Kosterlitz v. Klu, Case No: 2:18-cv-482-FtM-29MRM
| Decision Date | 17 January 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2:18-cv-482-FtM-29MRM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
| Parties | MICHAEL KOSTERLITZ, Plaintiff, v. THE S/V KNOTTA KLU, her engines, tackle, apparel, equipment and appurtenances, in rem and ROBERT E. LIBBEY, JR., Defendants. |
This matter comes before the Court on the plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. #75) filed on December 3, 2018. Defendant filed a Response (Doc. #77) on December 21, 2018, and plaintiff filed a Reply to the Response (Doc. #81) on January 4, 2019.
The central issue in this case is who owns the Knotta Klu, a 40-foot catamaran. After a failed attempt to repossess the vessel from defendant Robert Libbey, Jr., plaintiff Michael Kosterlitz initiated this action on March 9, 2018, by asserting a petitory and possessory claim in admiralty, as well as claims for malicious prosecution, civil theft, conversion, and false arrest. (Doc. #1, pp. 7-14.) In response, Libbey filed a countercomplaint asserting his own petitory and possessory action, as well as raising claims of conversion and unjust enrichment. (Doc. #15, pp. 8-11.) Kosterlitz now moves for summary judgment on his malicious prosecution, civil theft, and false arrest claims, as well as Libbey's affirmative defenses. (Doc. #75.) For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied and the affirmative defenses are stricken.
Summary judgment is appropriate only when the Court is satisfied that "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "An issue of fact is 'genuine' if the record taken as a whole could lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party." Hickson Corp. v. N. Crossarm Co., Inc., 357 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). A fact is "material" if it may affect the outcome of the suit under governing law. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "A court must decide 'whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.'" Hickson, 357 F.3d at 1260 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court views all evidence and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Tana v. Dantanna's, 611 F.3d 767, 772 (11th Cir.2010). Further, "[i]f reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed facts, then the court should deny summary judgment." St. Charles Foods, Inc. v. America's Favorite Chicken Co., 198 F.3d 815, 819 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296-97 (11th Cir. 1983)). "If a reasonable fact finder evaluating the evidence could draw more than one inference from the facts, and if that inference introduces a genuine issue of material fact, then the court should not grant summary judgment." Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. for Bibb Cty., 495 F.3d 1306, 1315 (11th Cir. 2007).
Kosterlitz purchased the Knotta Klu in 2012. (Doc. #77-2, pp. 17-18.) To do so, he borrowed $125, 000 from non-party Ned Christensen, executing a promissory note on Christensen's behalf. (Doc. #77-1, pp. 11-15.) The note, which was signed by Kosterlitz in October 2012, contained a balloon payment at the end of five years. (Id. p. 15.)
In 2015, Kosterlitz and Libbey, who were friends, began negotiating for the sale of the Knotta Klu. (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 10-11; Doc. #15, ¶¶ 10-11.) In August 2015, Kosterlitz signed a State of Florida "Notice of Sale and/or Bill of Sale for a Motor Vehicle, Mobile Home, Off-Highway Vehicle or Vessel" form. (Doc. #15, pp. 13; Doc. #30-1, pp. 12-13.) The form lists Kosterlitz as the seller, Libbey as the buyer, and the selling price of the Knotta Klu as "TRADE FOR F27 TRIMARAN."2 (Doc. #15, p. 13.) Around this time the parties also entered into a "Sells Agreement," conveying the Knotta Klu, it's equipment, and its motor from Kosterlitz to Libbey for $17,500.3 (Doc. #77-3, p. 41.) The agreement contains the signatures of both Kosterlitz and Libbey but is not notarized. (Id.) Libbey also gave possession of his trimaran to Kosterlitzand began making payments either to or on behalf of Kosterlitz.4 (Doc. #1, ¶¶ 11, 12, 15; Doc. #15, ¶ 12, p. 8.) The Knotta Klu was moved from Kosterlitz' home in Pinellas County to Libbey's home in Fort Myers. (Doc. #77-2, pp. 28-30.)
In 2017, Libbey hired Jan Painter, an employee with All Yacht Registries, Inc. (Doc. #75-5, pp. 302, 304.) Painter informed Libbey that the vessel could not be registered with the United States Coast Guard because Kosterlitz' signature on the Sells Agreement was not notarized. (Id. p. 314-15.) Painter submitted a request for deletion from the Coast Guard registration regarding the Knotta Klu, relying on the Sells Agreement to show that Libbey was the legal owner of the vessel. (Id. pp. 319-20.) The Coast Guard notified Painter that the vessel was deleted from documentation in December 2016 due to a failure to renew. (Id. p. 325; Doc. #27-1, p. 14.) The last owner of record was Kosterlitz and the last certificate of documentation was issued in 2014. (Doc. #27-1, p. 14.) Painter informed Libbey that he could use the State of Florida bill of sale and the Coast Guard evidence ofdeletion to register the vessel in Florida.5 (Doc. #75-5, pp. 315, 331, 339.)
In September 2017, Libbey applied for a State of Florida certificate of title for the Knotta Klu. (Doc. #75-1, p, 38.) The application notes that Libbey acquired the vessel via trade in August 2015. (Id.) Libbey also supplied the evidence of deletion from the Coast Guard, the State of Florida bill of sale listing the selling price as "TRADE FOR F27 TRIMARAN," and a signed affidavit attesting that the Knotta Klu was an "EVEN TRADE" for the trimaran.6 (Id. pp. 40, 42, 44.) On September 21, 2017, the State of Florida issued a certificate of title to Libbey for the Knotta Klu. (Doc. #15, p. 15.)
On December 26, 2017, Kosterlitz went to Libbey's residence in Fort Myers and removed the vessel. (Doc. #1, ¶ 19; Doc. #15, p. 8.) Libbey contacted the Coast Guard, who in turn contacted the Lee County Sheriff's Office. (Doc. #75-2, p. 119.) Sergeant Tim Galloway of LCSO met with Libbey and took a sworn recorded statement. (Id.; Doc. #77-8, p. 59-82.) Libbey informed Sergeant Galloway that he was the registered owner of the Knotta Klu andshowed Sergeant Galloway the Sells Agreement. (Doc. #75-2, p. 119; Doc. #77-8, pp. 62, 64.) He also told Sergeant Galloway that all the signatures on the documentation were genuine and Libbey had never forged Kosterlitz' signature. (Doc. #77-8, p. 73.) Sergeant Galloway compared Kosterlitz' signature on the agreement to the signature on his driver's license and believed they matched. (Doc. #75-2, pp. 68, 135.) Libbey informed Sergeant Galloway that he wished to prosecute and signed an affidavit to that effect. (Id. pp. 82, 152.)
The same day it was removed, the Knotta Klu was returned to Libbey's residence, (Doc. #1, ¶ 4; Doc. #15, p. 1), and Kosterlitz was arrested for grand theft, (Doc. #75-2, pp. 83, 127-30.) However, an assistant state attorney for the 20th Judicial Circuit subsequently determined the charge was legally insufficient to prosecute. (Doc. #75-2, p. 116; Doc. #75-4, pp. 254-55.) Since being returned, the Knotta Klu has remained birthed at Libbey's residence. (Doc. #1, ¶ 4.)
In March 2018, Kosterlitz filed a Verified Complaint asserting a petitory and possessory right to the Knotta Klu, as well as claims against Libbey for malicious prosecution, civil theft, conversion, and false arrest. (Doc. #1, pp. 7-14.) In response, Libbey filed a Verified Countercomplaint asserting his own petitory and possessory right to the vessel, in addition toraising claims against Kosterlitz for conversion and unjust enrichment. (Doc. #15, pp. 8-11.) Libbey also raised two affirmative defenses based on Kosterlitz conveying title of the Knotta Klu and accepting Libbey's cash, trimaran, and assumption of the promissory note. (Id. p. 5.)
In April 2018, Kosterlitz filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or Alternatively Summary Judgment as to the two petitory and possessory actions, as well as Libbey's conversion claim. (Doc. #18.) The Court denied the motion after finding there were genuine disputes of material fact as to (1) whether Kosterlitz and Libbey entered into a contractual agreement to convey the Knotta Klu and (2) the validity of Libbey's State of Florida certificate of title for the vessel.7 (Doc. #74, pp. 10-13.)
On December 3, 2018, Kosterlitz filed the instant motion seeking partial summary judgment. (Doc. #75.) He argues that regardless of whether there are material facts in dispute as to whether he and Libbey had an enforceable contract for the Knotta Klu, Libbey is liable as a matter of law for malicious prosecution, civil theft, and false arrest. (Id. p. 2.) He also argues that he is entitled to summary judgment on Libbey's two affirmativedefenses. (Id. pp. 17-20.) Kosterlitz' arguments will be addressed in turn.
Count Two of Kosterlitz' Verified Complaint alleges Libbey engaged in malicious prosecution. (Doc. #1, pp. 11-12.) To prevail on a claim of malicious prosecution under Florida law, a plaintiff must establish the following elements:
(1) an original criminal or civil judicial proceeding against the present plaintiff was commenced or continued; (2) the present defendant was the legal cause of the original proceeding against the present plaintiff as the defendant in the original proceeding; (3) the termination of the original proceeding constituted a bona fide termination of that proceeding in favor of the present plaintiff; (4) there was an absence of probable cause for the original proceeding; (5) there was malice on the part of the present defendant;...
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