Krachock v. Dep't of Revenue

• Decision Date: 11 May 1949
• Docket Number: No. 30698.,30698.
• Citation: 85 N.E.2d 682,403 Ill. 148
• Parties: KRACHOCK v. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

403 Ill. 148

85 N.E.2d 682

KRACHOCK

v.DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE.

No. 30698.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 19, 1949.

As Modified in Denial of Rehearing May 11, 1949.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; William V. Brothers, judge.

Action by Isadore M. Krachock against the Department of Revenue, brought by complaint purportedly filed under the Administrative Review Act, to compel issuance of distributor's license under Motor Fuel Tax Act. From an order quashing the complaint and dismissing the suit, plaintiff appeals.

Affirmed.

Harry G. Fins, of Chicago, for appellant.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen. (William C. Wines, Raymond S. Sarnow, and James C. Murray, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

GUNN, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the circuit court of Cook County quashing a complaint purportedly filed under the Administrative Review Act, and dismissing the plaintiff's suit.

Plaintiff, Isadore M. Krachock, filed his complaint against the Department of Revenue to compel it to issue a license to him as a distributor under the Motor Fuel Tax Act. Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 120, par. 417 et seq. The complaint purports to be in accord with the Administrative Review Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, chap. 110, pars. 264-279, incl., which authorizes a review of the final decisions of administrative boards or bureaus, when such decisions affect the rights, privileges or duties of the person appealing therefrom.

Section 2 of the Administrative Review Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, c. 110, s 265, provides that ‘any other statutory, equitable or common law mode of review of decisions of administrative agencies heretofore available shall not be employed after the effective date hereof’; and that all decisions made by administrative boards may be reviewed under the provisions of the Administrative Review Act where the act creating the board provides this manner of review by express reference to the act, and in this case the Motor Fuel Tax Act does so provide. However, the Administrative Review Act does not purport to give an independent remedy, or create any new cause of action, but merely provides a method of review, whereby challenged decisions of the administrative body may be subjected to a judgment of the court, as to its regularity and validity. It provides for reviews of the decisions of the board upon the record alone, as no additional evidence in support of, or in opposition to, any finding, order, determination, or decision of the administrative agency shall be heard by the court, and the findings and conclusions of the agency on questions of fact shall be held prima facie true and correct. (Sec. 11, Ill.Rev.Stat.1947, c. 110, s 274.) The act also provides that the pleadings shall consist of a complaint and an answer; that the complaint shall contain a statement of the decision sought to be reviewed, and shall specify whether the transcript of evidence, if any, or what portion thereof, shall be filed by the agency as a part of the record.

In the present case the complaint is a combination of ultimate facts alleged by the pleader, without producing the record thereof, and the remainder purporting to be the part of the record of the decision complained of. The first six allegations in the complaint are not supported by any record of the Department. These allegations relate to the length of time appellant was a distributor; that during such time he was bonded as required by statute; that throughout the period from 1933 to 1943 the Department of Revenue checked and audited his books and records, and notified plaintiff he was indebted in the sum of $742.59; that plaintiff voluntarily surrendered his license in 1943, and that defendant did not sue the plaintiff or his bondsmen for the alleged shortage.

The balance of the complaint alleges that on February 6, 1948, plaintiff filed with the Department of Revenue an application for a license as a distributor of motor fuel, and that on February 17, 1948, the Department of Revenue rejected his application on the sole ground he was indebted to the State; that on March 5, 1948, the plaintiff's attorney wrote the Department, advising it the plaintiff was not indebted to the State and requested a hearing; that on March 9, 1948, the Department wrote and advised plaintiff's attorney that it would not grant a hearing upon the question of issuing a license, and would not issue a license to applicant. It thus appears that appellant alleges matters prior to February 6, 1948, as independent, ultimate facts of his own knowledge, without bringing before the court, or requiring to be brought before the court, the record of the Department of Revenue. It is only matters occurring from and after February 6, 1948, of which the appellant requires a record of the Department of Revenue.

Fairly construed the complaint discloses that the plaintiff desires a hearing upon whether he owes the Department of Revenue $742.59, without requiring or producing the record of the Department. This was the issue upon which the license was refused.

The brief of appellant admits that all of the facts stated in the complaint appear in the record, but he does not...