Krause Inc. v. Little
| Decision Date | 21 November 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 36406.,36406. |
| Citation | 117 Nev. 929,34 P.3d 566 |
| Parties | KRAUSE INC. and Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., Appellants, v. Don LITTLE, Respondent. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Osborne Law Office and Ann O. Hall, Reno; Law Offices of George H. Ellis, Los Angeles, California, for Appellants.
David L. Bolnick and William R. Kendall, Reno, for Respondent.
Bradley Drendel & Jeanney, Reno, for Amicus Curiae Nevada Trial Lawyers Association.
Before SHEARING, ROSE and BECKER, JJ.
This appeal presents two novel legal questions: first, whether jurors may reconstruct an expert witness's experiment on an allegedly defective product; and second, whether a personal-injury plaintiff, must present expert testimony regarding future pain and suffering in order for the jury to award damages for the plaintiff's broken leg. We conclude that jurors may, using admitted evidence, reenact an experiment as performed by an expert. We further conclude that a broken bone is a sufficiently objective injury for a jury to award future pain and suffering damages without expert testimony.
Respondent, Don Little, a drywall contractor, purchased a Krause Multimatic ladder, manufactured by appellant Krause Inc., from appellant Home Depot U.S.A., Inc. The Multimatic is an articulated ladder that can be used in several ways, such as a stepladder, an extension ladder, or a scaffold.
Little was hired to repair some water damage in a garage. Little set up the Multimatic ladder, made sure that the hinges were locked, and began hanging drywall. While standing on the ladder's third step, Little inadvertently bumped the release lever. The ladder then collapsed and Little fell to the ground.
Little went directly to the emergency room. There, Dr. Mario Porras examined Little's ankle and concluded that it was broken in two places. Dr. Porras performed surgery, which entailed putting the bones back together using a plate and screws. Little stayed at the hospital overnight and left with a half-cast on his ankle.
Dr. Porras examined Little a week later, placed a full cast on his ankle, and recommended that he not apply any pressure on the ankle until the next visit. Two weeks later, Dr. Porras concluded that Little was progressing normally and placed the ankle in a "fracture boot," a type of cast that can be removed so that the ankle can be moved. Dr. Porras testified that five weeks after the injury, Little was progressing well, and he recommended that Little weight-bear as tolerated. Little's healing continued and after two and one-half months, Dr. Porras recommended that he resume full activity.
Five months after the accident, Little returned to Dr. Porras because he was experiencing limited range of motion in his ankle. Dr. Porras determined that Little was experiencing pain from the implanted plate and screws. Dr. Porras removed the plate and screws in an outpatient surgery. Because Little was again progressing well, Dr. Porras released him to full activities. While Little claimed at trial that his ankle is still stiff and painful, Dr. Porras never testified regarding the likelihood of Little's future pain.
Little sued Krause and Home Depot, claiming strict product liability based upon a manufacturing and/or design defect. At trial, Little presented the expert testimony of Lindley Manning, a Nevada registered mechanical engineer. Manning performed tests upon the accident ladder to determine whether Little's version of the accident was accurate. He attempted to replicate the conditions by setting up the ladder on a concrete surface (similar to the floor of the garage in which Little was injured) and having a man of Little's approximate size move in the manner described by Little.
After several tests, Manning discovered that when touched in a certain way, the release lever would engage and cause the ladder to collapse. Because this touch is typical with normal use of the ladder, Manning concluded that the ladder was defectively designed. He opined that the ladder's dangerousness could be cured by placing a guard over the release lever or by warning the user that the ladder could collapse when touched in this way.
Krause and Home Depot presented the expert testimony of another mechanical engineer, Dr. Mack Quan. Dr. Quan did not perform any tests on the accident ladder. Instead, he performed various tests on other Krause ladders. Rather than using a stunt man to activate the release lever, Dr. Quan loaded the exemplar ladders with a static weight while pushing and pulling from various directions. After performing his tests, Dr. Quan concluded that the ladder was "adequate for its intended use," and that Little must have attempted to climb the ladder without locking the appropriate hinges. On cross-examination, however, Dr. Quan admitted that if the hinges were not locked, the ladder would collapse when a person attempted to climb it, not when the person was already standing on it. Dr. Quan also admitted that the Multimatic is the only articulated ladder that he is aware that collapses by disengaging one mechanism (the release lever that is located near the third rung). Other articulated ladders require a person to simultaneously disengage two mechanisms in order to cause collapse, making inadvertent collapses more difficult.
In a motion in limine, Little sought a ruling permitting him to present evidence of four other similar accidents to show that the Krause Multimatic ladder was defectively designed. The district court initially ruled that Little could present the deposition testimony of three other claimants, Theodore Klentzin, Charles Eggers, and Gilbert Bloomquist, and accordingly, the depositions were read to the jury. After Little presented these depositions, the district court struck two of the depositions because they were not substantially similar to the circumstances of Little's accident. The district court then instructed the jury "to disregard all testimony concerning Charles Eggers and Gilbert Bloomquist." The jury was further instructed: "disregard anything you have heard as a result of that testimony in regards to either or both of these matters[,] and you shall treat those matters as if you had never heard of them." Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Little and awarded him $100,000 in damages ($80,000 in past damages and $20,000 for future pain and suffering). Krause and Home Depot moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
Standard of review
This court reviews the district court's grant or denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard.1 The district court's decision will not be overturned absent a palpable abuse of discretion.2 However, a district court's order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not appealable.3 We may construe, however, the appellant's notice of appeal from an order denying judgment notwithstanding the verdict as an intent to appeal from the underlying judgment.4
Expert witness qualification
Appellants contend that the district court erred in allowing Manning to testify as an expert witness. This court has repeatedly stated that it will not weigh the credibility of witnesses because that duty rests with the trier of fact.5 Instead, we review a district court's decision to admit expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. We will only reverse a district court's decision to admit expert testimony on a showing of a clear abuse of discretion.6
Appellants argue that this court should adopt a new standard for the admissibility of expert testimony, akin to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.7 We have previously declined to adopt the Daubert standard.8 We now take this opportunity to reaffirm our existing legal standard concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. The district court is in a better position than this court to determine the helpfulness of proposed testimony in light of the material facts in issue. When the district court's exercise of discretion is not manifestly wrong under NRS 50.275, we will not reverse.9
NRS 50.275 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by special knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify to matters within the scope of such knowledge." Here, the ladder's alleged defectiveness was a fact in issue. Here, scientific knowledge regarding the ladder's potential to collapse had the potential to assist the jury in determining whether the Krause ladder was defective.
Manning is a registered mechanical engineer with two degrees and multiple certifications in the field. Manning has been a professor in the engineering department of the University of Nevada, Reno, for twenty-five years. Further, Manning belongs to numerous organizations of professional engineers. Under such circumstances, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to characterize Manning as a qualified expert with special knowledge that could assist the jury.
Spoliation of evidence
Krause and Home Depot also argue that the district court erred in admitting the accident ladder into evidence. Appellants contend that Manning's experiments damaged the ladder, making its admission highly prejudicial. "NRS 48.035 allows the district court to exclude evidence if the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or undue delay."10 "By requiring the prejudicial effect of evidence to `substantially outweigh' its probative value, NRS 48.035 [strongly favors] admissibility."11 To merit exclusion, the evidence must unfairly prejudice an opponent, typically by appealing to the emotional and sympathetic tendencies of a jury, rather than the jury's intellectual ability to evaluate...
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