Koupal & Anton, Inc. v. Wieczorek

• Decision Date: 06 June 1984
• Docket Number: No. 14458,14458
• Citation: 375 N.W.2d 639
• Court: South Dakota Supreme Court
• Parties: KOUPAL & ANTON, INC., v. Glen WIECZOREK. . Considered on Briefs

Page 639

375 N.W.2d 639

KOUPAL & ANTON, INC., v. Glen WIECZOREK.

No. 14458.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Considered on Briefs June 6, 1984.

Decided Oct. 16, 1985.

Dennis R. Padrnos, James D. Taylor, Tinan, Padrnos, Smith & Taylor, Mitchell, for plaintiff and appellee.

Ellsworth E. Evans, Monte R. Walz, Davenport, Evans, Hurwitz & Smith, Sioux Falls, for defendant and appellant.

FOSHEIM, Chief Justice, (on reassignment).

Appellant-Glen Wieczorek (Principal) appeals from a verdict in favor of Appellee-Koupal & Anton, Inc., (Broker) for a real estate sales commission. We affirm.

On July 6, 1979, Broker executed a listing contract with Principal for the sale of farm land. The agreement contained these terms:

Contract for Deed, 29% down at closing for 15 yrs. or negotiable for 20 yrs. except NE 1/4 of Section 21 Township 102 Range 62, except highway Davison County, Mount Vernon, S.Dak. negotiable.

It further provided that Broker was to receive a 5% commission if, inter alia, a sale was made; a ready, willing and able purchaser was found before the expiration date; or Principal revoked or violated the agreement.

Broker contends the listing agreement was subsequently orally modified in accordance with Principal's wishes to reflect new financing terms. These alleged modifications were noted by Broker on his copy of the agreement. Principal, however, did not assent in writing to any alterations.

Broker located a buyer who signed a purchase agreement. Principal refused to sign the purchase agreement and to pay Broker their commission for locating a ready, willing, and able buyer.

Broker commenced this action to recover the sale commission on two theories: (1) Principal wrongfully revoked the listing contract, and, (2) Principal breached the contract by refusing to pay for the services rendered by Broker in obtaining a buyer. The jury returned a verdict for Broker. Principal's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict was denied.

Principal claims the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict in his favor because he did not revoke the listing agreement as a matter of law. A verdict is properly directed against the plaintiff when there are no questions for the trier of fact and all reasonable minds would agree that there has been an essential failure of proof to establish a prima facie case against the defendant. Thorstenson v. Mobridge Iron Works Co., 87 S.D. 358, 208 N.W.2d 715 (1973). We review the evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Cox v. Brookings International Life Insurance Co., 331 N.W.2d 299 (S.D.1983).

To avoid a directed verdict on the revocation issue, Broker must establish a valid fact question showing that Principal revoked the listing agreement. The record supports the trial court's conclusion that such an issue was established. Evidence was presented that Principal told Broker after the purchase offer was presented that the land was priceless; his sons were coming back to farm; and that he would not sell the farm for even $2,000.00 per acre. In other words, he simply changed his mind about selling. From this evidence, which was not directly disputed, the jury could, and apparently did, conclude that Principal revoked the listing agreement which entitled Broker to recover his commission. That conclusion would render the alleged oral modifications concerning financing terms irrelevant.

Each remaining error claimed by Principal is tied to Broker's theory that Principal breached the listing agreement. Under this theory, Broker alleges that Principal's initial refusal to complete the sale with the procured buyer was a breach of the listing contract. See, e.g., Larson v. Syverson, 84 S.D. 31, 166 N.W.2d 424 (1969). A refusal to complete a proposed sale is not the same as a revocation of the listing agreement. It is a different theory of recovery grounded on sellers breach of a fully consummated unilateral contract to pay for services rendered by the broker under the listing agreement. See id. at 35-36, 166 N.W.2d at 426.

In Meyer v. Johnson, 254 N.W.2d 107 (S.D.1977), we held:

In determining whether error was probably harmless or probably prejudicial an appellate court is guided by all the factors in the case bearing on the likelihood of prejudice, the force of the evidence to sustain the verdict the assumptions that the jury was intelligent, and where the verdict is sustainable on more than one theory, that the verdict is based on the theory unaffected by error where nothing in the case suggested the contrary.

Id. at 112 (quoting Allen v. McLain, 75 S.D. 520, 69 N.W.2d 390 (1955)). See also Plucker v. Kappler, 311 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1981). If at least one proper issue...