Kramer v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 052919 FED9, 18-15959
|Party Name:||LEO KRAMER; AUDREY KRAMER, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.; et al., Defendants-Appellees.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.|
|Case Date:||May 29, 2019|
|Court:||United States Courts of Appeals, Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit|
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
Submitted May 21, 2019 [**]
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, No. 3:18-cv-00001-MMD-WGC Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, LEAVY and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.
Leo Kramer and Audrey Kramer appeal pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing their action alleging federal and state law claims arising out of foreclosure proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1040 (9th Cir. 2011). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Johnson v. Riverside Healthcare Sys., LP, 534 F.3d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir. 2008). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in applying judicial estoppel to the Kramers' Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") and slander of title claims based on conduct before the bankruptcy discharge because these claims were omitted from Leo Kramer's bankruptcy schedules, and the Kramers failed to allege facts sufficient to show that the omission was due to inadvertence or mistake. See Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782-83 (9th Cir. 2001) (setting forth the standard of review and explaining that "a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor's schedules or disclosure statements"); see also Ah Quin v. Cty. of Kauai Dep't of Transp., 733 F.3d 267, 271-73 (9th Cir. 2013) (explaining application of judicial estoppel in the bankruptcy context and effect of an inadvertent or mistaken omission from a bankruptcy filing; the court applies a "presumption of deliberate manipulation" when a plaintiff-debtor has not reopened bankruptcy proceedings).
Dismissal of the Kramers' FDCPA and slander of title claims arising...
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