Kram v. Public Utilities Commission

• Decision Date: 16 April 1940
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: KRAM v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION.

12 A.2d 775

126 Conn. 543

KRAM v. PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

April 16, 1940

Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Edwin C. Dickenson Judge.

Appeal by John Kram from the action of the Public Utilities Commission in revoking the certificate authorizing plaintiff to operate taxicabs. The court ruled that the case would not be heard de novo, and from a judgment dismissing the appeal and affirming the action of the defendant, plaintiff appeals.

No error.

I Charles Suisman, of New London, for appellant.

Richard F. Corkey, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Francis A. Pallotti Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Argued before MALTBIE, C.J. and HINMAN, AVERY, BROWN, and JENNINGS, JJ.

AVERY Judge.

This action is an appeal by the plaintiff to the Superior Court from an order of the public utilities commission revoking the plaintiff's license to operate taxicabs in New London. In the Superior Court, the case was heard upon the record certified to the Superior Court by the commission. Upon the record so certified, the Superior Court held that the plaintiff had a fair hearing before the commission, that the evidence certified by it supported its finding, and that the finding justified the order revoking the plaintiff's certificate. The court further found that the order was proper, expedient and legal, and not arbitrary or unreasonable, and could not be set aside upon equitable grounds; and entered judgment dismissing the appeal. From this judgment, the plaintiff has appealed. The fundamental claim of the plaintiff upon this appeal is that in revoking his license to operate taxicabs the public utilities commission was acting not in an administrative capacity but in a quasi-judicial capacity, that in an appeal to the Superior Court from a proceeding of this character the plaintiff was entitled in the Superior Court to a trial of his case de nove, and that the procedure followed by the court was unathorized by statute and violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. The applicable statute, General Statutes, Cum.Supp.1935, § 1414c(g), is appended in the footnote.^[1]

From the record certified to the Superior Court by the public utilities commission, these facts appear: The plaintiff was a holder of a license issued by the public utilities commission to operate four taxicabs in taxi service originating within the town and city of New London. He was cited to appear before the commission on April 19, 1937, to show cause why his license should not be revoked and cancelled or suspended. The citation was served on the appellant and specified nine alleged violations by him or drivers in his employ of rules and regulations of the commission in operating his cabs at rates less than those established by the commission and for specific or flat-rates or fares differing from the fares which should have been charged if determined by meters, as required by the commission and at the rates established by it, and in operating three of his cabs with meters which were defective and not in operation. The alleged violations covered a period from October 30, 1936, to February 13, 1937, and were set forth in detail in the citation. At the hearing held by the commission on April 19, 1937, the plaintiff appeared with counsel. He admitted the violations alleged with respect to operating his cabs with meters which were defective and not in operation, and one violation with respect to ‘ flat-rates.’ Evidence was introduced tending to prove the other alleged violations. The plaintiff introduced evidence concerning only one of the alleged violations, and during the course of his testimony admitted other violations than those contained in the citation. Based upon the evidence presented at the hearing and the admissions of the plaintiff, the commission, on May 5th, issued an order revoking the plaintiff's license to operate a taxicab service. Thereafter the plaintiff made an application for a rehearing on the charges made against him, which was denied by the commission. From the rulings of the commission revoking his license and denying his application for a rehearing, the plaintiff brought an appeal to the Superior Court. Upon the filing of the appeal, the commission caused a record of the entire proceedings before it in this case to be certified to the Superior Court, together with its findings and orders in the matters of three other taxicab operators in New London, against whom charges had been filed at the same time as those against the plaintiff, and to which reference had been made in the plaintiff's appeal. The court, Simpson, J., denied a motion by the plaintiff to dismiss the record on appeal so certified, and granted a motion by the plaintiff to amend the record on appeal by ordering transcripts of the testimony taken by the commission in the cases of the other operators to be filed in connection with the record on this appeal, without, however, passing upon the question of whether or not the records in the other cases were material and relevant to this case; and the commission thereupon certified transcripts of the testimony taken by it in the cases of the other operators in addition to the testimony taken in the present case.

Under subsection (i) of § 1414c of the 1935 Cumulative Supplement § 3610 of the General Statutes which governed the procedure on appeals from the commission is repealed. The important change in the procedure on appeal is that the commission shall prepare a record of its proceedings, and the court shall review the proceedings of the commission ‘ upon the record so certified,’ remitting the cause to the commission if evidence was improperly excluded by it or if the facts disclosed by the record are insufficient for an ‘ equitable disposition of the appeal.’ Otherwise, the provisions concerning the manner of review by the court on appeal are the same as those formerly provided by General Statutes, § 3610. In construing a provision relating to an appeal from the railroad commissioners, predecessor to the public utilities commission, General Statutes, Revision of 1902, §§ 3747 and 3834, we said: ‘ By the appeal, taken under section 3834, the superior court is not empowered to try de nove the questions properly submitted to the railroad commissioners as an administrative tribunal. One may properly be said to be ‘ aggrieved,’ within the meaning of that word in section 3834, when his property rights are injuriously affected by the unauthorized or irregular acts of the commissioners. Norton v. Shore Line Electric R. Co., 84 Conn. 24, 34, 78 A. 587. In taking and prosecuting an appeal under this section, the so-called appellant assumes a position similar to that of a plaintiff in an action in equity, with the burden of showing that the railroad commissioners acted without authority or irregularly. Section 3834 provides that the appeal shall be taken in the same manner as appeals taken under section 3747, and with like effect; and section 3747 provides that the appeal shall be by a petition in writing, etc., and that the court ‘ shall proceed thereon in the same manner as upon complaints for equitable relief.’ ' Stevens v. Connecticut Co., 86 Conn. 36, 41, 84 A. 361, 363, Ann.Cas.1913D, 597. In construing Public Acts of 1911, Chapter 123, § 31 (the Public Utilities Act), we said: ‘ This section appears to have been drawn with careful regard to the decisions of this court as to the nature of so-called appeals from administrative tribunals, and as to the limitations on the jurisdiction of our courts in passing on such appeals. It recognizes the fact that such appeals are in the nature of original applications to the superior court by directing them to be proceeded with in the same manner as complaints...