Kravets v. Anthropologie, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 June 2022
• Docket Number: 22-cv-60443-BLOOM/Valle
• Parties: ESTA KRAVETS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ANTHROPOLOGIE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida

ESTA KRAVETS, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. ANTHROPOLOGIE, INC., Defendant.

No. 22-cv-60443-BLOOM/Valle

United States District Court, S.D. Florida

June 3, 2022

ORDER ON MOTION TO COMPEL INDIVIDUAL ARBITRATION AND STAY LITIGATION

BETH BLOOM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant Anthropologie, Inc.'s (“Defendant”) Motion to Compel Individual Arbitration and Stay Litigation, ECF No [18] (“Motion”). Plaintiff Esta Kravets (“Plaintiff”) has filed a Response in Opposition ECF No. [25] (“Response”), to which Defendant filed a Reply, ECF No. [26] (“Reply”). The Court has carefully reviewed the Motion, all related submissions the record in this case, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, the Motion is granted.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff initiated this class action against Defendant on February 1, 2022, in the Circuit Court of the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit in and for Broward County, Florida. See ECF No. [1-1] at 4. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(2) (“Count I”) and 47 U.S.C. § 227(B) (“Count II”). See id. On February 28, 2022, Defendant removed the case to this Court. See ECF No. [1].

In the instant Motion, Defendant requests that the Court compel the parties to arbitration and stay the case. ECF No. [18]. Defendant argues that Plaintiff agreed to the Anthropologie Messaging Terms & Conditions (“Text Terms”) for the text messaging program (“Text Program”), which includes an arbitration provision directing the parties to resolve all disputes related to the Text Terms through arbitration (“Arbitration Provision”). The Arbitration Provision states in relevant part:

Dispute Resolution

1. General. In the interest of resolving disputes between you and Anthropologie in the most expedient and cost effective manner, you and Anthropologie agree that any dispute arising out of or in any way related to these messaging terms and conditions (“Messaging Terms”) or your receipt of text messages from Anthropologie or its service providers will be resolved by binding arbitration. Arbitration is less formal than a lawsuit in court. Arbitration uses a neutral arbitrator instead of a judge or jury, may allow for more limited discovery than in court, and can be subject to very limited review by courts. Arbitrators can award the same damages and relief that a court can award. This agreement to arbitrate disputes includes all claims arising out of or in any way related to these Messaging Terms, or your receipt of text messages from Anthropologie or its service providers whether based in contract, tort, statute, fraud, misrepresentation, or any other legal theory, and regardless of when a claim arises. YOU UNDERSTAND AND AGREE THAT, BY AGREEING TO THESE MESSAGING TERMS, YOU AND Anthropologie ARE EACH WAIVING THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY JURY OR TO PARTICIPATE IN A CLASS ACTION AND THAT THESE MESSAGING TERMS SHALL BE SUBJECT TO AND GOVERNED BY THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT.

ECF No. [18-1] at 11 (emphasis in original).^[1] In support of the Motion, Defendant submitted the Declaration of Emily Kaplan, ECF No. [18-1] (“Kaplan Declaration”).

Plaintiff responds that she did not have actual or constructive notice of the Arbitration Provision because (1) Defendant did not provide Plaintiff with reasonably conspicuous notice of the Text Terms; (2) Plaintiff did not unambiguously manifest assent to Defendant's terms; and (3) Plaintiff did not ratify any agreement through her participation in the Text Program. See ECF No. [25]. In the alternative, Plaintiff argues that the Court should defer ruling on the Motion and grant leave to conduct limited arbitration-specific discovery. See id. at 13-15.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The presence of a valid arbitration provision raises a strong presumption in favor of enforcement. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 63031 (1985) (stressing that the enforcement of a mutually agreed upon arbitration or forum-selection clause serves as an “indispensable precondition to the achievement of the orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction”). Indeed, the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 9 U.S.C. § 1, et seq., “embodies a ‘liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.'” Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc. v. Johannesburg Consol. Invs., 553 F.3d 1351, 1366 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)). Accordingly, the FAA requires courts to “rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate.” Brandon, Jones, Sandall, Zeide, Kohn, Chalal & Musso, P.A. v. MedPartners, Inc., 312 F.3d 1349, 1357-58 (11th Cir. 2002) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 625-26), abrogated on other grounds by Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Cent. Pension Fund of Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs & Participating Emp'rs, 134 S.Ct. 773 (2014); see also Hemispherx Biopharma, Inc., 553 F.3d at 1366 (citing Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985)). Under the FAA, a written agreement to arbitrate is “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.” 9 U.S.C. § 2.

Despite courts' proclivity for enforcement, a party will not be required to arbitrate where it has not agreed to do so. See Nat'l Auto Lenders, Inc. v. SysLOCATE, Inc., 686 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2010), aff'd, 433 Fed.Appx. 842 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)). “Under federal law, arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion.” World Rentals & Sales, LLC v. Volvo Constr. Equip. Rents, Inc., 517 F.3d 1240, 1244 (11th Cir. 2008). It is axiomatic that the determination of whether parties have agreed to submit a dispute to arbitration is an issue of law subject to judicial resolution. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287, 296 (2010). Generally, this determination requires the district court to apply standard principles of state contract law. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 939 (1995); see also P&S Bus. Machs., Inc. v. Canon USA, Inc., 331 F.3d 804, 807 (11th Cir. 2003).

Under Florida law, when presented with a motion to compel arbitration, a court must consider three factors: (1) whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitrate was waived. Nat'l Auto Lenders, Inc. v. SysLOCATE, Inc., 686 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2010) aff'd, 433 Fed.Appx. 842 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Sims v. Clarendon Nat'l Ins. Co., 336 F.Supp.2d 1311, 1326 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Marine Envt'l. Partners, Inc. v. Johnson, 863 So.2d 423, 426 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); and Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1999)) (“Under both federal and Florida law, there are three factors for the court to consider in determining a party's right to arbitrate: (1) a written agreement exists between the parties containing an arbitration clause; (2) an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) the right to arbitration has not been waived.”).

In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that courts should “treat motions to compel arbitration similarly to motions for summary judgment.” Hearn v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, LLC, 992 F.3d 1209, 1215 n.3 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Bazemore v. Jefferson Cap. Sys., LLC, 827 F.3d 1325, 1333 (11th Cir. 2016) (concluding “that a summary judgment-like standard is appropriate and hold[ing] that a district court may conclude as a matter of law that parties did or did not enter into an arbitration agreement only if ‘there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact' concerning the formation of such an agreement”)). Once the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact, then “the burden shifts to the nonmovant to show evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.” Deal v. Tugalo Gas Co., 2021 WL 1049813, at *7 (11th Cir. 2021). “A plaintiff challenging the enforcement of an arbitration agreement bears the burden to establish, by substantial evidence, any defense to the enforcement of the agreement.” Inetianbor v. CashCall, Inc., 923 F.Supp.2d 1358, 1362 (S.D. Fla. 2013) (citing Bess v. Check Express, 294 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (11th Cir. 2002)). In determining whether to compel arbitration, district courts must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Allen v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 121 F.3d 642, 646 (11th Cir. 1997).

“By its terms, the [FAA] leaves no room for the exercise of discretion by a district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed.” Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 213. Thus, if the criteria above are satisfied, a court is required to issue an order compelling arbitration. See John B. Goodman Ltd. P'ship v. THF Constr., Inc., 321 F.3d 1094, 1095 (11th Cir. 2003) (“Under the FAA, . . . a district court must grant a motion to compel arbitration if it is satisfied that the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute.”).

III. DISCUSSION

As noted above, Defendant requests that the Court compel Plaintiff to submit her claims to arbitration and stay the case. See ECF No. [18]. The parties do not dispute that an arbitrable issue exists and that the right to arbitrate was not waived. As such, the only material issue before the Court is whether there was a valid agreement to arbitrate. See Nat'l Auto Lenders, Inc. v. SysLOCATE, Inc., 686 F.Supp.2d 1318, 1322 (S.D. Fla. 2010) aff'd, 433 Fed.Appx. 842 (11th Cir.2011).

...