Koslow v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, No. 01-2782.
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (3rd Circuit) |
Writing for the Court | Scirica |
Citation | 302 F.3d 161 |
Parties | George KOSLOW, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA d/b/a Department of Corrections; Donald T. Vaughn; PHICO Services Company; CompServices, Inc. |
Docket Number | No. 01-2782. |
Decision Date | 21 August 2002 |
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v.
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA d/b/a Department of Corrections; Donald T. Vaughn; PHICO Services Company; CompServices, Inc.
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Jeffrey Campolongo (Argued), Thomas M. Holland, Grace Hall, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellant.
Seth M. Galanter (Argued), Sarah E. Harrington, United States Department of Justice, Appellate Section, Washington, D.C., for Intervenor-Appellant, United States of America.
John G. Knorr, III (Argued), Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Department of Justice, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellees, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania d/b/a Department of Corrections; Donald T. Vaughn.
Elizabeth A. Malloy (Argued), Klett, Rooney, Lieber & Schorling, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee, PHICO Services Company.
Howard R. Flaxman (Argued), Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellee, CompServices, Inc.
Before: SCIRICA and ROSENN, Circuit Judges, and WARD, District Judge*.
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge.
In this disability discrimination case under the Rehabilitation Act, the principal issue on appeal is whether the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania waived its sovereign immunity by accepting certain federal funds for the Department of Corrections. We will reverse in part and affirm in part.
In October 1988, George Koslow was hired by the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections as a water treatment plant supervisor for the State Correctional Institute in Graterford, Pennsylvania ("SCI-Graterford"), a state prison receiving federal funds under the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program (SCAAP). On June 6, 1995, Koslow injured his lower back loading eighty-pound salt bags into SCI-Graterford's industrial water softener, then reinjured his back performing the same task in September 1995 and November 1996. On each occasion Koslow notified SCI-Graterford's Human Resources Department of his condition, requesting relief from lifting the salt bags and walking stairs. On June 10, 1997, after an investigation, SCI-Graterford officials informed Koslow he either had to return to work at full duty or be placed on workers' compensation leave. Koslow chose the former, remaining in a position at work that required stair climbing. On February 29, 2000, he was dismissed for being unable to perform "essential functions" of his job.1
Koslow alleged the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and SCI-Graterford Superintendent Donald Vaughn (collectively, the "Commonwealth defendants") refused to accommodate his disability, violating the Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 951 et seq. Koslow also alleged PHICO Services Co. and CompServices, Inc., his past and present worker's compensation administrators, had wrongfully processed his compensation claims.2 He sought reinstatement and damages.
The District Court granted summary judgment to PHICO and CompServices on Koslow's PHRA and ADA claims, finding that as "agents" of Koslow's "employers," they played no decisionmaking role regarding Koslow's employment. The District Court stayed the remainder of Koslow's action pending resolution of Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed.2d 866 (2001), then before the United States Supreme Court, which held Congress's abrogation of states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under Title I of the ADA was invalid. Id. at 965-68.
With the benefit of Garrett and after further briefing, the District Court granted the Commonwealth defendants' motions for summary judgment on Koslow's ADA claims. The District Court found neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act abrogated the Commonwealth's sovereign immunity. It also held the Commonwealth defendants had not waived sovereign immunity on the Rehabilitation Act claims. Therefore, Koslow could not state valid Title I claims against the Department of Corrections under either statute. Nor, the District Court found, could Koslow pursue injunctive relief against SCI-Graterford
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Superintendent Vaughn under Title I of the ADA. After disposing of Koslow's Title I claims, the District Court also dismissed Koslow's claim under Title II of the ADA. The latter claim is not pursued on appeal.3 As noted, the District Court had already dismissed Koslow's PHRA claims against PHICO and CompServices, holding they had played no "decisionmaking" role. This appeal focuses solely on Koslow's Rehabilitation Act claims against the Commonwealth defendants, his Title I claim for injunctive relief under the ADA against SCI-Graterford Superintendent Vaughn, and his PHRA claims against PHICO and CompServices.
The District Court had jurisdiction over Koslow's federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and supplemental jurisdiction on his state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
Certain background information on the federal fiscal connection to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, Koslow's employer, is essential here. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania receives federal funds for various designated purposes. From November 1996 through February 2000, at least forty-two federal grants were provided to the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.4 The Commonwealth identifies twenty-five of those federal grants as "programs with multiple years of
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funding." One such "multiple year" program is the State Criminal Alien Assistance Program, originally established to alleviate costs states incur when illegal aliens commit state crimes and are imprisoned in state correctional facilities. Despite its stated purpose, funds received under SCAAP are not necessarily directed by the Department of Corrections toward costs for imprisoned illegal aliens. Nor need the Department of Corrections track these funds or report to the federal government where the funds are allocated. 62 Fed.Reg. 35,232 (June 30, 1997).
The record demonstrates the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania accepted federal funds under SCAAP in 1996, 1997, 1998, and 1999, the relevant dates of this litigation. The parties stipulated the Commonwealth disbursed all of those funds to the Department of Corrections.5 Despite the stipulation, the exact amount of the federal contribution under SCAAP to the Department of Corrections or to SCI-Graterford is not part of the record.
The most difficult issue in this appeal is whether the Commonwealth defendants waived their sovereign immunity to suit on Koslow's federal Rehabilitation Act claims. There are three related, yet separate and independent, issues — whether the Commonwealth's acceptance of SCAAP funds means it waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity for Rehabilitation Act suits against a department receiving those funds; whether the Rehabilitation Act, especially 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7, imposes an "unconstitutional condition" on the Commonwealth's receipt of federal funds; and whether the Rehabilitation Act is valid legislation under the Spending Clause. We exercise plenary review over these questions of law, Blanciak v. Allegheny Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 694 (3d Cir.1996), and, more generally, over the grant of summary judgment. Doe v. County of Centre, 242 F.3d 437, 446 (3d Cir.2001).
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. The Eleventh Amendment does not explicitly apply to cases that do not involve "Citizens of another State" or "Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996) ("the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts"). But as the Supreme Court has held for over a century, see Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890), the Eleventh Amendment confirms a broader "background principle of state sovereign immunity." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, 116 S.Ct. 1114.
As developed, the Eleventh Amendment provides states with immunity not only from suits brought by citizens of other states, but also from suits brought by their own citizens. Hans, 134 U.S. at 13-14, 10 S.Ct. 504. Recent cases have emphasized the Eleventh Amendment's
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embodiment of this common law doctrine. E.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999); P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145-46, 113 S.Ct. 684, 121 L.Ed.2d 605 (1993) (declaring the Eleventh Amendment a "fundamental constitutional protection ... rooted in a recognition that the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity ... [and] respect owed them as members of the federation").
But a state's Eleventh Amendment protection from federal suits — whether brought by citizens of their state or another — is not absolute. Two established exceptions to the Eleventh Amendment's bar permit individuals to sue states. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670, 119 S.Ct. 2219, 144 L.Ed.2d 605 (1999). First, Congress may authorize such a suit under its power "to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment — an Amendment enacted after the Eleventh Amendment and specifically designed to alter the federal-state balance." Id. (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976)). Under this exception, Congress...
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