Kransky v. Glen Alden Coal Co.

• Decision Date: 25 June 1946
• Docket Number: 3785
• Citation: 47 A.2d 645,354 Pa. 425
• Parties: Kransky v. Glen Alden Coal Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

47 A.2d 645

354 Pa. 425

Kransky v. Glen Alden Coal Company, Appellant

No. 3785

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

June 25, 1946

Argued May 28, 1946

Appeal, No. 120, Jan. T., 1946, from order of Superior Court Feb. T., 1945, No. 4, affirming judgment of C.P., Luzerne Co., Dec. T., 1943, No. 70, in case of Mrs. John Kransky for Joan Edith Coates v. Glen Alden Coal Company. Order reversed.

Same case in Superior Court: 158 Pa.Super. 544.

Appeal by defendant from award by Workmen's Compensation Board.

Appeal dismissed and judgment entered for claimant, before VALENTINE, P.J., FLANNERY and FARRELL, JJ., opinion by FARRELL, J. Defendant appealed to the Superior Court which affirmed the judgment of the court below. Appeal by defendant to Supreme Court allowed.

The order of the Superior Court is reversed and the award vacated.

Franklin B. Gelder , with him J. H. Oliver , for appellant.

Frank J. Flannery , with him Patrick J. Flannery for appellee.

Before MAXEY, C.J., DREW, LINN, STERN, PATTERSON, STEARNE and JONES JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE JONES

This appeal is from an order of the Superior Court affirming an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County which, in turn, had affirmed an award of compensation to the minor claimant, Joan Edith Coates, for the death of John Kransky, an employee of the defendant company, who was killed in the course of his employment. The sole question involved is whether the findings made by the referee, which the Compensation Board confirmed and adopted, warranted a conclusion of law that Kransky stood in loco parentis to the minor claimant.

In order to qualify, within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act, as a "child" of an employee who is not its natural parent, it is necessary (1) that the "child" was a member of the employee's household at the time of his death and (2) that the latter stood in loco parentis to the "child": see Sec. 307 (7) of the Act of June 2, 1915, as amended, 77 P.S. § 562. The first requisite calls for a finding of fact; the second embraces a conclusion of law.

The referee competently found, and the Board confirmed, that Joan Edith Coates, the minor claimant in this case, was a member of Kransky's household at the time of his death. That fact is therefore final and may not be inquired into upon appellate review. The referee also found, and the Board likewise confirmed with equal finality, that from the day of the minor claimant's birth she was "maintained and supported entirely by the decedent" and that at the time of his death she and her grandmother "were both residing in the decedent's household and were receiving their entire support and maintenance from the decedent". The arrangement under which the child's support and maintenance were so provided grew out of the following circumstances.

At the time of Kransky's death, he and the child's grandmother, Mrs. Edith Coates, were living together in a meretricious relation and had been so living for the preceding eight years. Mrs. Coates had a lawful husband living from whom she had never been divorced. The child, Joan, was born on July 29, 1940, to Robert Coates, Jr. (Mrs. Edith Coates' son) and his wife. When the child was a day or two old, the grandmother, accompanied by Kransky, took her to their home where she lived until Kransky's death on August 5, 1941. On March 15, 1941, Joan then being about eight months old, her parents separated under articles of agreement wherein the natural mother was accorded the "full custody" of Joan and an older sister "to maintain, support and provide for said children".

Aside from the support furnished the child by Kransky, as above stated, there is not a word of testimony and, naturally, no finding that he had ever indicated by word or act any intention on his part to assume the responsibilities of a lawful father to the child. In loco parentis is a legal status and proof of essential facts is required to support a conclusion that such a relationship existed. While the support and maintenance of a dependent child is a fact of evidentiary value in determining whether the one furnishing the support stands in loco parentis to the child, it is necessary that the evidence as a whole be sufficient to justify a finding that the supporting person intended to assume the rights, duties and responsibilities of a lawful parent to the child.

In Robinson's Estate , 35 Pa.Super. 192, 195, the Superior Court adopted as a "proper definition" of a person in loco parentis to a child, viz., "a person who means to put himself in the situation of a lawful father of the child with reference to the father's office and duty of making provision for the child". (...