Kourosh Hamidi v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 1000,
| Decision Date | 08 February 2017 |
| Docket Number | CIV. NO. 2:14–cv–319 WBS KJN |
| Citation | 231 F.Supp.3d 624 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | KOUROSH HAMIDI, et al., and the Class They Seek to Represent, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1000, and Betty Yee, California State Controller, Defendants. |
W. James Young, PHV, National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation Inc., Springfield, VA, Steven R. Burlingham, Gary Till and Burlingham, Sacramento, CA, for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey B. Demain, Eve H. Cervantez, Patrick Casey Pitts, Eric Prince Brown, Altschuler Berzon, LLP, San Francisco, CA, Anne Marie Giese, Service Employees International Union, Local 1000, Thomas M. Patton, California Department of Justice Office of the Attorney General, Sacramento, CA, York Jiann Chang, SEIU Local 1000, Kim L. Nguyen, Mark Randolph Beckington, Attorney General's Office for the State of California, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND CROSS–MOTIONS FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Fifteen employees of the state of California ("plaintiffs")1 brought this class action against defendants Service Employees International Union Local 1000 ("Local 1000") and the California state controller,2 alleging that defendants' ‘opt-out’ system for collecting optional union fees violates the First Amendment. (Compl. (Docket No. 1).) Plaintiffs now move for summary judgment against defendants. Local 1000 cross-moves for summary judgment, and the state controller cross-moves for partial summary judgment, against plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs are employees of the state of California. (Compl. ¶ 6.3 ) California recognizes Local 1000 as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of plaintiffs and other state employees. (Id. ¶ 19.) Employees represented by Local 1000 may, but are not required to, join Local 1000 as dues-paying members. (Id. ¶ 20.)
Plaintiffs have not joined Local 1000 as dues-paying members. (Id. ¶ 6.)
Employees represented by, but not dues-paying members of, Local 1000 ("nonmembers") must, pursuant to a series of ‘agency shop’ agreements between Local 1000 and the state, pay Local 1000 a ‘fair share’ fee. (Id. ¶ 20.) Nonmembers may choose to pay the "full" fair share fee, which Local 1000 uses to fund expenditures both germane and not germane to collective bargaining, or a "reduced" fair share fee, which is used to fund only expenditures that are germane to collective bargaining.4 (See id. ¶¶ 20–21; Decl. of Brian Caldeira ("Caldeira Decl.") ¶ 3 (Docket No. 37).) Non-"germane" expenditures include contributions to political causes. (Compl. ¶ 21.)
In deciding whether to charge nonmembers the full or reduced fair share fee, Local 1000 has, with the state's authorization and assistance, implemented an ‘opt-out’ system. See (id. ¶ 26); Cal. Gov't Code § 3515.8 (); id. § 3515.7 ().
Under that system, Local 1000 sends nonmembers, prior to each annual fee cycle, a notice ("Hudson notice") informing them that they will be charged the full fair share fee for the upcoming cycle unless they opt out by sending back a written statement stating that they wish to be charged only the reduced fair share fee. (See Compl. ¶¶ 12, 26a–c.) The opt-out statement must include the objector's name, signature, address, department, and unit, and, per Local 1000's instructions, "should include, for identification purposes, [the objector's] social security number." (Id. Ex. A, Hudson Notice at 3 (Docket No. 1–1).) The statement must be sent by postal mail within a specified period, and employees must renew their objections each year. (Compl. ¶ 26g.) Nonmembers who do not opt out pursuant to the above procedure are charged the full fair share fee, (id. ¶ 26a), which the state controller deducts from their paychecks and forwards to Local 1000, Cal. Gov't Code ¶ 3515.7.
On January 31, 2014, plaintiffs filed this action against defendants. (Compl. at 15.) Plaintiffs' sole cause of action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleges that Local 1000's fee collection system violates the First Amendment by "requir[ing] that individuals pay agency fees ... [that] subsidiz[e Local 1000's] political and other non-bargaining activities, absent their affirmative consent." (Id. ¶ 31.) Plaintiffs also allege, under the same cause of action, that Local 1000's opt-out procedure—which requires nonmembers to renew their objections each year, send their objections by postal mail, and disclose their social security numbers in their objections—fails to meet the constitutional standard set forth in Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson , 475 U.S. 292, 106 S.Ct. 1066, 89 L.Ed.2d 232 (1986). (See id. ¶ 32; Pls.' Mot., Mem. ( ) at 18–19 (Docket No. 64–2).)
The court has certified plaintiffs' cause of action for class treatment to the extent it is brought as a facial challenge upon the constitutionality of Local 1000's opt-out requirement and procedure. (See May 22, 2015 Order at 3 n.3, 20 (Docket No. 53).) Plaintiffs have not, to date, raised any arguments pertaining to any as-applied challenges they might bring as individuals in this action, and appear to have waived those challenges in their Opposition to Local 1000's Cross–Motion.5 The only challenge pending in this action, therefore, is plaintiffs' facial challenge.
Plaintiffs and Local 1000 now move for summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs' facial challenge. Plaintiffs seek judgment declaring Local 1000's opt-out system unconstitutional, permanently enjoining defendants from enforcing the system, and ordering that defendants pay plaintiffs and the nonmember class compensatory damages for fees "exceeding constitutionally-chargeable costs" ("non-‘germane’ fees") collected pursuant the system. (Pls.' Proposed Order at 2–3 (Docket No. 83).) Local 1000 seeks judgment denying plaintiffs' challenge and dismissing this action with prejudice. (Local 1000's Proposed Order at 5 (Docket No. 73).)
The state controller separately moves for partial summary judgment denying plaintiffs' challenge to the extent it seeks monetary damages against her. (State Controller's Cross–Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs have conceded that they are barred from recovering monetary damages against the state controller under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. (Pl.'s Opp'n at 2 (Docket No. 87)); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police , 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Accordingly, the court will grant judgment to the state controller to the extent plaintiffs seek monetary damages against her, and decide plaintiffs' claim for declaratory and injunctive relief against her together with their claim for the same relief against Local 1000.6
Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that could affect the outcome of the suit, and a genuine issue is one that could permit a reasonable jury to enter a verdict in the non-moving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[W]here the operative facts are substantially undisputed, and the heart of the controversy is the legal effect of such facts, such a dispute effectively becomes a question of law that can, quite properly, be decided on summary judgment." Joyce v. Renaissance Design Inc. , No. CV 99-07995 LGB, 2000 WL 34335721, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 3, 2000) ; see also Braxton–Secret v. A.H. Robins Co. , 769 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1985) ().
Plaintiffs' challenge to the constitutionality of Local 1000's opt-out requirement arises from the United States Supreme Court's decision in Knox v. Serv. Employees Int'l Union, Local 1000 , 567 U.S. 298, 132 S.Ct. 2277, 183 L.Ed.2d 281 (2012). Language from Knox , plaintiffs contend, suggests that an opt-out system for collecting non-"germane" union fees violates the First Amendment. Local 1000 argues, in response, that Knox overruled neither prior Supreme Court cases that expressly assumed that the opt-out requirement is constitutionally acceptable, nor the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mitchell v. Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. , 963 F.2d 258 (9th Cir. 1992), which held "that the Constitution does not mandate a system under which nonmembers pay full union dues only if they opt in," id. at 260.
The Supreme Court has long assumed, without expressly deciding, that an opt-out system for collecting non-"germane" fees is tolerable under the First Amendment. In Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Street , 367 U.S. 740, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961), the Court was presented with the question of whether the Railway Labor Act authorized unions to use fees exacted from employees to fund political causes which they opposed. Id. at 743–44, 81 S.Ct. 1784. After holding that the Act did not grant unions such power, the Court stated, in dicta, that any remedies granted to employees who were subject to such use of their fees "would properly be granted only to [those] who have made known to the union officials that they do not desire their...
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