Krasniqi v. Dallas County Child Protective Services Unit of Texas Dept. of Human Services, 05-90-00965-CV
Citation | 809 S.W.2d 927 |
Decision Date | 07 May 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 05-90-00965-CV,05-90-00965-CV |
Parties | Sadri KRASNIQI and Sebhate Krasniqi, Appellants, v. DALLAS COUNTY CHILD PROTECTIVE SERVICES UNIT OF the TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES, Appellee. |
Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
Kenneth A. Mayfield, J. Craig Jett, Dallas, for appellants.
David Cole, Dallas, for appellee.
Before ENOCH, C.J., and WHITHAM and WHITTINGTON, JJ.
The parent-appellants, Sadri Krasniqi and Sebhate Krasniqi, appeal from a judgment terminating the parent-child relationships between them and their two children, Urtim Krasniqi and Limma Krasniqi. The judgment followed the filing of a petition for termination of parental rights by the appellee, Dallas County Child Protective Services Unit of the Texas Department of Human Services, pursuant to the Texas Family Code, section 15.02(1)(D) and (E) and 15.02(2). The jury found that each parent has knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the children's physical or emotional well-being and each parent has engaged in conduct and knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the children. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 15.02(1)(D) and (E) (Vernon Supp.1991). The jury also found that termination of the parent-child relationship between each parent and the children is in the best interest of the children. See TEX.FAM.CODE ANN. § 15.02(2) (Vernon Supp.1991). The initial points of error raise evidentiary matters only. We have no statement of facts. Accordingly, we affirm.
We have no statement of facts because of "time" constraints imposed by the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The following chronology pertains to the "timeliness" issue before this court and to the orders of this court:
DATE EVENT OR TRANSACTION April 18, Trial court judgment signed 1990 April 26, Motion for New Trial filed in trial court 1990 July 5, Motion for New Trial overruled by trial court 1990 August 16, Record Due in Court of Appeals (Tex.R.App.P. 54(a)) 1990 August 31, Last day for filing a Motion to Extend Time for filing a Statement 1990 of Facts in the Court of Appeals (Tex.R.App.P. 54(c)). September Motion to Extend Time to File Brief in the Court of Appeals 11, 1990 (Sebhate Krasniqi). September Motion to Extend Time to File Brief in Court of Appeals (Sadri 12, 1990 Krasniqi). September Order granting September 12, 1990 Motion and allowing the filing 17, 1990 of brief by October 4, 1990 (Sadri). September Order granting September 11, 1990 Motion and allowing the filing 20, 1990 of brief by October 29, 1990 (Sebhate). October 4, Brief filed in Court of Appeals (Sadri). 1990 October 4, Statement of Facts tendered to Court of Appeals. 1990 October 5, Motion to Extend Time and Motion to Compel Clerk of the Court of 1990 Appeals to file Statement of Facts filed (by both Sadri and Sebhate). October 15, Court of Appeals' Order denying October 5, 1990 Motion to Extend 1990 and Compel and Order striking Statement of Facts (as to both Sadri and Sebhate). October 24, Motion to Reconsider filed in Court of Appeals (Sebhate). 1990 October 25, Motion to Reconsider filed in Court of Appeals (Sadri). 1990 October 29, Court of Appeals' Order denying October 24, 1990 Motion to 1990 Reconsider (Sebhate). October 29, Brief filed in Court of Appeals (Sebhate). 1990 November Second Motion to Reconsider (or Motion for Rehearing on Motion to 13, 1990 Reconsider) filed in Court of Appeals (Sadri). (NOTE: Counsel for Sadri Krasniqi denominated this motion as "MOTION FOR REHEARING OF MOTION TO RECONSIDER APPELLANT'S MOTION TO EXTEND TIME AND COMPEL CLERK TO FILE STATEMENT OF FACTS, OR, ALTERNATIVELY, MOTION TO SUSPEND RULES OR FOR OUT OF TIME APPEAL." Counsel filed it on November 13, 1990. The Order on the original Motion to Reconsider filed on October 25, 1990 had not been acted upon as of November 13, 1990 (although the Order denying the original Motion shows to have been issued two days later). Thus, the Clerk of this Court of Appeals apparently changed the caption of this motion to conform with the situation that existed on the date of filing.) November Court of Appeals' Order denying October 25, 1990 Motion to 15, 1990 Reconsider (Sadri). November Court of Appeals' Order denying November 13, 1990 Motion (Sadri). 30, 1990
Therefore, we have no statement of facts because the parents did not timely file the statement of facts and did not timely move to extend time for filing the statement of facts. Consequently, the statement of facts tendered to this court was stricken. The parents concede that they did not timely file the statement of facts and did not timely move to extend time for filing the statement of facts. The parents, however, in supplemental points of error contained in their respective supplemental briefs, contend that this court has erroneously declined to allow them to file the statement of facts. The parents' supplemental points of error advance three arguments to support their contentions.
First, the parents argue that there is state law authority for out-of-time filing of the statement of facts. The parents point to Rule 2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure providing that "for good cause shown, a court of appeals ... may suspend requirements and provisions of any rule in a particular case on application of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its discretion." TEX.R.APP.P. 2(b) ( ). We quote the rule in its entirety, including its heading:
(b) Suspension of Rules in Criminal Matters. Except as otherwise provided in these rules, in the interest of expediting a decision or for other good cause shown, a court of appeals or the Court of Criminal Appeals may suspend requirements and provisions of any rule in a particular case on application of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in accordance with its direction. Provided, however, that nothing in this rule shall be construed to allow any court to suspend requirements or provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
TEX.R.APP.P. 2(b) ( ). We conclude that Rule 2(b) pertains to criminal appeals only. We reach this conclusion because the body of the rule refers to "a court of appeals" and "the Court of Criminal Appeals," but not to the "Supreme Court." Further, the body of the rule refers to the "Code of Criminal Procedure." Thus, we reason that Rule 2(b) has no application to civil appeals. It is undisputed that a termination of parental rights case, such as the present case, is a civil proceeding and not a criminal proceeding. In concluding that the language of Rule 2(b) refers to criminal appeals only, we place no import to the heading of Rule 2(b): "Suspension of Rules in Criminal Matters." Hence, we do not reach the parents' argument that section 311.024 of the Code Construction Act applies and we must treat the rule's heading as not to "limit or expand the meaning of the statute [rule]." TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.024 (Vernon 1988).
The parents, however, reach elsewhere within the Code Construction Act and insist that the language of section 311.021(3), "a just and reasonable result is intended," should be applied to the present case to mean that denial of the filing of the statement of facts would not be a just and reasonable result. See TEX.GOV'T CODE ANN. § 311.021(3) (Vernon 1988). The parents assert the absence of a "just and reasonable result" constitutes a deprivation of due process rights afforded by the state and federal constitutions. We disagree for the following reasons. First, the parents rely on criminal cases only involving various time requirements. Again, we point out that the present case is a civil appeal, not a criminal appeal. Moreover, a civil proceeding, even one involving a higher degree of proof than that ordinarily required, is not to be treated as a criminal case with all the procedural requirements of a criminal hearing strictly applicable. Howell v. Dallas County Child Welfare Unit, 710 S.W.2d 729, 735 (Tex.App.--Dallas 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018, 107 S.Ct. 1898, 95 L.Ed.2d 505 (1987). Second, due process and equal protection do not require that the procedural time limits for filing the statement of facts cannot be waived in a termination of parental rights case. See Howell, 710 S.W.2d at 734. Therefore, we conclude that the parents have suffered no violation of due process rights afforded by the state and federal constitutions. Hence, we find no merit in the parents' "State Law" argument.
Second, the parents argue that the failure to file the statement of facts deprives them of effective assistance of counsel. The parents maintain that denial of an out-of-time filing of the statement of facts violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because of the ineffectiveness of their counsel on appeal. The parents ground their argument on Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985). In Evitts, the issue before the Supreme Court was "whether the state court's dismissal of the appeal, despite the ineffective assistance of respondent's counsel on appeal, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Evitts, 469 U.S. at 391-92, 105 S.Ct. at 833. Evitts was a criminal case. As in the present case, "ineffective" in Evitts relates to an appellant's failure to timely...
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