Koster v. Koster

• Citation: 81 A.2d 355,137 Conn. 707
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 22 May 1951
• Parties: KOSTER v. KOSTER. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 355

81 A.2d 355

137 Conn. 707

KOSTER v. KOSTER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 22, 1951.

Joseph J. McGuinness, Guilford, for appellant.

Donald F. Keefe and Claire, Sweany, New Haven, for appellee.

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and TROLAND ^*, JJ.

BALDWIN, Judge.

The defendant secured a judgment of divorce against the plaintiff in a Nevada district court on June 4, 1945. He now claims, on technical grounds, that that judgment, obtained on his complaint, is not enforceable in Connecticut. The facts are undisputed. The defendant had previously brought an action for divorce in the Supreme Court of New York. Pending the latter action, the parties entered into agreements which provided: Beginning with May, 1945, the defendant was to pay the plaintiff $350 a month for the support of herself and three minor children. If the action in New York proceeded to trial, the agreements were to be null and void, but if a decree of separation or divorce was rendered in any other jurisdiction the agreements were to be embodied in that decree and made a part thereof, such decree superseding them. If the plaintiff was required to bring suit to enforce the agreements either separately or as a part of the judgment and was successful, she was to recover the reasonable value of the services of her counsel as fixed by the court and included as a part of the judgment. The agreements were to be interpreted in accordance with the law of the state of New York.

The Nevada judgment recited, with reference to these agreements, that 'the parties thereto entered into the same freely and voluntarily, with a full knowledge of the financial circumstances of each other; that said agreements be, and the same are hereby, ratified, approved, adopted and confirmed, and made a part of this Decree as if the same were herein set out in haec verba.' It further ordered that the parties abide by the agreements and that by them 'all rights of property of the parties are settled and adjusted and are decreed in accordance therewith.' In May, 1946, the parties entered into a further agreement whereby the defendant advanced money to the plaintiff for the purchase of a house and took back a second mortgage which the plaintiff agreed to pay by permitting the defendant to deduct $50 from each monthly allowance for support and maintenance beginning in June, 1946. The defendant defaulted in the payment of the full amount of the allowance for support and the plaintiff brought suit on the judgment. The trial court rendered judgment for $4977, which included $3900 due for support on the basis of $300 per month, with interest computed at $327, and, in addition, $750 for the reasonable value of the services of plaintiff's counsel. The judgment was for amounts due to the date thereof rather than to the institution of the action, but no error is assigned on that score. The defendant appealed.

The assignments of error raise the question of the enforceability of the Nevada decree in the courts of this state. The defendant claims that it is not a judgment which is entitled to full faith and credit under article IV, § 1, of the federal constitution because it contains no order for the payment of a sum certain but merely incorporates by reference a separation agreement made by the parties; because the terms of the separation agreement could be and were in fact amended by the parties subsequent to the date of the judgment; and because the judgment provides for the payment of an indefinite sum for attorneys' fees should an action be successfully brought thereon.

This is an action upon a judgment. Unless there are jurisdictional difficulties, we must give to the judgment the same effect as it has in the state where it was rendered. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584, 71 S.Ct. 474; Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355, 68 S.Ct. 1087, 92 L.Ed. 1429; 3 Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.) p. 2863. The Nevada court was not bound to accept the parties' written agreements. It could however incorporate them in the judgment and by so doing adopt their terms as its own. The legal effect of incorporating the agreements was to merge them with the judgment and make them a part thereof. Lewis v. Lewis, 53 Nev. 398, 411, 2 P.2d 131; Aseltine v. Second Judicial District Court, 57 Nev. 269, 272, 274, 62 P.2d 701. A like interpretation and effect have been given to such decrees in other courts. Douglas v. Willcuts, 296 U.S. 1, 7, 56 S.Ct. 59, 80 L.Ed. 3; Fleming v. Yoke, D.C., 53 F.Supp. 552, 554; Maginnis v. Mgainnis, 323 Ill. 113, 118, 153 N.E. 654; Warren v. Warren, 116 Minn. 458, 459, 460, 133 N.W. 1009. As a matter of fact, this legal effect is what the parties intended by the very terms of their agreements.

While contracts between husband and wife regarding property settlements entered into prior to instituting proceedings for divorce should be carefully examined, they are not necessarily contrary to public policy and void unless concealed from the court. If submitted to the court for approval with full opportunity for scrutiny and ascertainment of the facts, they are unobjectionable. Lasprogato v. Lasprogato, 127 Conn. 510, 513, 514, 18 A.2d 353; Weil v. Poulsen, 121 Conn. 281, 286, 184 A. 580.

The defendant complains that the Nevada decree does not set out the terms of the agreements in the judgment file itself but incorporates them by reference. This form of judgment is approved in Nevada and while we may prefer some other we are bound to give it validity and effect. Aseltine v. Second Judicial District Court, 57 Nev. 269, 271 272, 62 P.2d 701; Miller v. Superior Court, 9 Cal.2d 733, 738, 72 P.2d 868; 1 Nelson, Divorce & Annulment (2d Ed.) § 13.48.

While the Nevada decree does not upon its face set forth a fixed sum of money as representing the final obligation of...