Krebs v. Blankenship
| Citation | 80 S.E. 948,73 W.Va. 539 |
| Court | Supreme Court of West Virginia |
| Decision Date | 27 January 1914 |
| Parties | KREBS v. BLANKENSHIP et al. |
KREBS
v.
BLANKENSHIP et al.
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.
Jan. 27, 1914.
1. Partnership (§§ 5, 65*)—Agreement Between Partners—Construction.
By a contract in writing, K. and B. agreed "to option coal and timber lands" and to secure, when necessary, renewals of options; K. to furnish the "option money" to offset the services of B. in securing the options and renewals, and, "in case of a sale of the property under option or what may be optioned, " to divide the profits equally between them, "less option money." Each of them was thereby authorized "to sell the property under option, and to do all in his power to negotiate such sale." Held, that K. and B. thereby became partners for the purposes stated; that, when properly construed according to its terms alone or by its terms and the conduct of the partners, the contract authorized dealings in lands optioned, as well as in the instruments under which they thus controlled the. lands.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. §§ 15, 16, 92, 93 1/2; Dec. Dig. §§ 5, 65.*]
2. Partnership (§§ 70, 98*)—Partners—Dual Relation—Secret Dealings—Accounting.
A p, artner occupies a dual relation in respect of his dealings with his associates and with the partnership assets. As to the former, he is a trustee; as to the latter, a cestui que trust. Out of this dual relation arises the reciprocal duty by which each partner is required to refrain from all concealment in his transactions with his copartners and with the common property; and if, by fraud or concealment, he derives a benefit to the exclusion of his associates, equity will treat him as a trustee of the firm, and compel him to account therefor.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. §§ 114, 152; Dec. Dig. §§ 70, 98.*]
3. Partnership (§ 95*)—Dealings Between Partners—Goon Faith.
Partners in their dealings with each other are required to use the utmost good faith. If either of them seeks to acquire the interest of another, he must make to him a frank and honest disclosure of all knowledge possessed by him, from which his associate may form a sound judgment as to the value of such interest.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. § 95.*]
4. Partnership (§ 95*)—Dealinos Between Partners—Equitable Relief.
If, without a full disclosure of all knowledge within his exclusive possession, one partner, by the purchase of his copartner's interest, secures an unfair and inequitable advantage, he commits a breach of faith, from the effect of which equity will grant relief at the suit of the injured partner.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. § 95.*]
5. Partnership (§ 95*) — Termination — Secret Profit.
A partner cannot terminate the partnership relation in order to secure to himself a profit from a sale secretly effected by him of the community property, unless he makes a full, frank, and honest disclosure of all the facts and circumstances, from which his copartners may form a sound judgment as to the purpose and propriety of such dissolution.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. § 95.*]
[80 S.E. 949]6. Partnership (§ 98*)—Secret Profits—Accounting.
If to the firm property a pretended right is fraudulently obtained by one partner, who thereafter, with it as a nucleus, secretly secures other like property, and, by a sale of all of it, derives a profit, he will, at the suit of his copartner thus defrauded, be required to account to the latter for his proportionate share.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Partnership, Cent. Dig. § 152; Dec. Dig. § 98.*]
7. Estoppel (§ 50*)—Conduct.
To bind one by estoppel from conduct, he must have reasonable ground to anticipate that another will change his position, or in some way act on the faith of the conduct to his detriment.
[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Estoppel, Cent. Dig. § 142; Dec. Dig. § 56.*]
Appeal from Circuit Court, Raleigh County.
Bill by George R. Krebs against P. L. Blankenship and others. From decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.
Brown, Jackson & Knight, of Charleston, for appellant.
Sanders & Crockett, of Blue-field, for appellees.
LYNCH, J. Upon final hearing on pleadings and proof, the circuit court dismissed the bill of George R. Krebs, by which he sought a decree requiring P. L. Blankenship to pay to him a share of the profits derived, as charged by the bill, from the sale of certain lands in which Krebs and Blankenship were interested as partners. From the decree of dismissal, Krebs has appealed to this court.
On May 29, 1909, Krebs and Blankenship entered into an agreement "to option coal and timber lands" and to secure renewals of options when necessary, Krebs to furnish the "option money" to "offset the services" of Blankenship in securing the options and renewals. In case of a sale of the property under option "or what may be optioned, " they were to divide the profits equally, one-half to each, less "option money." Each of them was thereby authorized to sell the property under option and to do all in his power to negotiate such sale. This agreement is properly construed by the parties as constituting a partnership between Krebs and Blankenship. They differ only as to the scope of the dealings within its terms, Blankenship contending that the firm cannot deal as partners in the property optioned, though they may deal in options. This distinction is not warranted by the terms of the agreement. In fact, it is not seriously urged. The contract speaks of the "property under option or what may be optioned, " and gives to each partner authority "to sell the property under option." Besides, in the course of the joint dealings, the partners construed the terms as comprehending lands, and not inere ly the instruments under which they controlled the lands.
At the date of the agreement, Blankenship had options on 2, 100 acres of coal and timber lands in Mercer county—the Davis-Smith-Maitland 1, 100 acres, that is, a boundary in which the three persons named had interests, and the Karnes 1, 000 acres. Although the options themselves bear a subsequent date, these are the tracts in contemplation as a nucleus of a larger acreage at the inception of the joint dealings, whether, in fact, under their joint control at that time or later. This fact is conceded; at least it is affirmed by Krebs, and not satisfactorily denied by Blankenship.
After agreeing among themselves upon the location of the territory to which the joint dealings should be confined, Blankenship acquired in his own name options on other lands...
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