Krafcsik v. Egnatia Constr.
| Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 19 Civ. 5376 (AT) |
| Parties | OLIVER KRAFCSIK. Plaintiff, v. EGNATIA CONSTRUCTION INC., CARL J. CHISOLM, PRIYA M. CHISOLM, and ABC CORP., a fictitious name intending to be that of an unknown contractor, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Plaintiff Oliver Kiafcsik, brings this action against Defendants Egnatia Construction Inc. ("Egnatia"), Carl J Chisolm, Priya J. Chisohn, and ABC Corp., alleging violation of the New York Labor Law § 200 et seq. ("NYLL") and negligence. Compl. ¶¶ 114-20, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff moves for partial surnniary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 on the issues of Egnatia's liability under NYLL §§ 240(1), 241(6), and 200. ECF No. 68. Egnatia cross-moves for partial surnmaiy judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and Local Rule 7.1 on the same issues. ECF No. 73: Egnatia Mem. at 1, ECF No. 75. For the reasons stated below. Plaintiffs motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, and Defendant's motion is DENIED.
BACKGROUND[1]
In April 2018, Carl and Priya Chisohn hired Egnatia to renovate their two-family home located at 141 West 131st Street in Manhattan. PI. 56.111, ECF No. 78-1; Def. 56.111, ECF No. 80-2. On August 25, 2018, Egnatia entered into a subcontract with Prime Foam hie. ("Prime Foam") to apply spray foam insulation to the interior of the home. Def. 56.1 ¶ 2: Pl. 56.1 ¶ 5.
On August 28, 2018, Krafcsik-an employee of Prime Foam-arrived with a co-worker at the Chisolms' home to perform the insulation work. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 6. The owner of Prime Foam then directed Krafcsik and his co-worker to begin working on the third floor of the house. Id. ¶ 7. Krafcsik returned to the Prime Foam truck to retrieve a 300-foot-long hose. Id. ¶¶ 7-8. At the same time, Krafcsik's co-worker went to the third floor to assemble a movable, rolling scaffold consisting of a metal frame with wood planks. Id. Although the parties disagree as to the height of the scaffold, it is undisputed that the scaffold had no guardrails and that Krafcsik was not provided with a safety harness. Id. ¶ 9.
Krafcsik arrived on the third floor and-while standing on a wood plank of the scaffold-began to spray the foam insulation on the ceiling using the hose connected to the truck outside. Id. Approximately ten minutes later, Krafcsik pulled on the hose to gain some slack and fell backwards off the scaffold. Id. ¶ 10; Krafcsik Dep. Tr. at 42:19-43:13, ECF No. 74-4. Krafcsik's neck and back landed on top of a ladder lying on the floor, and the back of his head hit the floor directly. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 11. Krafcsik claims that he was injured as a result of the fall.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-26 (1986). A genuine dispute exists “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. The moving party initially bears the burden of informing the Court of the absence of a genuine dispute of material fact by citing particular evidence in the record. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-24; Koch v. Town of Brattleboro, 287 F.3d 162, 165 (2d Cir. 2002). If the nonmoving party has the ultimate burden of proof on specific issues at trial, the movant may also satisfy its own summary judgment burden by demonstrating that the adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support an issue of fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; PepsiCo, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the burden then shifts to the opposing party to establish a genuine dispute of material fact. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006); PepsiCo, 315 F.3d at 105. “Although a party opposing summary judgment need not prove its evidence in a form admissible at trial or under the evidentiary standard which will be required, it must show facts sufficient to enable a reasonable mind to conclude that a material dispute of fact exists.” Healy v. Chelsea Res. Ltd., 736 F.Supp. 488, 491-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted). In deciding the motion, the Court views the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Koch, 287 F.3d at 165.
Generally, when parties file cross-motions for summary judgment, the same standard applies. Morales v. Quintel Entm't, Inc., 249 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2001). “[E]ach party's motion must be examined on its own merits, and in each case all reasonable inferences must be drawn against the party whose motion is under consideration.” Id. Here, because the motion and cross-motion seek a determination on the same issues, this Court may consider them together. ExteNet Sys., Inc. v. Vill. of Pelham, 377 F.Supp.3d 217, 223 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
“For 120 years [NYLL] § 240(1)-commonly known as the scaffold law-has provided legal recourse to workers injured while engaging in construction at heights.” Wojcik v 42nd Street Development Project, 386 F.Supp.2d 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Blake v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of N.Y. City Inc., 803 N.E.2d 757 (N.Y. 2003)). The relevant part of § 240(1) states:
All contractors and owners and their agents . . . in the . . . repairing, [or] altering . . . of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed.
NYLL § 240(1). Section 240(1) was designed “to provide protection for workers who are subjected to elevation-related risks . . . [and] the statute achieves this by imposing absolute responsibility for safety practices on owners, general contractors, and their agents, instead of on the workers themselves.” Wilson v. City of New York, 89 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir. 1996).
To succeed on a claim brought under § 240(1), a plaintiff must establish “(1) that a violation of the statute, (2) is the proximate cause of his injury.” Wojcik, 386 F.Supp.2d at 450. A contractor's failure to provide safety devices “constitutes a per se violation of the statute” and subjects that contractor to absolute liability “for any injuries that result from such failure.” Cherry v. Time Warner, Inc., 885 N.Y.S.2d 28, 31 (1st Dep't 2009). Thus, § 240(1) must be “interpreted liberally” and a contractor will be held liable “so long as the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the worker's injuries[.]” Pollack v. Safeway Steel Products, Inc., 457 F.Supp.2d 444, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). And a plaintiff establishes proximate cause by showing that this “violation was a contributing cause of his fall[.]” Blake, 803 N.E.2d at 763.
Egnatia argues that § 240(1) does not apply because Plaintiff's injury is unrelated to the scaffold. Def. Mem. at 4-5, ECF No. 75. Although § 240(1) does “not encompass any and all perils that may be connected in some tangential way with the effects of gravity, ” it does cover “injuries that result from [an] elevation-related risk and the inadequacy of [a] safety device.” Nicometi v. Vineyards of Fredonia, LLC, 30 N.E.3d 154, 154 (N.Y. 2015) (emphasis omitted). Here, Krafcsik's injuries resulted from falling off of a scaffold that lacked guardrails, exactly the type of elevation-related hazard contemplated in § 240(1). Moreover, Egnatia's reliance on Palumbo v. Transit Tech., LLC, 41 N.Y.S.3d 85 (2d Dep't 2016) is misguided. Unlike Krafcsik, the Palumbo plaintiff was standing on the ground-not on a scaffold or other safety device-and was pulled into a trench by an accelerating cable. Id. at 86. Therefore, § 240(1) applies.
Krafcsik has satisfied his prima facie burden on his § 240(1) claim because the parties do not dispute that the scaffold lacked guardrails and that Krafcsik was not provided with a harness or any other protective device. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 9. See Morocho v. Boulevard Gardens Owners Corp., 85 N.Y.S.3d 135, 135 (2d Dep't 2018). The parties also do not dispute that Krafcsik was injured due to his fall. Pl. 56.1 ¶ 11. Although the parties dispute the height of the scaffold, there is no minimum height requirement for a scaffold to require a safety rail under § 240(1). Thompson v. St. Charles Condominiums, 756 N.Y.S.2d 530, 532-33 (1st Dep't 2003). Thus, Krafcsik has established a violation of § 240(1) and that this violation was a proximate cause of his injuries. See Morocho, 85 N.Y.S.3d at 135.
The Court rejects Egnatia's argument that it is not liable because Krafcsik was the “sole proximate cause” of his injuries. See Def. Mem. at 5-7. A defendant may be relieved of liability under § 240(1) if the plaintiff's negligence was the “sole proximate cause of the accident.” Blake v. Neighborhood Housing Services of New York City, Inc., 803 N.E.2d 757 763 (N.Y. 2003). However, to establish that a plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his injuries, a defendant must show that the “plaintiff had adequate safety devices available; that he knew both that they were available and that he was expected to use them; that he chose for no good reason not to do so; and that had he not made that choice he would not have been injured.” Auriemma v. Biltmore Theatre, LLC, 917 N.Y.S.2d 130, 136-37 (1st Dep't 2011) (quotation mark omitted). Egnatia has not established any of these elements. Additionally, “if a statutory violation is a...
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