Kraiza v. Planning And Zoning Comm'n Of The Town Of Hartland

• Decision Date: 08 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 30836.,30836.
• Citation: Kraiza v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n of the Hartland, 121 Conn.App. 478, 997 A.2d 583 (Conn. App. 2010)
• Parties: Harry KRAIZA, Jr.v.PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF HARTLAND.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

121 Conn.App. 478

997 A.2d 583

Harry KRAIZA, Jr.v.PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION OF the TOWN OF HARTLAND.

No. 30836.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued Dec. 3, 2009.

Decided June 8, 2010.

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Robert J. Reeve, Unionville, for the appellant(plaintiff).

Mary E.R. Bartholic, with whom, on the brief, was Thomas W. Witherington, Hartford, for the appellee(named defendant).

GRUENDEL, BEACH and BORDEN, Js.

GRUENDEL, J.

The plaintiff, Harry Kraiza, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing his appeal from the denial of his subdivision application by the defendant planning and zoning commission of the town of Hartland(commission).¹On appeal, the plaintiff claims that the court improperly (1) affirmed the commission's determination that the length of Eastwood Drive should be considered when evaluating his application, (2) affirmed the commission's finding that Eastwood Drive is a dead-end street and (3) rejected his claim that the commission arbitrarily reinterpreted its regulations when considering his application.We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history.On or about June 11, 2007, the plaintiff filed an application with the commission seeking approval of a proposed eight lot subdivision on his 19.57 acre property, located in the town of Hartland.The east side of the plaintiff's property adjoins Hartland's boundary with the town of Granby.The south side of the plaintiff's property adjoins the Eastwood subdivision.Access to the lots in the Eastwood subdivision is provided by Eastwood Drive, a permanent dead-end street, which was approved as part of that subdivision plan.Eastwood Drive intersects with Route 20 and extends into the Eastwood subdivision for approximately 850 feet, where it divides into two sections forming a loop.Ten lots are located on the outside of the loop and four lots within it.The total length of Eastwood Drive, including the loop, is approximately 3500 feet.Included on the Eastwood final subdivision plan is a fifty foot wide reserve strip labeled “Reserved For Future Road,” which runs from the loop section of Eastwood Drive to the boundary of the plaintiff's property.²The plaintiff's proposal included a dead-end street, Hazel Lane, to provide access to the lots by connecting to Eastwood Drive over the reserve strip.Hazel Lane extends approximately 1100 feet into the subdivision, forming a cul-de-sac.

Section I-6A-2 of Hartland's subdivision regulations (regulations) provides in relevant part: “Arrangement of streets shall provide for the continuation of the principal streets in adjoining subdivision, or for their proper projection when adjoining property is not subdivided.Permanent dead-end streets shall not exceed 1200 feet in length and shall be equipped with a turn-around roadway with a minimum radius of forty-five (45) feet for the outside curb at the closed end....”HartlandSubdivision Regs., § I-6A-2.Additionally, the regulations define a “dead-end street” in § I-1J as “any street described in paragraph D of this section which is used for access to any current lot of record, and which presently provides only one means of ingress or egress.”³Id., at § I-1J.

The commission hired Martin J. Connor, a planning consultant, to offer his expert opinion as to whether the plaintiff's proposal complied with the regulations.Connor opined that Hazel Lane did comply with the 1200 foot regulatory limitation for permanent dead-end streets because it measured only 1100 feet in length.He further opined that the length of Hazel Lane should not be combined with that of Eastwood Drive when assessing whether the plaintiff's proposal complied with the regulations.

Notwithstanding Connor's recommendation, and after concluding a public hearing on November 19, 2007, that had extended over multiple evenings, the commission, on January 17, 2008, unanimously voted to deny the plaintiff's application, finding that it was in violation of §§ I-1J and I-6A-2 of the regulations because Eastwood Drive and Hazel Lane combined to form an extended dead-end street with a total length exceeding the 1200 foot regulatory limitation.The plaintiff appealed to the Superior Court, which, on December 17, 2008, affirmed the commission's denial of his application.⁴This court subsequently granted the plaintiff's petition for certification to appeal.This appeal followed.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly affirmed the commission's determination that the length of Eastwood Drive must be added to that of Hazel Lane when considering his application.⁵We disagree.

The following additional facts and procedural history are necessary to our analysis.The plaintiff argued before the court that the commission was prohibited from considering the length of existing streets when determining whether Hazel Lane complied with the 1200 foot regulatory limitation.Instead, according to the plaintiff, the regulations permitted the commission to consider only the length of newly constructed streets.The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, reasoning that it was inconsistent with the plain language and intent of the regulations, and that it would lead to absurd results.Specifically, the court stated that “[t]here is nothing in the [r]egulations which says that when additions are made to an existing road, each new addition is considered a new road for purposes of the 1200 foot limitation.If this were not so, a developer could avoid the 1200 foot limitation by adding to a dead-end road in sections which never exceed 1200 feet.This could create a dead-end street of great length....”On appeal, the plaintiff repeats this claim.He further contends that § I-6A is a design and construction standard placed in a section that regulates the building of newly proposed dead-end streets.According to the plaintiff, because Eastwood Drive is an already existing street, the commission improperly considered its length in assessing whether Hazel Lane complied with the regulations.Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that even if we were to conclude that the regulations do not apply only to newly proposed dead-end streets, the regulations are ambiguous and, thus, must be construed in his favor.SeeFarrior v. Zoning Board of Appeals,70 Conn.App. 86, 90, 796 A.2d 1262(2002)(“[w]here more than one interpretation of language is permissible, restrictions upon the use of lands are not to be extended by implication ... [and] doubtful language will be construed against rather than in favor of a [restriction]”[internal quotation marks omitted]).

We now identify the applicable standard of review.“Because the interpretation of the regulations presents a question of law, our review is plenary....Additionally, zoning regulations are local legislative enactments ... and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes....Moreover, regulations must be interpreted in accordance with the principle that a reasonable and rational result was intended....The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language [or ... the relevant zoning regulation] as applied to the facts of the case, including the question of whether the language does so apply....

“[O]rdinarily, this court affords deference to the construction of a [regulation] applied by the administrative agency empowered by law to carry out the [regulation's] purposes....[A]n agency's factual and discretionary determinations are to be accorded considerable weight....Cases that present pure questions of law, however, invoke a broader standard of review than is ordinarily involved in deciding whether, in light of the evidence, the agency has acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally or in abuse of its discretion....Furthermore, when [an] agency's determination of a question of law has not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny ... the agency is not entitled to special deference....[I]t is for the courts, and not administrative agencies, to expound and apply governing principles of law....

“Finally, we note that a court that is faced with two equally plausible interpretations of regulatory language ... properly may give deference to the construction of that language adopted by the agency charged with enforcement of the regulation....Thus, in construing regulations, our function is to determine the expressed legislative intent....Moreover ... the words employed therein are to be given their commonly approved meaning.”(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)Trumbull Falls, LLC v. Planning & Zoning Commission,97 Conn.App. 17, 21-23, 902 A.2d 706, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 923, 908 A.2d 545(2006).

In considering the plaintiff's first argument that the plain language and context of the regulations demonstrate that they apply only to newly proposed streets, preliminarily, we note that the regulations at issue have not previously been subject to judicial scrutiny.Moreover, the commission did not indicate that it had applied a time-tested interpretation of the regulations.As such, we do not defer to the commission and exercise plenary review.

We begin with the text of the regulations.Section I-6A provides in relevant part: “Private streets, meaning streets not already dedicated and accepted for public travel by the State of Connecticut or by the Town of Hartland, shall be constructed according to [certain specifications]....”As noted previously, § I-6A-2 provides in relevant part: “Arrangement of streets shall provide for the continuation of the principal streets in adjoining subdivision, or for their proper projection when adjoining property is not subdivided.Permanent dead-end streets shall not exceed 1200 feet in length and shall be equipped with a turn-around roadway with a minimum radius of forty-five (...