Jr. (Andrew T. Rezendes, Budow & Noble, on brief), Bethesda, for Appellee.
Panel: MEREDITH, SHARER,* JAMES S. GETTY, (Retired, Specially Assigned), JJ.
In this appeal we are called upon to decide whether jurisdiction lies in Maryland over a non-resident decedent's estate where the only contact with Maryland is the Maryland residence of the personal representative. We shall hold that Maryland does not have jurisdiction for the purpose of a tort action against the decedent. Therefore, we shall affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, which granted appellee's motion to dismiss on lack of jurisdiction grounds.
The genesis of this litigation is a personal injury action arising out of an automobile collision that occurred on January 6, 2003, at the intersection of 12th Street, N.W., and K Street, N.W., in Washington, D.C. A vehicle being operated by appellant, M'Hamed Kortobi, was struck by a vehicle driven by Carver James Leach, Jr. Both Kortobi and Leach were residents of the District of Columbia. Kortobi was injured and required medical treatment. Leach died from causes unrelated to the motor vehicle accident before suit was filed.
Because Leach was a resident of the District of Columbia, and his assets, including real estate, were located in that jurisdiction, an estate was opened in the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. Brian L. Kass, appellee, was appointed by the probate court as the personal representative of Leach's estate. Kass is an attorney in the firm of Kass, Mitek & Kass, located in Washington, D.C. He is a resident of Maryland. All filings for the Leach Estate were made from Kass's District of Columbia office.1 No estate business was conducted in Maryland.
As Leach's personal representative, Kass gathered and reported all assets to the Superior Court. Leach's only beneficiaries were Willene C. Leach and Angela Leach, both of whom are residents of the District of Columbia. Leach owned no property in Maryland, or in any jurisdiction other than the District of Columbia.
Initially, Kortobi filed a complaint against the Leach Estate in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia. After the appointment of Kass as the personal representative, Kortobi dismissed the District of Columbia suit, and filed the instant suit in the Circuit Court for Price George's County. On July 15, 2006, Kortobi served Kass, in his capacity as personal representative, at Kass's residence in Howard County, Maryland.
Kass then filed, inter alia, a motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. After reviewing the parties' initial submissions, the circuit court ordered the parties to prepare memoranda to address the applicability of Md.Code, Trusts and Estates, § 5-502(a), with particular focus on the following provision:
Any foreign personal representative may exercise in Maryland all powers of his office, and may sue and be sued in Maryland, subject to any statute or rule relating to nonresidents.
Neither party requested an evidentiary hearing, and none was held. The trial court, upon "consideration of all submitted pleadings, the record and applicable case law and statutes," issued a memorandum opinion and order granting Kass's motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, finding "[t]he only basis for bringing suit in Maryland is that the Estate's Personal Representative is a Maryland resident."2
Judgment was entered on April 25, 2007, and Kortobi noted his timely appeal, asking:
Did the trial court err in granting appellee's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction over the personal representative of the estate?
In our review of a grant of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, we must determine "whether the trial court was legally correct in its decision to dismiss the action." Bond v. Messerman, 391 Md. 706, 718, 895 A.2d 990 (2006) (citing Beyond Systems, Inc. v. Realtime Gaming Holding Co., 388 Md. 1, 12-29, 878 A.2d 567 (2005); Jason Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Jianas Bros. Packaging Co., Inc., 94 Md.App. 425, 431-34, 617 A.2d 1125 (1993)).
Jurisdiction over a foreign or domestic estate is typically based on in rem jurisdiction theories. The State has the right "`to subject all property within its borders to its laws'" Livingston v. Naylor, 173 Md.App. 488, 514, 920 A.2d 34 (2007) (quoting Belcher v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co., 282 Md. 718, 720, 387 A.2d 770 (1978)). The question of whether there is property within the court's territorial reach that will provide a jurisdictional base "is a simple one since the situs of realty or tangible personalty is not difficult to determine." Id. In the case before us, however, there is no question that the circuit court lacked in rem jurisdiction over the Estate, and neither party asserts a claim to the contrary.
Instead, Kortobi contends that Kass's Maryland residence gives Maryland in personam jurisdiction over the Leach Estate. Kortobi contends that "[i]t cannot be disputed that Brian L. Kass, was the correct Defendant below," because "[t]he estate of a deceased person is not an entity known to the law, and is not a natural or artificial person but is merely a name indicating the sum total of assets and liabilities of a decedent." Therefore, Kortobi maintains, a personal jurisdiction, or minimum contacts, analysis is unnecessary. He asserts:
Clearly, whether the Estate itself has any contacts with the State of Maryland is irrelevant to the determination of personal jurisdiction over the Personal Representative of the Estate. Clearly, whether the decedent himself had sufficient contacts with the State of Maryland is also irrelevant to the issue before the court.
In sum, Kortobi concludes that Maryland would have jurisdiction over the Estate solely on the fortuitous basis of the residence of the personal representative.3
The trial court correctly viewed Kass as a foreign personal representative of the Leach Estate. A foreign personal representative is identified in Md.Code, Estates and Trusts § 5-502(a) and (b):
(a) Any foreign personal representative may exercise in Maryland all powers of his office, and may sue and be sued in Maryland, subject to any statute or rule relating to nonresidents.
(b) A foreign personal representative has the same power to sell, mortgage, lease, convey, or otherwise transfer or assign real property or an interest in the property which is located in Maryland as a Maryland personal representative has with respect to real property and an interest in the property.
(Emphasis added).
Our research has disclosed no Maryland authority to answer whether the Maryland residence, absent more, of a foreign personal representative creates personal jurisdiction over the foreign estate. Other jurisdictions have dealt with this issue, and provide helpful guidance, which we shall discuss, infra. First, however, we discuss the effect of Trusts and Estates § 5-502.
In Tribbitt v. State, 403 Md. 638, 645-46, 943 A.2d 1260 (2008), the Court of Appeals summarized the fundamental rules of statutory interpretation:
The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the Legislature. Statutory construction begins with the plain language of the statute, and ordinary, popular understanding of the English language dictates interpretation of its terminology. Bowen v. City of Annapolis, 402 Md. 587, 613, 937 A.2d 242 (2007) (quoting Kushell v. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 563, 576-78, 870 A.2d 186 (2005)). "When construing a statute, we recognize that it `should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory.'" Collins v. State, 383 Md. 684, 691, 861 A.2d 727 (2004) (quoting James v. Butler, 378 Md. 683, 696, 838 A.2d 1180 (2003)). We will "neither add nor delete language so as to reflect an intent not evidenced in the plain and unambiguous language of the statute...." Price v. State, 378 Md. 378, 387, 835 A.2d 1221 (2003).
If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, "the inquiry as to legislative intent ends; we do not then need to resort to the various, and sometimes inconsistent, external rules of construction, for `the Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant.'" The Arundel Corp. v. Marie, 383 Md. 489, 502, 860 A.2d 886, (2004) (quoting Toler v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 373 Md. 214, 220, 817 A.2d 229 (2003)). "If, however, the meaning of the plain language is ambiguous or unclear, we seek to discern legislative intent from surrounding circumstances, such as legislative history, prior case law, and the purposes upon which the statutory framework was based." Lewis v. State, 348 Md. 648, 653, 705 A.2d 1128 (1998) (citing Haupt v. State, 340 Md. 462, 471, 667 A.2d 179 (1995)).
The language of Estates and Trusts § 5-202(a) appears to create ambiguity in a situation such as that before us, where the "foreign" personal representative is actually a resident of Maryland. Because we find uncertainty in the wording of the statute, we look to the legislative history of Estates and Trusts § 5-202(a). Section 5-502 was formerly Md.Code, Article 93, § 5-202.4 The comment to Art. 93, § 5-502, (1969 Rep. Vol.) is instructive:
This Section adopts the basic theory of The Uniform Powers of Foreign Representatives Act. The new statute also repeals § 87, which gave to District of Columbia personal representatives certain powers given to Maryland personal representatives. The powers of a District of Columbia or any foreign representative...
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