Krause v. Krause
| Decision Date | 07 March 1978 |
| Citation | 174 Conn. 361,387 A.2d 548 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | Linda U. KRAUSE v. Herbert E. KRAUSE. |
Herbert V. Camp, Jr., Ridgefield, for the appellant (defendant).
Julius B. Kuriansky, Stamford, with whom was Marshall Goldberg, Stamford, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Before HOUSE, C. J., and COTTER, LOISELLE, BOGDANSKI and LONGO, JJ. COTTER, Associate Justice.
The basic issues decisive on this appeal are whether the trial court abused its discretion (1) in failing to make an award or assignment of property to the defendant based upon his claim that the plaintiff had an opportunity for future acquisition of capital assets and income from her parents and (2) in failing to admit into evidence the plaintiff's mother's testimony of her net worth. The court rendered judgment dissolving the marriage, granted custody of the minor child to the plaintiff, and ordered the defendant to pay child support of $50 per week and to maintain health insurance for the minor child's benefit. The judgment further provided that "neither the plaintiff nor defendant is entitled to support or a further division of each other's property and each may retain the assets shown on his or her financial affidavit, and that the defendant may retain the items and sums taken by him when he left the home."
The defendant does not specifically assign error in the court's conclusions that neither party is entitled to alimony or any further division of each other's property. Each of the conclusions which the defendant does challenge is amply supported by the unattacked findings of fact which include the facts that the defendant regularly drank huge amounts of alcohol daily, causing him to become grossly overweight; that he presently has gross earnings of $445 per week; that he made no contribution toward the acquisition, preservation or appreciation in value of any of the plaintiff's assets; and that certain income-producing assets held by the plaintiff were not totally secure. It is the defendant's position that the court erred in failing to consider all the factors outlined in § 46-51 of the General Statutes 1 in reaching its conclusion regarding the assignment of property. Its determination regarding the type and amount of property to be assigned in an action for divorce or dissolution of a marriage is based upon the circumstances of the parties to the action and is within the court's sound discretion, taking into account the criteria set forth in § 46-51 of the General Statutes. See Chambliss v. Chambliss, 171 Conn. 278, 370 A.2d 924. Although the finding did not recite the precise language of § 46-51 regarding the factors to be considered in reaching a conclusion relative to an assignment of property, the finding, taken as a whole, and the memorandum of decision clearly indicate that it fully considered and took into account the appropriate statutory criteria.
A finding will not be corrected by the addition of facts as requested in the draft finding which will not affect the result; Rushchak v. West Haven, 167 Conn. 564, 566, 356 A.2d 104; which are merely detailed restatements of facts already in the finding; Cleveland v. Cleveland, 165 Conn. 95, 96, 328 A.2d 691; or which do not appear in the draft finding. Kaskel v. Steinberg, 142 Conn. 379, 381, 114 A.2d 853. Similarly, findings made by the trial court which are supported by evidence printed in the appendix to the plaintiff's brief, or which are immaterial to the issues on appeal, will not be stricken. Practice Book § 627.
The defendant's final claim of error relates to the decision of the trial court in sustaining the plaintiff's objection to the admission of testimony of the plaintiff's mother, Mrs. Lenore Urdang, regarding her net worth. From 1968 to the date of the trial, the plaintiff received income from investments and gifts from her parents, who customarily gave her and the minor child $3000 each year. Mrs. Urdang testified that she and her husband wished to provide for the plaintiff...
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...calculate, largely because of the unquantifiable aspects of human nature which often cause wills to be revised. See Krause v. Krause, [174 Conn. 361, 387 A.2d 548 (1978)]. We conclude, therefore, that the court did not err in considering evidence of the plaintiffs unaccrued pension rights."......
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...and future testamentary capacity, valuation of the estates of others, familial relationships, and so forth. See Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 365, 387 A.2d 548 (1978). The record in this case shows no extraordinary circumstances which would support treating Henry's expectancy as a part o......
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...precluded from equitable distribution under § 46b-81. See Rubin v. Rubin, 204 Conn. 224, 236-39, 527 A.2d 1184 (1987); Krause v. Krause, 174 Conn. 361, 387 A.2d 548 (1978). In Krafick, we stated that unlike a property interest, an "expectancy may never be realized.... The term expectancy de......
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