Kosmicki v. State
| Decision Date | 08 November 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. S-01-508.,S-01-508. |
| Citation | 652 N.W.2d 883,264 Neb. 887 |
| Parties | Angela KOSMICKI, Appellee and Cross-Appellant, v. STATE of Nebraska, Department of Health and Human Services, and Ron Ross, director, Appellants and Cross-Appellees. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Don Stenberg, Attorney General, Michael J. Rumbaugh, Special Assistant Attorney General, Royce N. Harper, and Michele M. Lewon, Senior Certified Law Student, for appellants.
Rebecca L. Gould, D. Milo Mumgaard, and Sue Ellen Wall, of Nebraska Appleseed Center for Law in the Public Interest, Inc., for appellee.
The Welfare Reform Act (Act), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 68-1708 et seq. (Reissue 1996 & Cum.Supp.2000), limits recipients of public assistance to no more than 2 years of cash assistance and generally requires that while receiving cash assistance benefits, recipients engage in certain approved work-related activities. Full-time postsecondary education is among the work-related activities acceptable under the Act. The question presented in this appeal is whether Angela Kosmicki's pursuit of a bachelor's degree meets the work activity requirement of the Act when the evidence does not show that Kosmicki will be self-sufficient prior to the expiration of the 2-year cash assistance benefit limitation.
On September 16, 1998, while Kosmicki was living in Scottsbluff, Nebraska, she applied for public assistance benefits from the Nebraska Department of Health and Human Services (Department) for herself and her son. On November 9, Kosmicki signed a self-sufficiency contract, as required by the Act. Kosmicki's service plan required her to complete an associate degree at Western Nebraska Community College.
In August 1999, Kosmicki moved to Lincoln, Nebraska, to join her newborn daughter's father. In February 2000, Kosmicki left Lincoln to escape an abusive relationship, returned to Scottsbluff, and reapplied for benefits. In April, Kosmicki moved to a domestic violence shelter in Lincoln, and Kosmicki's public assistance case was transferred to the Lincoln office of the Department. On May 12, a new service plan was concluded with the Department in which Kosmicki would do an independent job search, but if her job search was unsuccessful, Kosmicki would attend workshops at Curtis & Associates, Inc.
Kosmicki did not attend required workshops at Curtis & Associates and telephoned her caseworker on June 20, 2000, to inform him that she wished to complete her education and was trying to enroll at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln (UNL). By this time, a total of 8 months had elapsed of the 24 months of cash assistance benefits to which Kosmicki was limited under the Act. Kosmicki's caseworker informed her that if she could not complete a degree program at UNL before reaching her 2-year time limit for cash assistance benefits, then Kosmicki would have to engage in at least 30 hours per week of other approved work activity in order to remain eligible for cash assistance. If, on the other hand, Kosmicki could receive a degree from UNL within the 2-year cash assistance limitation period, Kosmicki's status as a full-time student would satisfy her work activity requirement under the Act.
Kosmicki, at the time, had four to five semesters to complete at UNL before receiving a bachelor's degree. Because Kosmicki could not complete a degree before the end of the 2-year cash assistance limitation period, Kosmicki's caseworker informed her that she could not attend UNL. Kosmicki was told, however, that she would be allowed to complete her associate degree at Southeast Community College. Kosmicki refused to sign a new self-sufficiency contract under the terms offered by the Department.
In July 2000, Kosmicki was informed that as of August 1, 2000, her aid to dependent children payments and medical assistance would stop, although her food stamps would increase to $302 per month, as the result of an initial sanction imposed under the Act. Kosmicki appealed, and the director of the Department affirmed the sanction.
Kosmicki appealed to the district court under the Administrative Procedure Act, generally raising two arguments. Kosmicki argued that her self-sufficiency contract with the Department was void because the contract was involuntary on her part and that the Department erred in concluding that Kosmicki could not attend UNL. The district court found that the contract was valid, but concluded that the Department had erred in concluding that attending UNL would not be an acceptable work activity pursuant to the Act and the Department's regulations. The district court remanded the case to the Department for the negotiation of a new self-sufficiency contract consistent with the district court's order. The State appeals.
The State's sole assignment of error is that the district court erred in concluding that Kosmicki was entitled to renegotiate a new self-sufficiency contract that included Kosmicki's attending UNL, because Kosmicki cannot complete a degree within the 2-year time limit on her cash assistance benefits. On cross-appeal, Kosmicki assigns that the district court erred in concluding that there was no duress, coercion, and intimidation on the part of the Department
when the contract formation process outlined by statute and [Department] regulations, and designed to equalize the extreme disparity in bargaining power between low-income families and the State ... are not followed, and the applicant family is finally forced to accept a contract containing standard clauses that do not reflect the interests and barriers of the applicant family.
A judgment or final order rendered by a district court in a judicial review pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act may be reversed, vacated, or modified by an appellate court for errors appearing on the record. Hauser v. Nebraska Police Stds. Adv. Council, 264 Neb. 605, 650 N.W.2d 760 (2002). When reviewing an order of a district court under the Administrative Procedure Act for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id. In an appeal under the Administrative Procedure Act, an appellate court will not substitute its factual findings for those of the district court where competent evidence supports the district court's findings. City of Omaha v. Kum & Go, 263 Neb. 724, 642 N.W.2d 154 (2002).
To the extent that the meaning and interpretation of statutes and regulations are involved, questions of law are presented, in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below. Id. However, an appellate court accords deference to an agency's interpretation of its own regulations unless that interpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent. See CenTra, Inc. v. Chandler Ins. Co., 248 Neb. 844, 540 N.W.2d 318 (1995). See, also, Capitol City Telephone v. Nebraska Dept. of Rev., 264 Neb. 515, 650 N.W.2d 467 (2002).
The intent of the Act was, in part, to reform the welfare system to remove disincentives to work, promote economic self-sufficiency, and provide individuals and families the support needed to move from public assistance to economic self-sufficiency. See § 68-1709. The Act was intended to change public assistance from entitlements to temporary, "contract-based" support, accomplished through individualized assessments of the personal and economic resources of the applicant and the use of individualized self-sufficiency "contracts." See § 68-1709. To that end, the Act limits recipients of public assistance to no more than 2 years of cash assistance and generally requires that while receiving cash assistance benefits, recipients engage in certain approved work-related activities, which can include full-time postsecondary education.
When an individual or family applies for public assistance benefits, a comprehensive assessment of the applicant's personal and financial assets is conducted by the Department. Based on the results of the assessment, the applicant and Department case manager are to develop a self-sufficiency contract, built upon the premise of urgent action, and detailing the responsibilities, roles, and expectations of the applicant family, the case manager, and other service providers. See §§ 68-1719 and 68-1720. Cash assistance may be provided for a period of time not to exceed a total of 2 years for recipient families, absent certain exceptions which are not pertinent to this appeal. See § 68-1724. Cash assistance is also provided only while recipients are actively engaged in the specific work-related activities outlined in the self-sufficiency contract. § 68-1723.
Under the self-sufficiency contract, the principal wage earner and other nonexempt members of the applicant family are "required to participate in one or more of the following: Education, job skills training, work experience, job search, or employment." § 68-1721(1). Education consists of "the general education development program, high school, Adult Basic Education, English as a Second Language, postsecondary education, or other education programs approved in the contract." (Emphasis supplied.) § 68-1721(2). A regulation of the Department, 468 Neb. Admin. Code, ch. 2, § 020.06B1 (1997), provides, in relevant part:
Post-secondary education is limited to that which is directly related to the fulfillment of an individual's vocational goal. The participant can participate in postsecondary education for up to 24 months.... A postsecondary education program that can be included in the Self Sufficiency Contract should be for occupations that facilitate economic self-sufficiency. In order for postsecondary education to be...
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