Krage v. Macon-Bibb Cnty.

• Decision Date: 07 December 2021
• Docket Number: Civil Action 5:19-cv-321 (MTT)
• Parties: JUSTIN KRAGE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. MACON-BIBB COUNTY, Georgia, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia

JUSTIN KRAGE, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
MACON-BIBB COUNTY, Georgia, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 5:19-cv-321 (MTT)

United States District Court, M.D. Georgia, Macon Division

December 7, 2021

ORDER

MARC T. TREADWELL, CHIEF JUDGE

Plaintiffs-all sworn deputies with the Bibb County Sheriff's Office (“BCSO”)- bring this action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), 29 U.S.C. § 201, against Defendant Sheriff David Davis and Defendant Macon-Bibb County (“the County”). Specifically, Plaintiffs allege Sheriff Davis and the County violated the FLSA by failing to pay deputies for time spent “on-call.” Doc. 1 ¶ 3. Plaintiffs further allege Sheriff Davis and the County are liable under a state law contract theory because Sheriff Davis failed to pay his deputies in accordance with the County's compensation plan. Id. ¶ 5. The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Docs. 20; 27; 55-58. For the following reasons, Sheriff Davis's motion for summary judgment on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds (Docs. 27; 56; 58)^[1] is GRANTED as to Plaintiffs' FLSA claim, the County's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the County is not a “joint-employer” within the meaning of FLSA (Docs. 20; 55; 57) is GRANTED, and the

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remaining contract claims against Sheriff Davis and the County will be dismissed without prejudice.

I. BACKGROUND

The Georgia General Assembly consolidated the former City of Macon and former Bibb County to form a new unified government-Macon-Bibb County-effective January 1, 2014. Docs. 27-2 ¶ 2; 46-1 ¶ 2. Although deputies are not employees of the County, the County allows the Sheriff and other constitutional officers to subject their employees to some or all of the terms of the Macon-Bibb County Government Policies and Procedures Manual. Doc. 23-1 at 11-12. Following the consolidation, Sheriff Davis elected to subject his employees to the County's Manual except the sections relating to hiring, discipline, and employee problem-solving. Doc. 20-28 at 16:8-17:4. This election form was signed by Sheriff Davis on March 18, 2014. Id. at 20:10-20.

Notably, Sheriff Davis did not expressly exempt his office from the on-call provision contained in sections 6.06 and 7.05 of the County's Manual. Id. at 47:6-12.

This policy states in pertinent part:

As for compensation for the on-call time, the employee will be paid their regular hourly rate for two hours for each day on which he/she is on call and four hours for each Saturday Sunday or Holiday he/she is on call regardless of whether he/she is actually required to respond to a call. On-call time is not time actually worked and will not be included when calculating overtime. The rate of pay for actual work time while on call shall be in accordance with MBCG pay policy regarding overtime pay. Employees who have not met the threshold for required overtime shall be paid regular rate until he/she meets the required threshold. In the event the on-call supervisor must respond to a call during the on-call time, he/she will be paid for any time actually worked inclusive of the on-call time[.]

Doc. 23-1 at 63.

Plaintiffs worked in a variety of different divisions, including the Traffic Fatality Unit (“TFU”), Criminal Investigations Division (“CID”), Special Weapons and Tactics

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(“SWAT”) team, Special Investigations Unit (“SIU”), and Crime Scene Investigations-Forensics (“CSI-F”). Since the consolidation, Plaintiffs allege Sheriff Davis failed to compensate his employees for any on-call time as required by sections 6.06 and 7.05 of the County's Manual. Doc. 1 ¶ 5. Sheriff Davis admits his deputies are not compensated merely for their on-call status. Doc. 27-3 ¶ 12. Rather, deputies are only compensated for their on-call time when they actively respond to calls. Id. Nevertheless, Sheriff Davis contends the County's on-call policy never applied to his deputies, and thus, the deputies are not entitled to compensation for their on-call status. Id. Plaintiffs disagreed and filed this action to recover unpaid overtime compensation pursuant to the FLSA and to recover unpaid wages for on-call time as required by the Manual.^[2] Doc. 1 ¶ 6.

II. STANDARD

A court must grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A factual dispute is not genuine unless, based on the evidence presented, “‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Info. Sys. & Networks Corp. v. City of Atlanta, 281 F.3d 1220, 1224 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d 1428, 1437 (11th Cir. 1991)); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The movant may support its assertion that a fact is undisputed by “citing to particular parts of

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materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1)(A). “When the nonmoving party has the burden of proof at trial, the moving party is not required to ‘support its motion with affidavits or other similar material negating the opponent's claim[]' in order to discharge this ‘initial responsibility.'” Four Parcels of Real Prop., 941 F.2d at 1437-38 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). Rather, “the moving party simply may ‘show[ ]-that is, point[ ] out to the district court-that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). Alternatively, the movant may provide “affirmative evidence demonstrating that the nonmoving party will be unable to prove its case at trial.” Id.

The burden then shifts to the non-moving party, who must rebut the movant's showing “by producing … relevant and admissible evidence beyond the pleadings.” Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs, Inc., 662 F.3d 1292, 1315 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324). The non-moving party does not satisfy its burden “if the rebuttal evidence ‘is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative' of a disputed fact.” Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50). Further, where a party fails to address another party's assertion of fact as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), the Court may consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2). However, “credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge[.] The

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evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Sheriff Davis is Entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment bars federal courts from entertaining suits against states. U.S. Const. Amend. XI. Eleventh Amendment immunity acts as a limitation on the federal judiciary's Article III powers and protects a state's treasury from claims for damages brought by private entities in federal court. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716-21 (1999).

“Under the traditional Eleventh Amendment paradigm, states are extended immunity, counties and similar municipal corporations are not, and entities that share characteristics of both require a case-by-case analysis.” United States ex rel. Lesinski v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 739 F.3d 598, 601 (11th Cir. 2014) (citing Mt. Healthy Cty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977)). In the Eleventh Circuit, this case-by-case analysis is conducted by applying the factors set forth in Manders v. Lee, 338 F.3d 1304, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2003). When a county or municipality is acting in concert with an agent or instrumentally of the state, a Manders analysis is appropriate to determine the agency's status as either a state or local government actor when performing the specific function at issue. Monroe v. Fort Valley State Univ., __ F.Supp.3d __, 2021 WL 5451145, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 2021). In Georgia, this analysis is most frequently applied in cases involving sheriffs because the office of sheriff is constitutionally created by and accountable only to the State of Georgia but yet

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exists to serve a particular county and derives significant funding from that county. See Manders, 338 F.3d at 1310-12.

Under the “function-specific” Manders inquiry, an agency's status as an “arm of the state” is determined by examining four factors: “(1) how state law defines the entity; (2) what degree of control the State maintains over the entity; (3) where the entity derives its funds; and (4) who is responsible for judgments against the entity.” Id. at 1309. The entity invoking the Eleventh Amendment “bears the burden of demonstrating that it qualifie[s] as an arm of the state entitled to share in its immunity.” Haven v. Bd. of Trustees of Three Rivers Reg'l Libr. Sys., 625 Fed.Appx. 929, 933 (11th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted); see also Lange v. Houston Cnty., Ga., 499 F.Supp.3d 1258, 1267 n.3 (M.D. Ga. 2020) (citing cases).

Both parties agree the function at issue is Sheriff Davis's failure to compensate his deputies for additional compensation for time spent on-call. Docs. 27-1 at 12; 46 at 7. But the parties disagree as to whether Sheriff Davis has carried his burden of proving he is an “arm of the state” with regard to that specific function. Id. Plaintiffs argue there are some cases-specifically where the “function-specific” inquiry is an issue of first impression-that necessitate discovery. Lange, 499 F.Supp.3d at 1267-69 (denying motion to dismiss because sheriff's office failed to carry its burden of showing it...