Kozlowski v. Greenridge Farm, Inc., 18 C 147

• Decision Date: 22 June 2018
• Docket Number: 18 C 147
• Citation: 338 F.Supp.3d 828
• Parties: Paulina KOZLOWSKI, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, v. GREENRIDGE FARM, INC. and Michael Shannon, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois

338 F.Supp.3d 828

Paulina KOZLOWSKI, Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant,

v.GREENRIDGE FARM, INC. and Michael Shannon, Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

18 C 147

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed June 22, 2018

Mark David Hansen, Graefe & Hansen, Ltd., Stephanie L. Matthews, Cole Sadkin, LLC, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant.

Margherita Maria Albarello, Peter Mark Follenweider, DiMonte & Lizak, Park Ridge, IL, for Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Gary Feinerman, United States District Judge

Paulina Kozlowski sued her former employer, Greenridge Farm, Inc., and her former supervisor at Greenridge, Michael Shannon, alleging that Greenridge violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. , and that both defendants violated the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), 775 ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. , when they demoted and then terminated her after learning she was pregnant. Doc. 1. Greenridge counterclaimed, alleging that Kozlowski unlawfully defamed it and tortiously interfered with its business when she told its customers that she had been fired because she was pregnant. Doc. 21. Shannon now moves under Civil Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Kozlowski's claims against him, Doc. 23, while Kozlowski moves under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss Greenridge's counterclaim against her, Doc. 31. Shannon's motion is granted and Kozlowski's is denied.

Background

In resolving a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court assumes the truth of the operative pleading's well-pleaded factual allegations, though not its legal conclusions. See Zahn v. N. Am. Power & Gas, LLC , 815 F.3d 1082, 1087 (7th Cir. 2016). The court must also consider "documents attached to the [pleading], documents that are critical to the [pleading] and referred to in it, and information that is subject to proper judicial notice," along with additional facts set forth in the nonmovant's brief opposing dismissal, so long as those additional facts "are consistent with the pleadings." Phillips v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. , 714 F.3d 1017, 1019-20 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts are set forth as favorably to the nonmovant as those materials allow. See Pierce v. Zoetis, Inc. , 818 F.3d 274, 277 (7th Cir. 2016). In setting forth those facts at this stage, the court does not vouch for their accuracy. See Jay E. Hayden Found. v. First Neighbor Bank, N.A. , 610 F.3d 382, 384 (7th Cir. 2010). Given these principles, the court rejects Kozlowski's argument, which she advances to support dismissal of Greenridge's counterclaim, that Greenridge's answer to her complaint contradicts certain allegations in its counterclaim, Doc. 33 at 3-4, as the argument effectively asks the court to draw inferences against Greenridge as the nonmovant.

A. Kozlowski's Complaint

Beginning in September 2009, Kozlowski worked in sales for Greenridge, a meat distributor. Doc. 1 at ¶ 9. Kozlowski learned that she was pregnant on July 21, 2016, and informed Shannon, her supervisor, two weeks later. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. On August 24, Shannon met with Kozlowski to let her know that he was reassigning her to an "inside sales" position. Id. at ¶¶ 14-15. Her annual salary would be reduced from $78,000 to $40,000, and her existing customers reallocated to other sales personnel. Id. at ¶ 15. Kozlowski objected that she was being demoted because of her pregnancy; Shannon responded that the decision was final. Id. at ¶ 16. Kozlowski hired an attorney, who sent a letter to Shannon asserting that she had been unlawfully demoted. Id. at ¶ 17.

On August 26, Kozlowski discovered that the password she used to log-in to Greenridge's email system had been changed, preventing her access. Id. at ¶ 18. Kozlowski reported the issue to Shannon, who told her to "go home" and "not do any work until Greenridge's attorney responds to your lawyer." Id. at ¶ 19. On September 7, Kozlowski received a letter from Greenridge stating that she was being terminated because she had not returned to work since August 26. Id. at ¶ 23. On September 12, Kozlowski traveled to Greenridge's facility to return her company car, laptop, and uniforms. Id. at ¶ 24. Later that day, she received a letter threatening her with a defamation suit. Ibid.

B. Greenridge's Counterclaim

Greenridge's counterclaim disputes material portions of Kozlowski's account of the events leading up to her termination. It alleges that Kozlowski first met with Shannon on June 15, 2016 to discuss an "action plan" to put one of her accounts "back on track." Doc. 21 at ¶ 7. Kozlowski and Shannon met a second time on July 21, with Shannon telling Kozlowski that Greenridge was planning to restructure the sales department and that she would be responsible for new accounts. Id. at ¶ 8. Shannon promised that Kozlowski's earning potential—including salary, bonus, and commissions—would be higher than her then-current salary. Ibid.

When Shannon and Kozlowski again met on August 24, Shannon said that he was putting in place the restructuring plan and that Kozlowski would be transitioning to a position as a "new account specialist." Id. at ¶ 10. Shannon acknowledged that Kozlowski would receive a lower base salary, but noted that she would receive a $200 bonus for each new store she opened and a commission on all new accounts. Ibid. Kozlowski refused the offer, protesting that it was a pregnancy-related demotion—which Shannon disputed—and stating that she would "rather sit at home than work for this money." Id. at ¶¶ 11-13. The next day, Kozlowski's attorney told Greenridge that she would return to work, but only in her previous position. Id. at ¶ 14. From August 24 through at least September 14, Kozlowski told Greenridge's customers that she had been fired because she was pregnant. Id. at ¶ 17. Greenridge alleges that Kozlowski knew that charge to be untrue. Id. at ¶¶ 17-19.

Discussion

I. Kozlowski's Claims Against Shannon

Kozlowski's complaint has two counts, both arising under Title VII and the IHRA as to Greenridge and only under the IHRA as to Shannon. Count I alleges that Greenridge and Shannon unlawfully demoted and then terminated Kozlowski because she was pregnant. Doc. 1 at ¶¶ 26-42. Count II alleges that Greenridge and Shannon retaliated against Kozlowski by first telling her not to return to work and then terminating her after she complained that her demotion was due to her being pregnant. Id. at ¶¶ 43-55. As noted, Shannon seeks dismissal of the claims against him.

A. IHRA Pregnancy Discrimination Claim

The IHRA makes it a "civil rights violation ... [f]or an employer to refuse to hire, to segregate, or to act with respect to recruitment, hiring, promotion, renewal of employment, selection for training or apprenticeship, discharge, discipline, tenure or terms, privileges or conditions of employment on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or medical or common conditions related to pregnancy or childbirth." 775 ILCS 5/2-102(I) (emphasis added). For purposes of this pregnancy discrimination provision, the IHRA defines the term "employer" to "include[ ] ... [a]ny person employing 15 or more employees within Illinois ...." 775 ILCS 5/2-101(B)(1)(a). Kozlowski contends that the definition of "employer" in Section 2-101(B)(1)(b) governs. Doc. 34 at 3. That definition applies "when a complainant alleges [a] civil rights violation due to unlawful discrimination based upon his or her physical or mental disabilityunrelated to ability, pregnancy, or sexual harassment." 775 ILCS 5/2-101(B)(1)(b) (emphasis added). Kozlowski does not allege that she suffered such discrimination, so that definition does not apply here.

Thus, Kozlowski's IHRA pregnancy discrimination claim against Shannon can proceed only if he qualifies as an "employer" under Section 2-101(B)(1)(a). Because Kozlowski alleges that Shannon was her "boss" and himself a Greenridge employee, Doc. 1 at ¶ 12, he does not qualify as her employer. See Nischan v. Stratosphere Quality, LLC , 865 F.3d 922, 930 (7th Cir. 2017) (dismissing an IHRA sexual harassment claim because the defendants in question were not the plaintiff's employer) (citing Pickett v. Sharon Willow Health Care , 1999 WL 33256273, at * 3 (Ill. Human Rights Comm'n May 6, 1999) ); Robertson v. Lofton , 2013 WL 5796780, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 25, 2013) (holding that the plaintiff's supervisor "was not a proper defendant" in an IHRA race discrimination claim); Zayadeen v. Abbott Molecular, Inc. , 2013 WL 361726, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 2013) (explaining that it was "appropriate" that, while the plaintiff's claims against the company that employed him were brought under Title VII, the IHRA, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, his claims against his former supervisor were "brought only under § 1981..., as § 1981 provides for individual liability while Title VII and the IHRA do not") (citing cases). Kozlowski's pregnancy discrimination claim against Shannon accordingly is dismissed.

In pressing the opposite result, Kozlowski relies on Title VII case law establishing a "de facto employer," "indirect employer," or "joint employer" test for determining whether a "putative defendant is so extensively involved with the plaintiff's day to day employment that the putative defendant is the ‘real’ employer for all intents and purposes." Doc. 34 at 3-5. That case law is inapposite. Given that Kozlowski alleges only that Shannon was her supervisor and himself a Greenridge employee, not her de facto , joint, or indirect employer, Shannon cannot qualify as an "employer" under the IHRA's definition of that term in Section 2-101(B)(1)(a) even if the de facto , joint, or indirect employer doctrine applied to that provision.

B. IHRA Retaliation Claim

Kozlowski's retaliation claim raises a closer question. The IHRA makes it a "civil rights violation for a person ... to ... [r]etaliate against a person because he or she has opposed that which he or she reasonably and in good faith believes to be unlawful discrimination, ... because he or she has made a charge,...