Kreider Dairy Farms v. Glickman

Decision Date09 June 1999
Docket NumberNos. 98-1983,Nos. 98-1906,Nos. 98-1982,98-1982 and 98-1983,s. 98-1906,s. 98-1982,s. 98-1983
Citation190 F.3d 113
Parties(3rd Cir. 1999) KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC., a Pennsylvania Family Farm Corporation v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture, DAN GLICKMAN, Appellant in, (D.C. 98-cv-00518) KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC., a Pennsylvania Family Farm Corporation v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture; Ahava Dairy Products Inc. KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC., Appellant in(D.C. 95-cv-06648) KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC., a Pennsylvania Family Farm Corporation v. DAN GLICKMAN, Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture KREIDER DAIRY FARMS, INC., Appellant in, (D.C. 98-cv-00518) , 98-1982 and 98-1983 Argued:
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania District Judge: Honorable Edward N. Cahn

[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Marvin Beshore, Esquire (ARGUED), Dawn L. Lisi, Esquire, Milspaw & Beshore, 130 State Street, P.O. Box 946, Harrisburg, PA 17108-0946, COUNSEL FOR KREIDER DAIRY FARMS

David W. Ogden, Esquire, Acting Assistant Attorney General

Michael R. Stiles, Esquire, United States Attorney

Barbara C. Biddle, Esquire, United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, 10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530-0001

Michael E. Robinson, Esquire, United States Department of Justice, Appellate Section, 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530

Douglas Hallward-Driemeier, Esquire (ARGUED), United States Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, 601 D Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20530-0001, COUNSEL FOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

Before: SLOVITER and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges, and WARD,* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MANSMANN, Circuit Judge.

These appeals implicate important issues related to our appellate jurisdiction in the context of a dispute over dairy regulations. Specifically, we must determine the extent to which our jurisdiction extends to District Court orders remanding for further factual findings in administrative proceedings in light of Forney v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 266, 118 S. Ct. 1984 (1998). We hold today that because the discussion on appellate jurisdiction in Forney is founded upon specific language located within the Social Security Act, the holding in Forney does not extend to all District Court orders remanding for further administrative proceedings. We also reaffirm our longstanding rule that we lack jurisdiction over District Court orders remanding for further administrative findings unless an important legal issue has been finally determined which would evade appellate review in the absence of an immediate appeal.

Applying these principles to the appeals before us, we find that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal filed by Kreider Dairy Farm, Inc. ("Kreider") in 1998 from a 1996 District Court order which remanded for further factual findings relating to the merits of the dairy dispute. Accordingly, we will dismiss Kreider's appeal (No. 98-1982) for lack of jurisdiction. Under these same principles, however, we find that we do have appellate jurisdiction over the timely appeal filed by the Secretary of the United States Department of Agriculture ("USDA") from the District Court's August 10, 1998 order reversing a USDA determination that Kreider's administrative appeal on remand was untimely (No. 98-1906) and remanding for further administrative proceedings on the merits.

With respect to the merits of the USDA's appeal, we hold that the District Court erred in exercising jurisdiction over Kreider's appeal and accordingly will vacate the District Court's 1998 Order. Finally, we will dismiss summarily Kreider's "cross-appeal" from the District Court's August 10, 1998 order (No. 98-1983) as Kreider has informed us that it never intended to cross-appeal from that order and has not pursued that cross-appeal in its briefing or at oral argument before us.

I.

These appeals come to us after a long and tortured procedural history that spans nearly a decade. Because this procedural history is central to our decision, we shall discuss it in some detail. By contrast, because we do not reach the merits of the parties' dispute over the dairy regulations at issue in these appeals, the underlying factual background that forms the basis of that dispute will be discussed only generally.1

A.

Kreider is a dairy farm corporation that produces and distributes packaged kosher fluid milk within the New York-New Jersey milk marketing area with the aid of two independent subdistributors. The production and sale of milk within the New York-New Jersey milk marketing area is regulated by Order 2 which was promulgated under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 ("AMAA"), 7 U.S.C. S 601 et seq. Under Order 2, certain milk producers can qualify for producer-handler status which entitles them to an exemption from paying certain fees in connection with the sales of milk. Kreider first applied for producer-handler status under Order 2 by letter dated December 19, 1990.

The Market Administrator ("MA") responsible for administering Order 2 denied Kreider's application for producer-handler status, finding that Kreider did not meet the producer-handler requirements due to Kreider's use of independent subdistributors. See generally 7 C.F.R. S 1002.12(b)(1999) (setting forth exclusive control requirements for producer-handler exemption). On December 23, 1993, Kreider challenged the MA's decision by filing a petition with the USDA pursuant to section 608c(15)(A) of the AMAA.

After a December 14, 1994 hearing, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") issued a decision holding that Kreider was entitled to producer-handler status under Order 2. The Agricultural Marketing Service appealed to a Judicial Officer ("JO") of the USDA, who acts on behalf of the Secretary of Agriculture in all adjudicative matters. See 7 C.F.R. S 2.35 (1999). The JO reversed the ALJ's decision, holding that Kreider was not entitled to producer-handler status. See In re: Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc., 94 AMA Docket No. M-1-2, 1995 WL 598331 (U.S.D.A. September 28, 1995).

On October 18, 1995, Kreider filed a complaint pursuant to the AMAA in the District Court challenging the JO's decision. See AMAA, 7 U.S.C. S 608c(15)(B)(1994). By opinion and order filed August 15, 1996 ("1996 Order"), the District Court denied the parties' cross motions for summary judgment and remanded for further administrative findings on whether Kreider was "riding the pool," i.e., whether Kreider was the type of dairy for which producer-handler status should be denied pursuant to the promulgation history of the producer-handler exemption. See Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, No. Civ. A. 95- 6648, 1996 WL 472414 (E.D. Pa. August 15, 1996). Neither Kreider nor the USDA appealed the District Court's 1996 Order at that time.

B.

On remand, the ALJ held a hearing and issued a decision on August 12, 1997 holding that Kreider was "riding the pool" and therefore was not entitled to producer-handler status. Under applicable regulations, the ALJ's decision becomes effective thirty-five (35) days after service upon the parties unless appealed to the JO thirty days (30) after service. See 7 C.F.R. SS 900.64(c), 900.65(a)(1999). The ALJ's decision was served on Kreider on August 15, 1997.

On September 12, 1997, Kreider moved for an extension of time to file its appeal from the ALJ's August 12, 1997 decision. The JO granted Kreider an extension until September 19, 1997. On September 19, 1997, Kreider sent its appeal via Federal Express next day delivery. The Office of the Hearing Clerk stamped Kreider's appeal as received on September 25, 1997.

On January 12, 1998, the JO issued an opinion denying Kreider's administrative appeal as untimely because, under applicable regulations, an administrative appeal is deemed to be filed "when it is postmarked, or when it is received by the hearing clerk." 7 C.F.R. S 900.69(d)(1999). The JO held that because the term "postmarked" requires a United States Postal Service postmark, a date label generated by Federal Express does not toll the appeal period. See In re: Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc., No. 94 AMA Docket No. M-1-2, 1998 WL 25746, at *8 (U.S.D.A. January 12, 1998). Kreider filed a timely motion for reconsideration.

While Kreider's motion for reconsideration was pending before the JO, Kreider filed a complaint with the District Court on February 2, 1998 challenging the ALJ's August 12, 1997 decision and noting that the JO had denied its appeal as untimely.2 The JO denied Kreider's motion for reconsideration on February 20, 1998. On April 3, 1998, Kreider filed an amended complaint challenging the JO's January 12, 1998 and February 20, 1998 decisions. The USDA filed a motion to dismiss.

By opinion and order entered August 10, 1998 ("1998 Order"), the District Court denied the USDA's motion to dismiss, vacated the JO's January 12, 1998 and February 20, 1998 decisions, and remanded for the JO to consider the merits of Kreider's appeal of the ALJ's August 12, 1997 decision. See Kreider Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Glickman, No. 98- 518, 1998 WL 481926 (E.D. Pa. August 10, 1998). The District Court held that because Kreider's April 3, 1998 amended complaint challenging the JO's decisions related back to Kreider's initial complaint filed on February 2, 1998, Kreider's appeal of the JO's January 12, 1998 decision was timely. The District Court further determined that because the JO erred in holding that a United States postmark was required under applicable regulations, Kreider's appeal to the JO from the ALJ's decision was timely and should have been considered by the JO. The District Court accordingly entered the 1998 Order remanding for the JO to consider the merits of Kreider's appeal from the ALJ's...

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