Koskoff v. Goldman

• Decision Date: 19 December 1912
• Citation: 86 Conn. 415,85 A. 588
• Parties: KOSKOFF v. GOLDMAN.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

85 A. 588

86 Conn. 415

KOSKOFF

v. GOLDMAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

Dec. 19, 1912.

Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; William L. Bennett, Judge.

Action by Isaac Koskoff, administrator, against Albert Goldman. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. No error.

Action to recover damages for personal injuries resulting in the death of the plaintiff's intestate and alleged to have been caused by the defendant's negligence, brought to the superior court in New Haven county and tried to the jury before Bennett, J. Verdict and judgment for the plaintiff for $3,500, and appeal by the defendant.

July 4, 1910, the defendant was, and for a considerable period of time had been, the owner of premises known as No. 448 Congress street in the city of New Haven. In the rear of these premises was a three-story building. The lower floor was occupied by the defendant as a place of business; the two upper floors as tenements by different tenants. Entrance to the tenements was by a stairway on the outside of the building leading from the ground to a landing place which was substantially on a level with the second floor of the building. This stairway ran parallel to the wall, and was built close to It The steps extended straight out from the building, except that the four upper ones were carried in a curve, so that a person ascending the stairs was, when he reached the top step, brought face to face with a door leading into the building, and stood upon a landing which was of the size and shape of one of the curved steps. This door was close to the southwest corner of the building, and furnished the only means of access to the tenements in the building. The occupants of the upper floor tenement in reaching their apartments, having passed through the door, ascended a flight of interior stairs. All persons entering or leaving either of the tenements were compelled to pass up or down this outside stairway, over the landing which the upper step provided, and through this door, and the stairway, landing, and door were used in common by all the occupants of the two tenements.

The stairway and landing were covered by a roof supported by wooden columns extending practically the entire length of the building, thus giving the external appearance of a second-story porch. Surrounding it on the three sides not against the building was a railing with upright spindles. This railing ran from post to post on the side, and from end post to a pilaster fastened to the wall at the two ends. These end railings were about 3 1/2 feet in length. The upper step or landing, like the three below it, was, on the inner side of the curve of the stairs, somewhat narrower than the other steps, and on the outside somewhat wider. The outer or wider end was next to the south end railing, which joined the house a few inches from the doorway. This railing was held in place by being attached to the pilaster and corner post. The landing step was about 12 feet above the ground, which, directly under this end of the railing, was covered with solid pavement.

On said date the plaintiff's intestate, Shendall Koskoff, her husband, and children occupied the second floor tenement, and for some six months had been its tenants. Prior to that time they had lived in the tenement above. About 3 o'clock in the afternoon of that day Mrs. Koskoff took the tablecloth from the table where the family had been eating, and, with it in her hand, stepped out of the entrance door onto the landing step. A moment or two later she fell through the end railing described, carrying it away with her in her fall, and struck the pavement below, with the result that she received injuries from which she died that night.

The above facts were uncontroverted. The plaintiff offered evidence to prove, in addition, that the railing which gave way was at the time, and for a considerable time had been, in an unfit and dangerous condition by reason of its insecure and improper construction, want of repair, and rotten condition; that the stairway and landing were thereby rendered unsafe for their intended use in connection with the tenement which the intestate occupied; that this unfit and unsafe condition of the railing, stairway, and landing was and for some time had been known, or ought to have been known, to the defendant; that this condition was occasioned by the defendant's negligence; and that Mrs. Koskoff's injuries and death were due directly to it. Evidence of two witnesses was presented to the effect that complaint of the defective condition of the railing had been made to the defendant on Mrs. Koskoff's behalf about six weeks before the accident.

The defendant offered testimony to disprove these charges. Included in, it was testimony tending to show that any weakness which may have existed in the railing on July 4th was caused by hard and improper usage to which the Koskoff family and its guests had subjected it during the two or three days immediately preceding, and of which the defendant had no knowledge. He denied the receipt of complaints about the condition of it, and all knowledge or suspicion that it was not in proper condition at any time. He also testified and offered a witness to corroborate him that only a few weeks before Mrs. Koskoff's fall he had employed a carpenter of long experience to look over the building generally and the approaches in particular to see what repairs ought to be made, and to make them. He also contended that he was under no obligation to keep the stairway and railing in repair, and not liable for its nonrepair. The only testimony as to Mrs. Koskoff's movements and conduct between the time she passed out of the door with the tablecloth and the time when she was on her way to the ground was that recited in the opinion.

Spotswood D. Bowers, of Bridgeport, and Benjamin Slade, of New Haven, for appellant.

Robert C. Stoddard, of New Haven, for appellee.

PRENTICE, J. (after stating the facts as above). The defendant says that the court erred in refusing to set aside the verdict An examination of the evidence leads us to the contrary conclusion.

The jury might reasonably have found the defendant guilty of negligence. Evidence was before it upon which it reasonably might have found that the railing in question had for a considerable time been in an unfit and dangerous condition; that some six weeks prior to the accident complaint of that condition had been made to the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff's intestate; that the defendant had then promised to repair it that thereafter nothing was done in that direction beyond possibly the driving of a nail or two; that, whatever was done, the attempted reparation was negligently and improperly done and wholly inadequate; that the unfit and dangerous condition remained; that this continuing condition was readily discoverable and would have been discovered at any time by...