Krasner v. Ward

• Decision Date: 12 January 2023
• Docket Number: 563 M.D. 2022
• Parties: Larry Krasner, in his official capacity as the District Attorney of Philadelphia, Petitioner v. Senator Kim Ward, in her official capacity as Interim President Pro Tempore of the Senate; Representative Timothy R. Bonner, in his official capacity as an impeachment manager; Representative Craig Williams, in his official capacity as an impeachment manager; Representative Jared Solomon, in his official capacity as an impeachment manager; and John Does, in their official capacities as members of the Senate Impeachment Committee, Respondents
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

Larry Krasner, in his official capacity as the District Attorney of Philadelphia, Petitioner v. Senator Kim Ward, in her official capacity as Interim President Pro Tempore of the Senate; Representative Timothy R. Bonner, in his official capacity as an impeachment manager; Representative Craig Williams, in his official capacity as an impeachment manager; Representative Jared Solomon, in his official capacity as an impeachment manager; and John Does, in their official capacities as members of the Senate Impeachment Committee, Respondents

No. 563 M.D. 2022

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

January 12, 2023

OPINION NOT REPORTED

Argued: December 29, 2022

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

MEMORANDUM OPINION

ELLEN CEISLER, JUDGE

Petitioner Larry Krasner, in his official capacity as the District Attorney of Philadelphia (District Attorney), has filed a Petition for Review in the Nature of a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment (PFR) in this Court's original jurisdiction.

Through this PFR, Krasner seeks a judicial declaration against Respondents Senator Kim Ward, in her official capacity as Interim President Pro Tempore of the Senate (Interim President);^[1] Representatives Timothy R. Bonner, Craig Williams, Jared Solomon, and John Does, in their official capacities as members of the Senate Impeachment Committee (collectively, Respondents), that the impeachment proceeding against him, which is currently pending in the General Assembly, is unlawful and unconstitutional. Respondents Representatives Timothy R. Bonner, and Craig Williams, in their official capacities as impeachment managers (collectively, Impeachment Managers), have filed preliminary objections to the PFR.^[2] Additionally, Interim President has filed a Cross-Application for Summary Relief (Cross-Application).^[3] Finally, Proposed Intervenor Senator Jay Costa, in his official capacity (Proposed Intervenor), has filed an Application for Leave to Intervene (Intervention Application).

After thorough review, we grant Proposed Intervenor's Intervention Application, overrule Impeachment Managers' preliminary objections in full, grant District Attorney's Application for Summary Relief in part and deny it in part and grant Interim President's Cross-Application in part and deny it in part.

I. Facts and Procedural History

On November 16, 2022, the Pennsylvania House of Representatives (House) passed House Resolution 240 (HR 240), which contained amended articles of impeachment (Amended Articles) against District Attorney, by a vote of 107 to 85. The Amended Articles provide the following bases for impeaching District Attorney:

Article I: Misbehavior in Office In the Nature of Dereliction of Duty and Refusal to Enforce the Law

Article II: Misbehavior in Office In the Nature of Obstruction of House Select Committee Investigation

Article III: Misbehavior in Office In the Nature of Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct; specifically Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal, Rule 8.4 Professional Misconduct, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Impropriety and Appearance of Impropriety in the Matter of Robert Wharton v. Donald T. Vaughn

Article IV: Misbehavior in Office In the Nature of Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct; specifically Rule 3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal, Rule 8.4 Professional Misconduct, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Impropriety and Appearance of Impropriety in the Matter of Commonwealth v. Pownall

Article V: Misbehavior in Office In the Nature of Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Code of Judicial Conduct; specifically Rule 3.3 Candor to Tribunal, Rule 8.4 Professional Misconduct, and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct Impropriety and Appearance of Impropriety in the matter In re: Conflicts of Interest of Philadelphia District Attorney's Office

Article VI: Misbehavior in Office in Nature of Violation of Victims [sic] Rights

Article VII: Misbehavior in Office in the Nature of Violation of the Constitution of Pennsylvania By Usurpation of the Legislative Function

PFR, Ex. C. On November 29, 2022, the Pennsylvania State Senate (Senate) passed Senate Resolution 386 (SR 386), which established "special rules of practice and procedure in the Senate when sitting on impeachment trials[,]" and Senate Resolution 387 (SR 387), which directed the House to "exhibit" the Amended Articles through its designated impeachment managers before the Senate on November 30, 2022.

On November 30, 2022, the Senate enacted Senate Resolution 388 (SR 388), which ordered that a writ of impeachment summons be issued to District Attorney and set the start date of his impeachment trial as January 18, 2023. The 206th General Assembly, which was responsible for passing all of the aforementioned resolutions, terminated at 11:59 p.m. on November 30, 2022, and was replaced by the 207th General Assembly. See Pa. Const. art. II, §§ 2-4. The Senate's summons was then served upon District Attorney on December 1, 2022.

On December 2, 2022, District Attorney filed his PFR with this Court. Therein, he requested judgment against Respondents that would declare the pending impeachment proceedings to be unconstitutional and unlawful. The PFR contains three counts, each of which offers a separate argument for why District Attorney is entitled to such relief. In Count I, District Attorney argues that the Amended Articles, as a pending matter, were rendered void upon the termination of the 206th General Assembly on November 30, 2022, and did not carry over to the 207th General Assembly. PFR ¶¶41-50. In Count II, he claims that he cannot be impeached and removed by the General Assembly, because the Pennsylvania Constitution does not give the General Assembly power to impeach local elected officials, as well as because the power to do so has been delegated to the City of Philadelphia's government. Id. ¶¶52-61. Finally, in Count III, he argues that the Amended Articles are invalid and do not provide a constitutionally valid basis for his impeachment, as none of them assert viable claims that District Attorney engaged in "any misbehavior in office." Id. ¶¶63-79. Accordingly, District Attorney has asked this Court to:

(A) Declare that the Amended Articles and related legislative business, including [SR] 386, 387, and 388, became null and void on November 30, 2022, upon the adjournment sine die of the 206th General Assembly legislative session.

(B) Declare that [a]rticle VI, [s]ection 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution^[4] does not authorize impeachment of . . . [District Attorney] by the General Assembly.

(C) Declare that the Amended Articles against . . . [District Attorney] do not allege conduct that constitutes "any misbehavior in office" within the meaning of [a]rticle VI, [s]ection 6 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

(D) Declare that [] Respondents have no authority to take up the Amended Articles and any such efforts would be unlawful.

(E) Declare that any effort by [] Respondents, House[,] or Senate to take up the Amended Articles or related legislation, including [SR] 386, 387, or 388, is unlawful.

(F) Grant such other relief as is just and proper.

PFR, Prayer for Relief. Contemporaneously, District Attorney also filed an Application for Summary Relief, in which he argues that he is entitled to summary relief on each of the three counts in the PFR.

Both Impeachment Managers and Interim President have filed challenges to the PFR. In their preliminary objections, Impeachment Managers argue that this Court should dismiss the PFR for several reasons. First, Counts I and III present non-justiciable political questions, as it is exclusively within the General Assembly's purview to decide whether impeachment proceedings can continue into a new iteration of the General Assembly, as well as whether District Attorney's behavior constitutes "any misbehavior in office." Impeachment Managers' Br. in Support of Prelim. Objs. at 10-17. Second, District Attorney lacks standing to challenge the impeachment proceedings, as he is not aggrieved by the impeachment proceedings, which have yet to take place. Id. at 18-20. Finally, Counts II and III are not yet ripe for judicial review, as District Attorney is not entitled to preemptive judicial determinations regarding whether someone in his elected office is subject to impeachment and removal by the General Assembly, or whether the impeachment charges against him are sufficient. Id. at 20-25. As for Interim President, she argues in her Cross-Application that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because District Attorney has failed to join the Senate and the Senate Impeachment Committee, both of which Interim President alleges are indispensable parties, as well as because District Attorney has allegedly failed to state claims that are legally sufficient and ripe for judicial review. Interim President's Br. at 16-82.

II. Discussion

A. Indispensable Parties

We first address Interim President's assertion that District Attorney has failed to join all indispensable parties, specifically the Senate and Senate Impeachment Committee, as this argument implicates this Court's jurisdiction to consider the merits of District Attorney's PFR. On this point, Interim President's argument is without merit.

[The Supreme] Court has stated that a party is indispensable "when his or her rights are so connected with the claims of the litigants that no decree can be made without impairing those rights." Sprague v. Casey, . . . 550 A.2d 184, 189 ([Pa.] 1988). "[T]he basic inquiry in determining whether a party is indispensable concerns whether justice can be done in the

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