Kraft v. State

• Citation: 16 Md.App. 347,297 A.2d 328
• Decision Date: 04 December 1972
• Docket Number: No. 86,86
• Parties: Betty Jean KRAFT v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 347

16 Md.App. 347

297 A.2d 328

Betty Jean KRAFT v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 86.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 4, 1972.

Neal P. Myerberg, Lexington Park, for appellant.

Gary Melick, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., and Joseph D. Weiner, State's Atty., for St. Mary's County, on the brief, for appellee.

Argued before THOMPSON, MOYLAN and POWERS, JJ.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Betty Jean Kraft, appellant, was convicted by a jury in the circuit Court for St. Mary's County for violations of state laws concerning controlled dangerous substances. The only evidence presented against her was obtained as a result of a search of the apartment wherein she resided and a seizure of contraband pursuant to a judicially issued warrant. We need discuss only her challenge to the legality of that search and seizure as we have determined that the exclusionary rule must be invoked and the judgments against her reversed.

The warrant issued on the basis of an integrated Application and Affidavit prepared by two deputy sheriffs of St. Mary's County. The application prayed a warrant to search a residence located at 6 East Rennell, Lexington Park, St. Mary's County and which was occupied by Betty (Blaylock) Kraft and David Thompson. In support of their application the affiants presented the following facts and circumstances quoted verbatim:

'That on or about 1 September 1971, one; Peter Fletcher, a known and convicted Heroin user was seen at this apartment. Further that on the 3RD of October 1971, information from a reliably established informant, who is responsible for eleven narcotics arrests, states that the Thompson subject is making trips to the Wash. D. C. area twice weekly to obtain narcotics, and is transporting them back into the County. Further, this informant states that he has personally observed the Thompson subject with 100 units of LSD on the 2ND of October 1971.

'Further, that on 4 October 1971, information from a second informant, who has provided reliable information to this Dept. for the past six months, and who has also purchased LSD and other narcotics from the Thompson in the past states that he had seen large quantities of LSD and amphetamines in the Thompson apt. on 3 October 1971. Further, on 6 October 1971, this same informant states that he personally observed a large quantity of LSD, described as; White Lightnings, and Orange Paradise, in a tin can in the refrigerator in the Thompson apt.

'The Kraft subject residing at this address is known by Dept. Clarke to be an admitted user of Heroin.'

Any determination of probable cause must be made solely from information contained within the four corners of the application. Buckner v. State, 11 Md.App. 55, 272 A.2d 828; Lashley v. State, 10 Md.App. 136, 268 A.2d 502. In considering an application for a search and seizure warrant, the judicial officer may find the probable cause necessary for its issuance from a statement by the affiant of his direct observations or by hearsay information provided the affiant, by a named or unnamed informant or a combination of direct observation and hearsay information. Moore v. State, 13 Md.App. 711, 284 A.2d 614; Dawson v. State, 11 Md.App. 694, 276 A.2d 680.

Although we must interpret an affidavit in support of a search warrant in a common sense and not in a hypertechnical manner, United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 85 S.Ct. 741, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, this does not mean that we are free to disregard the technical requirements of Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 as interpreted by Spinelli v. U. S., 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 588, 21 L.Ed.2d 637, and United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 91 S.Ct. 2075, 29 L.Ed.2d 723. In order to comply with these cases we proceed to make a detailed examination of the affidavit.

Other than the first sentence referring to Fletcher and the single-sentence last paragraph referring to Kraft, the recitations in the affidavit purport to present hearsay information provided the affiants by two unnamed informations. For such information to qualify as a basis for a finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search and seizure warrant, with respect to Aguilar's first prong there must be enough facts and circumstances presented to enable the judicial officer to make an independent determination that the informant was credible or his information otherwise reliable. See Kist v. State, 4 Md.App. 282, 242 A.2d 586. This requirement does not necessarily mean that the statements be voluminous nor that they provide intricate detail. It does demand of the applicant a presentation of facts and circumstances such that the judicial officer considering the application can determine that the informant was credible or his information reliable before that informant's revelations can show probable cause. See Dawson v. State, 11 Md.App., supra, at 699, 276 A.2d 680.

Of the first unnamed informant it is here said, he is 'a reliably established informant; who is responsible for eleven narcotics arrests,' the second, is introduced as one 'who has provided reliable information to this Dept. for the past six months.' We shall see that these general conclusionary assertions are insufficient of themselves to establish the reliability of these informants.

In Iannone v. State, 10 Md.App. 81, 267 A.2d 812, we held the conclusionary statement 'a confidential informant who has furnished information which has proven to be reliable in the past' was insufficient to establish credibility under Aguilar v. Texas, supra. In Moore v. State, supra, we held a bare assertion that prior information had led 'to arrests and convictions', if not particularized, was insufficient. On the other hand we held in Watkins v. State, 7 Md.App. 151, 253 A.2d 925, an allegation of 'arrests' sufficient where very specific colateral details were furnished...