Krasner, In re

• Decision Date: 21 January 1965
• Docket Number: No. 38783,38783
• Parties: In re David P. KRASNER, Attorney, Respondent.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 10

204 N.E.2d 10

32 Ill.2d 121

In re David P. KRASNER, Attorney, Respondent.

No. 38783.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Jan. 21, 1965.

J. R. Christianson, Chicago, amicus curiae.

Harry J. Busch and Jacob Shamberg, Chicago, for respondent.

DAILY, Justice.

The Board of Managers and Committee on Grievances of the Chicago Bar Association, as commissioners of this court under Rule 59, Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, c. 110, § 101.59, have filed a report recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years on the basis of findings that he had unethically engaged in conduct which constituted a division of fees with laymen and the employment of solicitors to procure law business. Respondent, a 50-year-old practitioner who was admitted to the bar of this State in 1938, has filed exceptions to the report contending there is no evidence to support such findings.

The disciplinary proceeding was an outgrowth of an indictment returned to a Federal district court wherein a man named David E. Vogele was charged with evasion of income tax. He pleaded guilty, and at a hearing on the matter of his punishment it came to light that he was a professional 'ambulance chaser' and that the source of his unreported income had been payments from some twenty lawyers, of whom respondent was one. The trial judge, by a letter of February 20, 1963, brought the matter to the attention of the Chicago Bar Association and as a consequence an inquiry was made and a complaint filed against respondent. At the hearing which followed, the evidence on behalf of the complainant association consisted only of the testimony of respondent and his partner, and certain ledger sheets and cancelled checks of the partnership. For the respondent, two judges, numerous attorneys and a businessman testified to his good character and reputation and to his professional integrity.

Since, as we have said, the complainant's proof rested almost entirely upon the testimony of respondent and his partner, there is no dispute as to the facts and what follows is largely a summation of their statements at the hearings. During the years 1957, 1958, and 1959, respondent, in partnership with his brother-in-law, engaged in a general practice and handled personal injury work. And while the charges of his professional misconduct center principally around his dealings with Vogele, respondent testified that he had known a man named Paul Skidmore prior to meeting Vogele, that Skidmore 'might have recommended a case or two,' and that he, respondent, remembered a few 'isolated instances' in which he had paid Skidmore 'gratuities' for the cases referred. At another point in his testimony, respondent gave a less positive answer, and stated that he 'may have' given Skidmore a check, considered by the witness to be a 'gratuity.'

To avoid future repetition, it may be stated respondent repeatedly testified he considered that all payments made to Skidmore, Vogele and others who had referred business to him, were voluntary gratuities, or gifts, and expressly denied that they were investigational fees or commissions paid pursuant to agreement.

Describing his first meeting and transaction with Vogele, respondent said they had been introduced at lunch sometime in the Spring of 1957, and that during the course of the conversation he had told Vogele, in response to the latter's inquiries, that he was an attorney and that he had done personal injury work. When asked if he had ascertained Vogele's occupation, respondent replied: ' * * * as I recall he was a man with a lot of connections and the thing that I remember with some particularity is the fact he made some reference he is (sic) connected with, in some sort, with the insurance field, insurance business or something like that.' Respondent couldn't recall if Skidmore was present, or who made the introduction, and stated that it was a chance meeting and that he was unaware that Vogele was a person who sought out personal injury cases for profit. However, at another point in his testimony, he said he 'guessed' that it was Skidmore who had introduced him to Vogele. Shortly after this meeting, by respondent's version, he was retained by a client in a case, then subsequently received a telephone call from Vogele who represented that he had referred the client and said: 'I took care of you, and perhaps you could do something for me.' Respondent's recollection was that he gave Vogele a check as a gratuity, but he could not recall the amount. Vogele, as he did on subsequent occasions, came to respondent's office for the check.

Respondent conceded that his relationship with Vogele continued until the middle of 1959, when respondent purportedly terminated it because Vogele proposed to 'chase a case.' During this period, by respondent's admission, Vogele referred some 70 to 75 cases, and it was likewise conceded that Vogele had been paid 'gratuities' of approximately $7,295 in 1959, approximately $10,000 during 1958, and $6,000, 'more or less,' in 1957. In excess of 100 checks, totalling the above amounts, were drawn on the partnership account and were made payable either to Vogele directly, or to cash, or, in two instances, to Skidmore at Vogele's direction. Incredibily, respondent testified that the pattern for each transaction was the same as the first, (i. e. that Vogele would telephone and claim to have referred a certain client,) and that he took no steps to verify whether the client had in fact been referred by Vogele, but took the latter's word for it and paid him a gratuity. This testimony, we are constrained to remark, makes it difficult to see why in excess of 100 checks were necessary to pay for only 70 to 75 of the so-called referrals, particularly since respondent also testified he could not recall giving more than one gratuity to Vogele in any case.

The size of the gratuity in a given case depended upon what respondent 'thought the case was worth.' Further, he stated that in no instance had a client been charged with any of the sums received by Vogele, and ledger sheets in evidence disclosed that all checks made payable to cash were charged to respondent and his partner, one-half to each, as part of their drawing accounts. Checks made payable to Vogele by name were treated as a business expense and deducted for income tax purposes; those payable to cash were not so deducted.

When asked if he had paid 'gratuities' to any other persons for the referral of personal injury cases during the years of 1957, 1958 and 1959, respondent temporized that 'if a person or client would refer a case I would make a gratuity,' and then stated he could recall no individual vidual who had received more than two or three gratuities in those years. Again, upon being queried about 'gratuities' given since the termination of his relationship with Vogele, respondent replied that he had paid some on occasion, but not as many, and explained that he felt the payment of a cash gratuity was no different from the giving of a gift of clothing or something similar. No records were kept of any of the gratuities given, and respondent stated that individual case of client records likewise contained no reference to gratuities or to the person to whom they were given. Respondent promised to look for and present case files involving clients sent to him by Vogele, provided they had not been destroyed, but we find no indication that any such files were ever placed at the disposal of the commissioners. It is axiomatic that an attorney whose conduct is questioned must appear for examination under oath, and must submit for examination whatever records are in his possession relevant to the inquiry. In re Royal, 29 Ill.2d 458, 460, 194 N.E.2d 242.

At all times in question Canon 28 of the Canons of Ethics of the Chicago and State bar associations provided in part: '* * * It is disreputable to * * * breed litigation by seeking out those with claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in order to secure them as clients, or to employ agents or runners for like purposes, or to pay or reward, directly or indirectly, those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office * * *.' Also, Canon 34 provided: 'No division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility.' Based upon the evidence substantially as related, it was the finding of the commissioners that respondent had violated these canons.

Anchoring his argument to the frequently expressed principle that charges in a disciplinary proceeding must be sustained by clear and convincing proof, (e. g. In re Donaghy, 402 Ill. 120, 124, 83 N.E.2d 560,) respondent contends there is no proof that Vogele, Skidmore or any other person actually solicited any cases, or that respondent had any knowledge they were doing so, and as consequence no evidence that business was ever solicited by respondent or by others in his behalf. His theory seems to be that without direct...