Kravis v. Hock

• Decision Date: 09 June 1948
• Docket Number: No. 301.,301.
• Citation: 137 N.J.L. 252,59 A.2d 657
• Parties: KRAVIS v. HOCK, Commissioner of Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

137 N.J.L. 252

59 A.2d 657

KRAVIS

v.HOCK, Commissioner of Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.

No. 301.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

June 9, 1948.

Certiorari proceeding by Rebecca Kravis, trading as the Paddock International, against Erwin B. Hock, Commissioner of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, to review an order of the commissioner revoking the petitioner's plenary retail consumption license.

Application for writ of certiorari denied.

See also 136 N.J.L. 161, 54 A.2d 778.

May term, 1948, before DONGES, COLIE, and EASTWOOD, JJ.

Emerson Richards, of Atlantic City, for petitioner.

Walter D. Van Riper, Atty. Gen., by Samuel B. Helfand, Deputy Atty. Gen., for respondent.

EASTWOOD, Justice.

Disciplinary proceedings were instituted by respondent, Commissioner of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, against the petitioner, holder of Plenary Retail Consumption License C-106, issued to her by the Board of Commissioners of the City of Atlantic City, for premises 1643 Atlantic Avenue, Atlantic City, New Jersey. As the result of a hearing of the charges, the Commissioner made an order on April 20, 1948, revoking the license in question, effective immediately. Upon application to this Court an order to show cause why certiorari should not issue was granted, and it was provided therein that the order of April 20, 1948, be stayed and suspended pending the further order of this Court.

As the bases of the order of revocation the Commissioner assigned three violations of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Law on the part of the petitioner licensee, viz:

(1) Petitioner unlawfully allowed, permitted and suffered females employed on her premises to accept beverages at the expense of and as gifts from customers and patrons in violation of Rule 22 of State Regulations No. 20; (2) petitioner knowingly employed and had connected with her in a business capacity one Edward Kravis, a person who would fail to qualify as a licensee under the provisions of R.S. 33:1-1 et seq., N.J.S.A., and (3) petitioner knowingly employed and had connected with her in a business capacity said Edward Kravis, who had been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, in violation of Rule 1 of State Regulations No. 13.

The petitioner pleaded not guilty to the foregoing charges and as a result of said hearing thereon, she was found guilty as charged, with consequent revocation of the plenary retail consumption license in question.

We have carefully reviewed the testimony taken before the Hearer Edward F. Hodges, on behalf of the Commissioner of the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, as well as the conclusions of said Commissioner and his findings of facts set forth therein. The Commissioner determined that it had been established by the evidence that certain females who had been secured by the petitioner through the services of a New York theatrical agency and who had appeared in a show running on the petitioner's premises during the month of November, 1947, had on the several dates mentioned in the charges accepted alcoholic drinks in the petitioner's barroom at the expense of and as gifts from various customers and patrons; that Edward Kravis, a son of the petitioner, had been knowingly employed and connected with the licensed business in violation of R.S. 33:1-1 et seq., N.J.S.A., having been previously convicted on December 10, 1943, of the crime of aiding and abetting in lewd entertainment, a crime involving moral turpitude at the licensed premises. We conclude that there was ample evidence to justify said conviction by the Commissioner. Under the disciplinary proceedings instituted against petitioner, to justify her conviction, respondent was only required to establish the truth of said charges by a preponderance of the believable evidence and not to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Such proceedings are civil in nature and not criminal. Grant Lunch Corp. v. Driscoll, 129 N.J.L. 408, 29 A.2d 888, affirmed 130 N.J.L. 554, 33 A.2d 900, certiorari denied 320 U.S. 801, 64 S.Ct. 431, 88 L.Ed. 484; The Panda v. Driscoll, Err. & App., 135 N.J.L. 164, 50 A.2d 630; Commonwealth v. Lyons, 142 Pa.Super. 54, 15 A.2d 851.

Petitioner contends that her conviction should be reversed on the ground that the female entertainers, allegedly treated to drinks, were not employees of the licensee; that they were ‘independent contractors', having been furnished through a theatrical agency in New York. We think this argument is beside the point and specious. Rule 22 of State Regulations No. 20 provides:

‘No plenary or seasonal retail consumption licensee shall allow, permit or suffer any female employed on the licensed premises to accept any food or beverage, alcoholic or otherwise, at the expense of or as a gift from any customer or patron.’

It will be ovserved that said regulation only makes it necessary to prove that the females are ‘employed...