Kowal v. Hofher

• Citation: 436 A.2d 1,181 Conn. 355
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Decision Date: 01 July 1980
• Parties: Walter C. KOWAL, Administrator (ESTATE of James W. KOWAL) v. James M. HOFHER et al.

Page 1

436 A.2d 1

181 Conn. 355

Walter C. KOWAL, Administrator (ESTATE of James W. KOWAL) v. James M. HOFHER et al.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued Feb. 15, 1980.

Decided July 1, 1980.

Michael F. Dowley, Middletown, with whom, on the brief, was Glenn F. McNamara, Middletown, for appellant (plaintiff).

Richard F. Banbury, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Milton W. Horwitz, Hartford, for appellees (defendants).

Before LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI, PETERS, HEALEY and PARSKEY, JJ.

PARSKEY, Associate Justice.

The plaintiff, administrator of the estate of James W. Kowal, brought this action in three counts against the defendant restaurant owner and permittee, his agents and employees. Each count alleged that the defendant served alcoholic beverages to the driver of the automobile which collided with the automobile driven by the plaintiff's decedent, while the driver was already in an intoxicated condition, and that the driver then operated his vehicle in a negligent manner causing the collision and injuries which resulted in death. In the first count the defendant alleged liability under General Statutes § 30-102, the dram shop act. ¹ In the second and third counts, the plaintiff alleged liability for common-law negligence and for gross negligence and wanton and reckless conduct. The defendants moved to strike the second and third counts on the ground that the remedies provided by the dram shop act are exclusive and the plaintiff has no common-law cause of action. The motion was granted, and judgment was rendered in favor of the defendants on the second and third counts. The plaintiff appealed from the partial judgment. The sole question presented on appeal is whether the plaintiff's remedies are limited to those provided by the dram shop act.

We have held in a number of cases that there is no common-law action in negligence against one who furnished, whether by sale or gift, intoxicating liquor to a person who thereby voluntarily became intoxicated and in consequence of his intoxication injured the person or property either of himself or of another. Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 361, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976); Moore v. Bunk, 154 Conn. 644, 649, 228 A.2d 510 (1967); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436, 226 A.2d 383 (1967). ² We adhered to this principle most recently in Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 255, 429 A.2d 855 (1980). The reason underlying the rule is that the proximate cause of the intoxication was not the sale or furnishing of the liquor but the consumption of it by the purchaser or donee. Id. The trial court concluded that because no duty existed at common law, the dram shop act, § 30-102, provided the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained as a result of another's intoxication.

Section 30-102 had its genesis in 1933 following the repeal of the eighteenth (prohibition) amendment to the federal constitution. Cum.Sup.1935, § 1088c. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Duryea, 143 Conn. 53, 56, 119 A.2d 325 (1955). There is no specific provision in this statute which bars a common-law action or otherwise preempts the field of liability of a seller of liquor. This statute, which requires no showing of a causal relation between the sale of intoxicating liquor and the subsequent injury, was enacted to fill the void created by the old rule's disallowance of any action against the barkeeper grounded in negligence. The underlying premise of the dram shop statute is that it is in the public interest to compensate citizens of this state for injuries received when a vendor sells alcohol to an intoxicated person who in turn brings about injuries as a result of such intoxication. There is absolutely no indication, however, that where causation is adequately traced back to the barkeeper who served an intoxicated person an alcoholic beverage the legislature, nevertheless, intended the dram shop act to be the injured plaintiff's exclusive remedy. See Berkeley v. Park, 47 Misc.2d 381, 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965); Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St.2d 29, 32, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973). If the plaintiff has no cause of action against the bartender for negligence, it is not the statute but rather the common law which denies the plaintiff a right of recovery. Although the trial court granted the motion to strike the second count on the basis of its conclusion that the statute provided the exclusive remedy, the motion to strike was also based, correctly, in our view, on the absence of a common-law cause of action. The court's ruling was therefore correct, even though the ground on which it was supported was erroneous. Fraser v. Henninger, 173 Conn. 52, 59, 376 A.2d 406 (1977).

The third count, however, bases a cause of action on wanton and reckless misconduct. ³ The question arises whether the same principles of causation apply to such actions as apply to those founded on negligence. To answer this question requires a further discussion of the principle of "legal cause."

Legal cause is a hybrid construct, the result of balancing philosophic, pragmatic and moral approaches to causation. "In a philosophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event go back to the discovery of America and beyond." Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) § 41, p. 236. "Causation in fact" is the purest legal application of the philosophical dimension of legal cause. The test for cause in fact is, simply, would the injury have occurred were it not for the actor's conduct. That the test is applied as a matter of fact rather than as a matter of metaphysics does not change the character but only the extent of the intellectual inquiry.

This expansive view of causation is tempered by the pragmatic requirement of shaping rules which are feasible to administer, and yield a workable degree of certainty. 2 Harper and James, Torts § 20.4, p. 1133. Remote or trivial causes are generally rejected because the determination of the responsibility for another's injury is much too important to be distracted by explorations for obscure consequences or inconsequential causes.

Finally, a moral approach to causation introduces into the formula the perceived nature of the actor's conduct which produced the injury. Responsibility for greater consequences may be considered justified in the case of intentional or reckless conduct rather than for mere negligence. Prosser, Torts § 34, p. 184. "The fact that the actor's misconduct is in reckless disregard of another's safety rather than merely negligent is a matter to be taken into account in determining whether a jury may reasonably find that the actor's conduct bears a sufficient causal relation to another's harm to make the actor liable therefor." Restatement (Second), 2 Torts § 501 (2); cf. id., § 435B. Comment (a) to § 501 makes it clear that a jury may be permitted to find causation in cases of reckless misconduct even though no such finding would be permissible were the defendant's conduct merely negligent. In sum, whatever the formulation of the rule, policy considerations generally underlie the doctrine of proximate cause. 2 Harper and James, Torts § 20.4, p. 1132.

The question before us, then, is whether those policy considerations which might justify protecting both a vendor and a social host from common-law liability for the injurious consequences of negligent conduct in the sale or serving of alcoholic beverages to another also apply when the conduct constitutes wanton and reckless misconduct. We hold that they do not. This conclusion is based primarily on the notion that one ought to be required, as a matter of policy, to bear a greater responsibility for consequences resulting from his act when his conduct is reckless or wanton than when his conduct is merely negligent. See Restatement (Second), 2 Torts § 501, comment (a).

There are a number of cases which have considered the liability of an actor for intentional or reckless misconduct in the sale of alcoholic liquor. The seminal case in this field is Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky.1956). Kentucky does not recognize a common-law action against a vendor of liquor on the ground of negligence; nor does it have a dram shop statute. Nally involved an action alleging wrongful death resulting from the drinking of an excessive quantity of whiskey, where the vendor knew when he sold liquor to an intoxicated person that such person intended to drink all of it without ceasing, that he could not safely be trusted with it, and that the vendor could reasonably foresee that death might result. The court held that the complaint stated a sufficient cause of action since it could be concluded that the unlawful sale was the proximate cause of death, especially where it was alleged that the sale was made to the deceased for the purpose of injuring him. A cause of action based principally on wilful, wanton and intentional misconduct in serving alcoholic beverages to a known compulsive alcoholic was also upheld in Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich.App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757 (1977).

The reason that intentional and reckless misconduct are treated the same is that the conduct in both cases is outrageous, and the difference between the two in a conceptual sense is microscopic. "Wanton misconduct is more than negligence, more than gross negligence. It is such conduct as indicates a reckless disregard of the just rights or safety of others or of the consequences of action. Willful misconduct is intentional misconduct, and wanton misconduct is reckless misconduct, which is the equivalent of willful misconduct." Menzie v. Kalmonowitz, 107 Conn. 197, 199, 139 A. 698, 699 (1928).

An examination of the policy considerations involved in legal cause persuades us that there is no logical reason for denying the plaintiff a recovery based on proof of wanton and reckless misconduct. The trial court's contrary conclusion was, therefore, erroneous.

There is error in part, the judgment is set aside with respect to the third count and the case is...