Kowalski v. Chicago G.W. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 03 January 1898
• Citation: 84 F. 586
• Parties: KOWALSKI v. CHICAGO G. W. RY. CO.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa

84 F. 586

KOWALSKI v. CHICAGO G. W. RY. CO.

United States Circuit Court, N.D. Iowa, Eastern Division.

January 3, 1898

N. H Utt and A. Matthews, for plaintiff.

D. E Lyon and D. J. Lenehan, for defendant.

SHIRAS District Judge.

The first question presented by the motion for a new trial in this cause is whether, ordinarily, the negligence of a parent is to be imputed to his infant child, so as to defeat the right of recovery on behalf of the infant against one whose negligence has caused personal injury to the child. Briefly stated, the facts are as follows: In June, 1896, a collision occurred at a street crossing in the city of Dubuque between a freight train on the defendant's line of railway and a wagon driven by the father of the infant plaintiff, in which wagon were the parents of the plaintiff, then an infant about three months old. The evidence tended to show that the railway company was guilty of negligence, in that it did not have a flagman at the crossing, and the jury, on this issue found for the plaintiff. The evidence also tended to show that the father of the plaintiff, who was the driver of the team and wagon, was guilty of contributory negligence in not keeping a proper outlook when approaching the crossing.

The court instructed the jury that the negligence of the driver of the wagon, even though he was the father of the plaintiff could not be imputed to the plaintiff, so as to defeat his right of recovery for the injuries to his person; and the question presented by the motion for a new trial is whether the court erred in thus instructing the jury.

In giving this instruction the court followed the ruling of the supreme court of Iowa, which court, in the case of Wymore v. Mahaska Co., 78 Iowa, 396, 43 N.W. 264, expressly held that the negligence of a parent could not be imputed to an infant child under circumstances substantially similar to the case now before the court. On behalf of the defendant company it is contended that this court is not bound to follow the ruling of the supreme court of the state, but that this court must exercise its independent judgment upon the question, even though it results in variant rules upon the one question between the state and federal courts in Iowa. The great desirability of securing uniformity in the rulings of courts acting within the same territorial limit is self-apparent, and therefore in matters which are purely domestic, and which are not affected by any provision of the constitution or laws of the United States, or which do not pertain to the general commercial law of the country or other matters within the legislative control of congress, the rule adopted by the supreme court of the state wherein the cause of action arises should be followed by the federal court, acting within the state.

In the case now under consideration it appears that the defendant company, through negligence on its part, injured the person of the plaintiff, and, in order to defeat the liability thus shown to exist against it, it is claimed that, under the law existing in Iowa, the negligence of a parent may be imputed to his infant child; that the parent in this case, by negligence on his part, when driving the wagon over the crossing, aided in causing the accident, and therefore recovery on part of the child is defeated. In dealing with the question of the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the relation of parent and child, the supreme court of Iowa holds that, in cases of this character, the negligence of the parent is not legally imputable to the child; and therefore it is clear that under the law of Iowa, as declared by the highest court of the state, the defendant company cannot escape liability, for injuries caused to the infant plaintiff by its negligence, by showing that the father of the infant was also guilty of negligence contributing to the accident wherein the plaintiff was injured. Admitting that this is the law upon the subject in the courts of Iowa, the defendant company contends that this court should refuse to follow the rule governing the question in the courts of the state, and should exercise an independent judgment upon the point; but, as already stated, it is not a question arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, or which affects the commercial intercourse and business of the country at large, but it pertains solely to a subject-matter wholly within state control, and touching which each state is at absolute liberty to adopt the rule deemed most suitable for its circumstances. Thus, in the case of In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 10 Sup.Ct. 850, in which the United States district court in Nebraska had undertaken, upon a writ of habeas corpus, to determine the conflicting claims of a father and grandparent to the custody of an infant, the supreme court held that 'the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws of the states, and not to the laws of the United States. ' This being true, and it being also true that the supreme court of the state holds that the negligence of a father is not imputable to a child, so as to defeat a recovery for personal injuries to the child, caused by the negligence of a third party, upon what defensible theory should this court refuse to follow the rule of the state court, and assert the right to establish an antagonistic position upon the mutual duties and responsibilities growing out of the relation of parent and child? Even if it be held that the question is such that this court is not strictly bound to follow the ruling of the supreme court of the state, nevertheless it belongs to that class of questions with regard to which it is highly desirable that uniformity of ruling should be maintained between the several courts, exercising jurisdiction within the territorial limits of the same state; and for that reason I should deem it my duty to accept the decision of the supreme court of the state, as a proper guide to be followed, in determining the matter in dispute.

But furthermore, if the question was open to consideration on principle, it would not change the result; for, in my judgment, the case is not one wherein the negligence of a parent ought to be availed of as a defense by one whose own negligence has caused injuries to the person of the infant plaintiff. The facts of the case are these: A collision occurred at a street crossing between a railway train operated by the defendant company and a wagon driven by one Albert Kowalski, in which wagon was the plaintiff, with other parties. The railway company and the driver of the wagon were each guilty of negligence causing the collision, and the plaintiff was injured. Under the view taken in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.B. 116, and the cases in this country based thereon, the negligence of a driver was held imputable to the occupants of the vehicle, and, if that view was still in force, it would follow in this case that none of the occupants of the wagon could recover against the...