Kotzalas v. Svnicki
| Decision Date | 31 March 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-CV-2926-PWG |
| Parties | MARGARET KOTZALAS, Plaintiff, v. KRISTINE L. SVNICKI, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff Margaret Kotzalas filed this single count employment discrimination action on May 28, 2021. ECF 1, Compl. Defendant Kristine Svnicki is the Chairman of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (“NRC”) where Ms. Kotzalas worked for over 24 years. Id. In her Amended Complaint, Ms. Kotzalas alleges that she was demoted in retaliation for protected activity including filing complaints with the EEOC in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. ECF 15, Amend. Compl. Pending before me is the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Ms. Kotzalas's claims because, the Defendant argues, her Complaint was untimely filed. ECF 18, MTD. The Motion is fully briefed and I find that no hearing is necessary. See ECF 21 Opposition; ECF 24, Reply; Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons explained below, the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is DENIED.
Because the Defendant moves to dismiss purely on limitations grounds a brief summary of the underlying facts will suffice to provide the necessary context.
Ms Kotzalas began working at the NRC as a Reactor Engineer Intern, GG-9, in 1996. Amend. Compl. at ¶ 12. After 24 years at the NRC, Ms. Kotzalas had advanced to the role of Branch Chief, GG-0801-15, Licensing and Oversight Branch, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards, and Environmental Review, Office of Nuclear Materials Safety and Safeguards. Id. ¶ 10-15; ECF No. 18-7, Final Agency Decision (“FAD”) at 1. On September 4, 2019, following an investigation, the NRC provided Ms. Kotzalas with a Notice of Proposed Adverse Action (“Notice”), which proposed that Ms. Kotzalas be demoted to a non-supervisory position. Amend. Compl. ¶ 62; FAD at 6. The Notice identified three charges warranting Ms. Kotzalas's proposed demotion. FAD at 6. First, the Notice charged Ms. Kotzalas with conduct unbecoming a federal supervisor, namely, using inappropriate nicknames for members of her staff.[1] Id. Second, the Notice charged Ms. Kotzalas for failure to follow supervisory instructions. Id. This charge also related to Ms. Kotzalas's use of inappropriate nicknames, which Ms. Kotzalas had been counseled against in 2015. Id. Finally, the Notice charged Ms. Kotzalas with lack of candor in an official investigation for denying that she had used any inappropriate nickname in the office and claiming instead that she had used it only when socializing outside of work. Id.
Ms. Kotzalas alleges that each of the three charges in the Notice were “either untrue or trumped up to justify Ms. Kotzalas's demotion, which had been preordained since at least June 1 of 2018.” Amend. Compl. ¶ 63. Ms. Kotzalas claims that the allegations that she continually used inappropriate nicknames while acting in her official capacity were in fact concocted in retaliation for earlier protected conduct including: “(1) submit[ing] an EEO complaint of sex and race discrimination on her own behalf and on behalf of her staff in April 2018; (2) submit[ing] a harassment complaint around the same time; (3) amend[ing] her complaint in December 2018 [to include additional incidences of retaliation]; and (4) inform[ing] the NRC she retained counsel in February 2019.” Id. ¶ 113.
Ms. Kotzalas filed a formal complaint with the NRC on December 17, 2019. Id. ¶ 105. On August 14, 2020, the NRC issued its Final Agency Decision on Ms. Kotzalas's claims. Id. ¶ 109; FAD. The Final Agency Decision concluded that Ms. Kotzalas was “not subject to disparate treatment based on [her] gender when [she] was notified” that she was “being demoted from [her] position as Branch Chief, GG-0801-15” position, “to a GG-0801-14 position.” FAD at 3. It also found that Ms. Kotzalas was “not subject to reprisal for engaging in prior protected activity.” Id.
Ms. Kotzalas filed this action on October 9, 2020, 54 days after the NRC issued the Final Agency Decision. Compl. The Defendant now moves to dismiss on the theory that Ms. Kotzalas's Complaint was untimely filed under the relevant regulatory limitations period. MTD at 1. Additional facts will be provided below as needed.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint must be dismissed if it “fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” The purpose of the rule is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to address its merits. Presley v. City of Charlottesville, 464 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2006). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). The claim for relief must be plausible, and “threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678-79.
When reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the well pleaded facts in the operative complaint, and also may “consider documents attached to the complaint, as well as documents attached to the motion to dismiss, if they are integral to the complaint and their authenticity is not disputed.” Sposato v. First Mariner Bank, No. CCB-12-1569, 2013 WL 1308582, at *2 (D. Md. Mar. 28, 2013) (citing Philips v. Pitt County Memorial Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)). And where the allegations of the complaint conflict with an attached written instrument, “the exhibit prevails.” Fayetteville Investors v. Commercial Builders, Inc., 936 F.2d 1462, 1465 (4th Cir. 1991). If the Court considers matters outside the pleadings, it must treat the motion as a motion for summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d). However, a court may take judicial notice of matters of public record without converting a motion to dismiss into motion for summary judgment. Secretary of State For Defence v. Trimble Navigation Ltd., 484 F.3d 700, 705 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing Hall v. Virginia, 385 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2004)).
The parties' present dispute centers on the written summary of Ms. Kotzalas's appeal rights that was provided at the conclusion of the NRC's Final Agency Decision. FAD at 32-35. The Appeal Rights section advises that complainants “may file an appeal of the Final Agency Decision with the [Merit Systems Protection Board (“MSPB”)]” within 30 days of receiving the Final Agency Decision. Id. at 32. It then describes the requirements for filing a civil action directly in the appropriate U.S. District Court for complainants who elect not to file an appeal with the MSPB. Id. at 34-35. It provides:
CIVIL ACTIONS
You [] have a right to file a civil action in an appropriate U.S District Court. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.310. This section provides as follows:
Id. at 31-32. The Appeal Rights section then provides the following information specific to civil actions filed under Title VII:
Id. at 32-33 (emphasis in original).
The Defendant contends that Ms. Kotzalas's lawsuit is barred by her failure to file her Complaint in this Court within 30 days of the NRC's Final Agency Decision. MTD at 1. Ms. Kotzalas responds that the Appeal Rights information provided by the NRC expressly agreed to a 90 day period in which to file a Title VII suit, and that the Defendant therefore waived the limitations defense it now advances. Opp. at 6. Alternatively, Ms. Kotzalas argues that the doctrines of equitable tolling or equitable estoppel excuse her untimely filing because it was the result of NRC's misrepresentation of the time in which to file a Title VII action in this Court. Id. at 10.
I agree with the Defendant that the Final Agency Decision's Appeal Rights section cannot be read to constitute an agreement by the NRC to waive the applicable limitations period. The Appeal Rights section references the 30-day limitations period under 29 C.F.R. § 1614.310, see FAD at 33, and it makes no assurances that can be construed as an agreement to toll the applicable limitations period.[2] However, I also agree with Ms. Kotzalas that equitable...
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