Kramer v. City of Lake Oswego
| Decision Date | 11 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12-cv-00927-HA |
| Parties | MARK KRAMER and TODD PRAGER, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LAKE OSWEGO, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
This lawsuit stems from a city resolution limiting access to Oswego Lake (the Lake). Plaintiffs allege that defendant City of Lake Oswego's ("City") passing of Resolution 12-12 violates their First Amendment right to association, Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection, and article 1, sections 18 and 20 of the Oregon Constitution. Plaintiffs also claim that the resolution is invalid under the public use doctrine and the public trust doctrine. Defendant has moved to dismiss for failure to join a necessary party, the State of Oregon. Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to File an Amended Complaint [26], Oral argument was held on October 1, 2012. For the following reasons, plaintiffs' Motion to File an Amended Complaint [26] is denied, defendant's Motion to Dismiss [17] is granted, and this case is dismissed without prejudice.
In order to put new states entering the union on "equal footing" with the original thirteen states, "the United States early adopted and constantly has adhered to the policy of regarding lands under navigable waters in acquired territory ... as held for the ultimate benefit of future States." United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 55 (1926); Idaho v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001). Pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the State of Oregon obtained the title to land beneath the navigable waters within its borders when it became a state in 1859. Jones v. Rose, 2005 WL 2218134 (D. Or. Sept. 9, 2005). Further elaborating on the public trust doctrine, the Oregon Supreme Court stated that the rights of the state are those of a "trustee for the public" and maintained that the "lands are held in trust for the public uses of navigation and fishery." Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co. v. State Land Board, 439 P.2d 575, 582 (1968) (quoting Winston Bros. Co., v. State Tax Comm'n, 62 P.2d 7, 9 (1936)).
On April 3,2012, the Lake Oswego City Council voted 5-0 to pass Resolution 12-12, amending city park regulations and prohibiting "any person" from entering the Lake from Millenium Plaza Park, Sundeleaf Park, or the Headless Walkway "by any means or method." The resolution has the effect of banning public entry to the lake except through the two swim parks during limited summer months. The first park, Lake Grove Swim Park, is owned by the Lake Oswego School District and is available only to residents who live within the boundary of the former school district and pay additional property tax. The second park, Lake Oswego Swim Park, is owned and operated by the City of Lake Oswego, and is available only to city residents. Resolution 12-12 justifies the restricted access on the basis that the City has limited facilities and resources for maintaining the safety of the premises and on concerns about the water quality inthe Lake. The Lake Oswego Corporation (LOC) is a nonprofit organization owned by shareholders who live on and near the Lake. The LOC contends that it owns the Lake. Shareholders have access to the Lake, and at this time, all permitted boating activity on the Lake is controlled by the LOC.
Plaintiffs argue that, pursuant to the public trust doctrine, the Lake is property of the State to be held in trust for the public and the City should be enjoined from limiting access to the Lake or in conveying title to the LOC. The State of Oregon holds title to the Lake if the Lake was navigable at the time Oregon became a state in 1859.
Defendant contends that this case must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(7) as plaintiffs have failed to join a necessary party, the State of Oregon. Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, plaintiffs cannot join the State as a party in this court absent a waiver of sovereign immunity. However, plaintiffs could join the State in a suit brought in state court.
A defendant may move to dismiss a lawsuit when the plaintiff has failed "to join a party under Rule 19." FRCP 12(b)(7). Rule 19(a) provides as follows:
The Ninth Circuit utilizes a two-part test to analyze whether .a party is a required party pursuant to Rule 19(a). Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty of the Bishop Colony, Cal. v. City of Los Angeles, 637 F.3d 993, 997 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Yellowstone County v. Pease, 96 F.3d 1169,1172 (9th Cir. 1996)). The court must first determine whether it "could award complete relief to the parties present without joining the non-party" or if "the non-party has a legally protected interest in [the] action that would be impaired or impeded by adjudicating the case without it." Id. (citation and quotations omitted). If either of these questions is answered in the affirmative, the non-party is a required party under Rule 19(a) and the Ninth Circuit turns to the second part of the Rule 19(a) analysis and asks whether the non-party could be feasibly joined. Id, at 998.
When joinder is not feasible, the court must turn to Rule 19(b) to determine whether proceeding without the required party is appropriate. Rule 19(b) provides:
In considering whether to proceed without a required party, this court must "undertake a 'practical examination of the circumstances' to determine whether an action may proceed 'in good conscience' without the absent party." Paiute-Shoshone, 637 F.3d at 1000 (quoting Provident Tradesman Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 119 n.16 (1968)). At a minimum, Rule 19(b) requires this court to consider:
(1) the plaintiff's interest in having a forum; (2) the defendant's interest in not proceeding without the required party; (3) the interest of the non-party by examining the extent to which the judgment may as a practical matter impair or impede its ability to protect its interest in the matter; and (4) the interests of the courts and the public in complete, consistent, and efficient settlement of controversies.
Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 19(a), this court must determine whether it could offer complete relief to the existing parties without joining the State of Oregon or if the State's legally protected interests would be impaired or impeded by adjudicating the case without it, Paiute-Shoshone, 637 F.3d at 997. Plaintiffs' Complaint asserts, among other things, that "waters of the Lake are navigable-for-public use waters that are, or have been, owned by the State of Oregon and are held in trust for the public" and that:
the State of Oregon has an equitable right and obligation to protect the public's interest in submerged and submersible lands underlying navigable waterways or navigable portions of waterways and the enjoyment of those rights by the public, including all rights incident to navigation of the Lake, by causing the removal offences, "no trespassing" signs, and other obstacles preventing and/or discouraging the exercise by the public of said rights and it should be enjoined to do so.
First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 18, 21 at 7-8.
Plaintiffs present the questions raised by this lawsuit as ones of competing interests between the public and the City. Plaintiffs argue that they are simply attempting to enjoin defendant from impinging upon rights granted to the public as a consequence of State ownership. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue that the court can afford the parties complete relief without involving the State. Plaintiffs cite Puyallup Indian Tribe v. Port of Tacoma, in support of this argument. 717 F.2d 1251 (9th Cir. 1983). In that case, the Puyallup Indian Tribe sought to eject the Port of Tacoma from possession of an exposed riverbed. The Ninth Circuit held that the State of Washington was not a necessary party because the action was an ejection action that merely required a determination of whether the Tribe or the Port held superior title to the riverbed. I...
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