Kota v. Little, Civ. No. 914.

• Decision Date: 29 September 1971
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 914.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
• Parties: Veeriah V. KOTA, Plaintiff, v. Hal W. LITTLE et al., Defendants.

351 F. Supp. 1059

Veeriah V. KOTA, Plaintiff, v. Hal W. LITTLE et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 914.

United States District Court, E. D. North Carolina, Fayetteville Division.

September 29, 1971.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Adam Stein, J. LeVonne Chambers, Chambers, Stein, Ferguson & Lanning, Charlotte, N. C., for plaintiff.

Burley B. Mitchell, Jr., Staff Atty., Department of Justice, Raleigh, N. C., for defendants.

DUPREE, District Judge.

This case arises upon plaintiff's complaint under the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, for a declaratory judgment, injunctive relief and damages on behalf of himself and others similarly situated. The defendants are the members of the Board of Trustees of Pembroke State University at the time the complaint was filed, the President of the University, the Dean of the University, and the Chairman of the Department of Mathematics at the time the suit was instituted. Pembroke State University is an institution of higher education established and maintained by the State of North Carolina.¹

The day following the filing of the complaint plaintiff moved for a preliminary injunction (1) reinstating him in his former position pending a fair and impartial hearing on the alleged termination of his employment, and (2) enjoining the defendants from making any decision terminating his employment on the basis of race, color or national origin or for any arbitrary or capricious purpose. Defendants opposed the preliminary injunction and moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Plaintiff then amended his complaint, and defendants moved to strike the amendment. The parties responded to the foregoing motions and filed memoranda of authorities in support of their respective positions. Thereafter, the parties engaged in extensive discovery.

This cause came before the court for trial on August 12, 1971, in Wilmington, North Carolina. None of the above motions having been ruled upon, defendants filed their answer on the day of the trial. In their answer they denied the material allegations of plaintiff's complaint, challenged plaintiff's right to maintain this suit as a class action, and moved that their previous motion to dismiss be treated as a motion for summary judgment and that it be granted.

The only live testimony at the trial was that of the plaintiff, Dr. Kota. The parties jointly introduced depositions taken during the discovery period. Thus, the trial consisted of the depositions, answers to interrogatories, exhibits and the live testimony of the plaintiff. Following the trial the parties filed further memoranda of authorities in support of their positions.

Initially, a ruling must be made on the outstanding motions. At this time plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction is moot and, therefore, it is denied. Since plaintiff alleged that "his dismissal was based solely on his race and color and on the fact that he had sought to complain of the arbitrary and capricious practices of the defendants with respect to him . . .", he did state a claim under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983;² consequently, defendants' motion to dismiss is denied. The court is of the opinion that the amendment to the complaint merely amplifies and expands allegations in the complaint,³ and it is not "irrelevant, immaterial, remote, and incompetent"; accordingly, defendants' motion to strike the amendment is denied. As this case was tried and the court has examined some 525 pages of deposition testimony, defendants' motion to treat their motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment is denied. Moreover, since there has been no showing that anyone else was affected in the same or similar manner as the plaintiff by the acts of the defendants, this case is not a proper one for the maintenance of a class action under Rule 23.

At the trial plaintiff abandoned his allegations that the actions of the defendants were in any manner racially motivated.⁴ Thus, the sole issue for determination is whether the defendants violated procedural due process in failing to renew the plaintiff's contract of employment.

During the spring of 1965 plaintiff was appointed as a full professor of mathematics at Pembroke for the 1965-66 academic year. His appointment was based on credentials that he had supplied to Bryant Teachers Bureau, the agency through which the parties contacted each other. He was re-appointed to his position through the 1969-70 academic year with a salary increase for each year except the 1969-70 academic year, his last contract period. In December, 1969, the chairman of his department wrote a letter to Dean Kersh recommending that plaintiff not be reemployed following that academic year. Dean Kersh made a similar recommendation to President Jones. President Jones then wrote a letter to the plaintiff advising him that his contract with Pembroke would not be renewed at the end of that academic year. The plaintiff protested the non-renewal of his contract and asked for the specific reasons for such non-renewal. The specific reasons were not given at that time.⁵ Later the plaintiff appeared before the spring meeting of the Board of Trustees on March 20, 1970, to further protest the non-renewal of his contract. After plaintiff's presentation at this meeting the Board of Trustees voted to support the administration's recommendation not to renew his contract. Thereafter, plaintiff instituted the instant suit.

The resolution of the issue here is dependent upon plaintiff's legal relationship with Pembroke State University. In his complaint he alleged that he was a non-tenured professor, and he has contended throughout this litigation that he did not have tenure; however, he also contended that tenure was wrongfully withheld, so the resolution of this question requires further development.

Plaintiff contends that at the time he was hired by Pembroke for the 1965-66 academic year, he was led to believe that he would be granted tenure. The representations upon which plaintiff contends he relied were the provisions relating to tenure contained in the Faculty Handbook⁶ and assurances made to him by Warren I. Smith, then the academic dean at Pembroke.⁷ Furthermore, plaintiff showed that he had been recommended for tenure by Mr. Jacobs, the Chairman of his Department.⁸ On the other hand, the defendants contend that plaintiff never furnished satisfactory evidence of his background in mathematics to justify granting him tenure.⁹

Although the evidence discloses that the plaintiff was induced by the assurances of Dean Smith to relinquish another position to accept employment at Pembroke, there is no evidence to show that Smith had authority, either actual or implied, to make such representations, or that they were ever brought to the attention of those in a position to grant tenure. Thus, from the evidence the court concludes that the defendants did not wrongfully withhold tenure from the plaintiff, and that he was a nontenured professor.

Next, the plaintiff contends that even if he were a non-tenured professor, Pembroke had adopted regulations or standards of practice which gave him an expectation of re-employment.¹⁰ To create such an obligation the court in Ferguson, supra, relied upon the acts of the college in treating their action as a termination of employment rather than a decision not to offer a new or subsequent term of employment, and their concession that such a decision not to renew required a showing of cause. Neither of these actions is present here. To the contrary, Pembroke treated their action as a failure to renew plaintiff's term of employment, and they did not feel a necessity to show cause for their action.¹¹ In addition, the nature of the yearly contract renewals is revealing on this point. Each year Pembroke required plaintiff to sign a letter of intent indicating his plans with respect to employment for the next year, and each year a new contract was signed.

Furthermore, since the Ferguson case focused on the actions of the college to create a legal obligation, the actions of the plaintiff should likewise be examined. Upon such examination it is apparent that the actions of the plaintiff here during the fall semester of his last contract year were incompatible with the continuance of employment with Pembroke State University.¹²

Thus, from the evidence the court finds that the parties by their actions had not created the obligation of an expectation of employment. The court is of the opinion that the holding here is not inconsistent with the holding in Greene, supra, regarding contract interpretations and customary practices.

From the foregoing evidence and discussion the court finds that the plaintiff was a non-tenured professor at Pembroke, and that he did not have an expectation of re-employment. The plaintiff contends, however, that a non-tenured university professor is still entitled to a statement of the reasons for the non-renewal of his contract and the right to a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal on the non-renewal determination.¹³

What is involved here is the employment contract of a university professor that was renewable annually at the will of either party. The Pembroke administration gave plaintiff ample notice that they were recommending to the Board of Trustees that his contract not be renewed. There are no remaining contentions and there is no evidence that the administration considered any constitutionally impermissible factors such as race or the infringement of First Amendment freedoms in reaching their decision. In the absence of such impermissible factors the court holds that plaintiff was not constitutionally entitled to a statement of the reasons for the non-renewal determination and a hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal.¹⁴

This result is in accord with the balancing formula established by the Supreme Court for the requirements of due process in a given situation.¹⁵...