Kozler v. N.Y. Tel. Co.

• Decision Date: 18 November 1919
• Citation: 108 A. 375
• Parties: KOZLER v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

108 A. 375

KOZLER

v. NEW YORK TELEPHONE CO.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Nov. 18, 1919.

Appeal from District Court of Paterson.

Action by Sam Kozler, alias Samuel Kirchner, against the New York Telephone Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remitted for new trial.

Argued June term, 1919, before SWAYZE and PARKER. JJ.

Smith & Sllngerland, of Newark, for appellant.

Harry H. Weinberger, of Passaic, for respondent.

SWAYZE, J. The action is to recover a reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of any person guilty of criminally receiving property belonging to the telephone company. The plaintiff, as a part of his case, relied upon the conviction of a boy under the age of 16 years. The prosecutor of the pleas had alleged that the boy was a juvenile delinquent. At a court for the trial of juvenile offenders as the record recites, the boy was found guilty in manner and form as charged in the accusation. The judgment was that he pay a fine of $25, and be placed in the custody of "probation officer (probation to pay)." It was proved and not disputed that the boy at the time of trial was not on probation; he had not been confined in any institution, we assume, in the absence of proof, because the fine had been paid. At the trial of the present action, proof of the conviction of the juvenile offender and the record of the juvenile court was admitted over objection. The question is whether the admission of this evidence was error. This depends on whether the act of 1916 (P. L. 429) controls. By its express words it certainly does. It enacts that neither the record of the conviction of juvenile offenders contained in the record of proceedings of the court, nor the fact of such conviction, shall be admissible in evidence, or in any way shown in any action or proceeding of a civil or criminal nature, except during the period for which the defendant has been placed on probation, or within two years after the defendant's discharge from any institution to which he has been committed by the court. The lad who was convicted is not within the exceptions, and evidence of his conviction was improper, unless the statute fails of effect. The only argument that we need consider against the statute is that it was beyond the power of the Legislature to make evidence inadmissible that is otherwise relevant.

The question of the power of the Legislature to make evidence inadmissible is different from the question so frequently passed upon of the effect of proof of evidential facts as prima facie proof of facts in issue. We do not suppose that the Legislature could, under the guise or form of a rule of evidence or procedure, deprive parties of substantial rights. On the other hand, the Legislature certainly has the power to prescribe what proof shall be essential, as, for instance, to comply with the statute of frauds; and it has also power to prescribe what contracts shall be void as against public policy, as,...