Krachenfels v. N. Shore Long Island Jewish Health Sys. & N. Shore Univ. Hosp., 13-CV-243 (JFB) (WDW)

• Decision Date: 29 July 2014
• Docket Number: No. 13-CV-243 (JFB) (WDW),13-CV-243 (JFB) (WDW)
• Parties: ANN MARIE KRACHENFELS, Plaintiff, v. NORTH SHORE LONG ISLAND JEWISH HEALTH SYSTEM AND NORTH SHORE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

ANN MARIE KRACHENFELS, Plaintiff, v. NORTH SHORE LONG ISLAND JEWISH HEALTH SYSTEMAND NORTH SHORE UNIVERSITY HOSPITAL, Defendants.

No. 13-CV-243 (JFB) (WDW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

July 29, 2014

AMENDED MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JOSEPH F. BIANCO, District Judge:

Plaintiff Ann Marie Krachenfels ("Krachenfels" or "plaintiff") commenced this action against North Shore Long Island Jewish Health System (the "Health System") and North Shore University Hospital (the "Hospital") (collectively, "defendants") on January 15, 2013, alleging disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq. ("ADA"), and the New York State Human Rights Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 et seq. ("NYSHRL"), and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq. ("ADEA"), and the NYSHRL. A former operating room nurse at the Hospital, plaintiff claims that she was denied a reasonable accommodation for her hand condition (discoid dermatitis), subjected to a hostile work environment because of her discoid dermatitis and her accommodation request, denied a transfer to a different part of the Health System even though a younger nurse was granted such a transfer, and was constructively discharged.

Defendants move for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants the motion as to all the federal claims. First, plaintiff's failure to accommodate and hostile work environment claims are time-barred because they accrued more than 300 days before plaintiff filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Council ("EEOC"). Plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim accrued on July 13, 2010, and plaintiff's reliance on the continuing violation doctrine to support the timeliness of this claim is unavailing; the failure to accommodate is a discrete act, not a continuing violation. Plaintiff's hostile work environment claims are also untimelybecause plaintiff left work more than 300 days before filing her claim with the EEOC; thus, the last act contributing to the allegedly hostile work environment could not have occurred within the applicable limitations period. Although plaintiff claims that she was denied the ability to transfer to a different position while on leave and within the limitations period, this has no bearing on plaintiff's hostile work environment claim, which requires evidence of harassment in the "workplace." Second, even assuming that plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim were timely, the Court concludes that it fails as a matter of law because there is no evidence that plaintiff was disabled within the meaning of the ADA. Third, plaintiff has failed to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether she was constructively discharged. Even resolving all factual disputes in favor of plaintiff and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to her, a reasonable jury could not find that plaintiff's treatment in the workplace was objectively intolerable, that defendants deliberately created such an environment, or that any behavior about which plaintiff complains occurred in circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Fourth, plaintiff's retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because defendants' failure to transfer her—the only action taken by defendants that falls within the applicable limitations period—does not constitute an adverse employment action in this case. Specifically, plaintiff has proffered no evidence concerning the positions that she sought, and it is therefore impossible to determine whether the failure to transfer well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Moreover, even if plaintiff could establish a prima facie retaliation claim, defendants have proffered uncontroverted evidence that plaintiff did not secure a transfer because she applied to positions for which she was not qualified, did not return calls for interviews, and did not conduct herself professionally in interviews. This evidence shifts the burden to plaintiff to establish that retaliation was a motivating factor in defendants' decision not to transfer her, and in this case, there is no such evidence. Fifth, plaintiff's age discrimination claim, which is also premised on defendants' failure to transfer her, also fails because plaintiff cannot show that she was denied a transfer to a materially more advantageous position. Additionally, plaintiff has not created a triable issue of fact as to an inference of age discrimination. Plaintiff relies solely on the fact that another nurse ten to fifteen years younger than she received a transfer; however, plaintiff offers no evidence about the other nurse's qualifications, the assignment that the other nurse received, or whether plaintiff had applied for that position and was qualified for it. In sum, the Court grants summary judgment for defendants on all of plaintiff's federal claims. Because the Court grants summary judgment to defendants on all federal claims, the Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law discrimination claims.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

The following facts are taken from the parties' depositions, declarations, exhibits, and respective Local Rule 56.1 statements of facts. Upon consideration of a motion for summary judgment, the Court construes the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Capobianco v. City of New York, 422 F.3d 47, 50 n.1 (2d Cir. 2005). Unless otherwise noted, where a party's Rule 56.1 statement is cited, that fact is undisputed, or the opposing party has notpointed to any evidence in the record to contradict it.¹

1. The Parties

The Health System is a regional non-profit healthcare network of member hospitals, progressive care centers, long-term care facilities, and home health agencies. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 1.) The Hospital is a member hospital located in Manhasset, New York. (Id.)

Plaintiff began working for the Hospital as a Registered Nurse ("RN") in 1983. (Id. ¶ 6.) Around 1996, she was assigned to work part-time in the operating rooms of the Hospital's Cardiac Surgery Unit ("CSU"). (Id. ¶ 7.) As such, she was designated a "Perioperative RN-OR." (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.) Plaintiff held that position until February 9, 2011, after which she took a leave of absence. (Id. ¶ 9; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶ 9.1.) She formally resigned from her position on August 2, 2011. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 84.)

2. Duties of a Perioperative RN-OR

During weekday business hours, each operating room in the Hospital had either two nurses or one nurse and one Surgical Technologist ("Surgical Tech"). (Id. ¶ 27.) If two nurses were present, then one performed "circulating" duties while the other performed "scrubbing" duties. (Id. ¶ 28.) If a Surgical Tech were present instead of a second nurse, then the nurse would circulate and the Surgical Tech would scrub. (Id. ¶ 29.) Circulating duties entailed, inter alia, ensuring the safe transfer of the patient to the operating room, providing assistance to anesthesia personnel, performing skin preparation, documenting the plan of care, assessing needs of the medical team, and handling all specimens. (Id. ¶ 25.) Scrubbing duties entailed, inter alia, checking all instruments and assisting the surgeon during the operation by handling those instruments. (Id. ¶ 26.) The scrubbing nurse (or Surgical Tech) worked closely beside the surgeons and often came into physical contact with the patient and the surgical site. (Id.) Accordingly, although all nurses and Surgical Techs in the operating room would wash their hands and put on gloves before every operation, the person performing the scrubbing duties also had to be completely sterile throughout the operation. (Id. ¶ 30-31; Pl.'s 56.1 ¶¶ 30.1-31.2; see also Krachenfels Dep. at 100 ("The scrub is sterile and the circulator is not.").)

Each specialty area in the Hospital, such as the CSU, had its own on-call procedures and staffing requirements to ensure the availability of qualified staff outside weekday business hours. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 32-33, 35.) On-call shifts for the CSU ran from 7:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. to 7:00 a.m. on Monday through Friday, and forty-eight hours straight on Saturday and Sunday. (Id. ¶ 34.) Either two CSU nurses or a CSU nurse and a Surgical Tech were assigned to an on-call shift. ² An on-callnurse needed to be able to perform both circulating and scrubbing duties. (Id. ¶ 36; see also Cifu Dep. at 55 ("If you are on call, the expectation is that you can circulate and scrub."); Moleski Dep. at 41 ("Being on call, there is only two staff members on call, and they have to be able to scrub and circulate.").) This requirement was reflected in the Policy and Procedure Manual, which stated that any nurse "taking call must be able to scrub and circulate within their assigned specialty . . . in order to maintain a safe patient environment." (Solivan Aff. Ex. E, Manual, at 1.) The Policy and Procedure Manual went into effect in 1990 (Solivan Aff. ¶ 15), and the version in the record was last revised in November 2009 (see Solivan Aff. Ex. E, Manual, at 2). The Hospital required on-call nurses to be able to scrub and circulate in order to ensure patient safety. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶ 37.) Given that the Hospital was not fully staffed during on-call hours, an on-call nurse could have been the only nurse present during an operation, in which case she would have to scrub. Even if the two on-call nurses were present in the operating room, the circulating nurse needed to be able to scrub in case the scrubbing nurse became incapacitated. ³ (Solivan Aff. ¶ 18; Moleski Dep. at 40-45, 67.)

3. Plaintiff's Tenure in the CSU

Plaintiff worked as a Perioperative RN-OR in the CSU from 1996 to February 9, 2011. (Defs.' 56.1 ¶¶ 5, 7, 9.) When she worked part-time from 1996 through July 2010, she supplemented her income...