Kreitzer v. Puerto Rico Cars, Inc.

• Citation: 417 F. Supp. 498
• Decision Date: 03 June 1975
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 786-73.
• Parties: Nancy KREITZER, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO CARS, INC. et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

417 F. Supp. 498

Nancy KREITZER, Plaintiff, v. PUERTO RICO CARS, INC. et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 786-73.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

June 3, 1975.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Harvey B. Nachman, Nachman, Feldstein & Gelpi, San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.

Eli B. Arroyo, Géigel, Silva, Soler Favale & Arroyo, San Juan, P. R., for defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

TOLEDO, Chief Judge.

This complaint was filed on August 30, 1973. In it plaintiff alleges that on May 23, 1973 while she was in her own vehicle, riding as a passenger, she was injured when said car was struck by a 1973 Ford LTD operated by Juan J. Garcia, who had leased said vehicle from the defendants Puerto Rico Cars, Inc. and Hertz Rent-A-Car, which were the owners thereof. As a result of the foregoing, the plaintiff became sick, sore, lame and disabled, suffering injuries, was compelled to undergo hospital and medical services, and will be compelled to undergo future medical, hospital and surgical treatment.

Plaintiff also sued Insurance Company of North America which was the insuror of Hertz Rent-A-Car, the parent corporation, and all the local subsidiaries at the moment the accident occurred.

Jurisdiction was invoked under the diversity provision, Title 28, United States Code, Section 1332.

On October 15, 1973, defendant filed a motion requesting a non-resident bond since the plaintiff was a resident of the State of Maryland. Plaintiff opposed said motion on October 18, 1973, alleging that the requirement that non-residents post a bond for costs denies the non-residents the privileges and immunities of citizenship and violates their right to the equal protections of the laws, affecting also their right to travel.

As a result thereof plaintiff, in the case at bar, is attacking the constitutionality of this Court's local rule requiring non-residents to post a bond.¹

Rule 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reads as follows:

"Each district court by action of a majority of the judges thereof may, from time to time, make and amend rules governing its practice not inconsistent with these rules. Copies of rules and amendments so made by any district court shall, upon their promulgation, be furnished to the Supreme Court of the United States. In all cases not provided for by rule, the district courts may regulate their practice in any manner not inconsistent with the rules."

Where there is no controlling Federal statute, a district court may, by virtue of Rule 83, deal with the matter by local rule;² which may refer to and adopt state practice or the court may regulate the matter in any just manner which is not inconsistent with the Federal rule. See Brewster v. North American Van Lines, Inc., 461 F.2d 649 (7 Cir. 1972); Russell v. Cunningham, 233 F.2d 806 (9 Cir. 1956); Levine v. Bradlee, 248 F.Supp. 395 (E.D.Pa.1965); McClure v. Borne Chemical, 292 F.2d 824 (3 Cir. 1961).

The general solution to the problem as to whether a party (usually a non-resident plaintiff) should be required to give security for costs can be found in Rule 83. See also Azarow v. Sherneth Corporation, 8 F.R.D. 247 (S.D.N.Y.1948); Cary v. Hardy, 1 F.R.D. 355 (E.D.Tenn.1940).

Various grounds for requiring security for costs will be found in the statutes. For example, security may be required where the plaintiff does not own, within the state, property out of which costs could be made by execution. The manifest purposes of a rule requiring non-residents to furnish security for costs is to insure to the defendant and to the officials of the court the payment of costs which may be awarded against a plaintiff against whom the court has no means of enforcing a collection, Outlaw v. Pearce, 176 Va. 458, 11 S.E.2d 600, to have within reach of process of the court some financially responsible person who is bound therefor, Myrus v. Commonwealth Fuel Co., 120 Misc. 201, 198 N.Y.S. 1. A further object is to protect a party from being harassed with groundless suits. Moore v. Banner, 39 N.C. 293; Leslie One-Stop In Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Audiofidelity, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 16 (S.D.N.Y.1963); A and R Theatre Corp. v. Azteca Films, Inc., 32 F.R.D. 47 (S.D.N.Y.1962).

I. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Laws are usually based on classifications of persons or property. Such classifications are not per se violative of equal protection. The only constitutional requirement is that any disparity in treatment caused by such classification be reasonable. Hitchcock v. Collenberg (D.C.Md.1956), 140 F.Supp. 894, affirmed 353 U.S. 919, 77 S.Ct. 679, 1 L.Ed.2d 718; Feinerman v. Jones (D.C.Pa.1973), 356 F.Supp. 252; Faruki v. Rogers (D.C.D.C.1972), 349 F.Supp. 723; Green v. Waterford Board of Education (D.C.Conn.1972), 349 F.Supp. 687; Amezquita v. Hernandez-Colon, 378 F.Supp. 737 (D.C.P.R.1974).

The standards traditionally utilized by the United States Supreme Court in determining the reasonableness of a statutory classification are as follows:

(a) Whether the classification itself is a rational one;

(b) Whether the classification bears a reasonable relationship to a proper legislative purpose;

(c) Whether all persons within the classes established are treated equally.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has employed a stricter test where the classification is based on "suspect criteria" or where the classification restricts some fundamental right. There those are involved, the classification must not only meet the standards of the traditional test of the reasonableness as pointed above, but there must be a compelling state interest served by the classification. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969).

In Re Application of Fre Le Pole Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 93 S.Ct. 2851, 37 L.Ed.2d 910 (1973), the Court stated the following:

"The Court has consistently emphasized that a State which adopts a suspect classification `bears a heavy burden of justification.' McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196, 85 S.Ct. 283, 290, 13 L.Ed.2d 222 (1964), a burden which, though variously formulated, requires the State to meet certain standards of proof. In order to justify the use of a suspect classification a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally permissible and substantial, and that its use of the classification is `necessary . . . to the accomplishment' of its purpose or the safeguarding of its interest."

In any event the first criterion which must be established to support any statutory classification is that it be rational — based on factors which justify disparate treatment.

The Court has recognized a presumption which operates in favor of the reasonableness of legislative classifications. If any state of facts can reasonably be conceived that would justify the classification, the existence of those facts will be assumed by the Court to be the basis for the classification in order to uphold the legislation. Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369 (1911). The presumption is not applied where the classification affects "fundamental rights". A classification which would confer fundamental rights on some while denying it to others, is suspect, and, consequently, subject to close scrutiny. No presumption exists in its favor. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 393 U.S. 818, 89 S.Ct. 117, 21 L.Ed.2d 90 (1969). Furthermore, to be valid, such classifications must be necessary, not merely reasonably related to the object of the legislation. McLaughlin v. Florida, supra. In the final analysis the Court determines the reasonableness of the classifications on broad policy lines — i. e. whether in its opinion the prevailing social, economic and historic factors involved justify the classification and disparity resulting therefrom.

In ascertaining the purpose of the statute, the Court focuses not only on the terms of the statute, but also the context in which it was enacted and its operative effect — both legal and practical. Some reasonable relationship must exist between the purpose and the classification adopted by the statute. Usually, however, all that need be shown is that the classifications adopted in the statute are not based on reasons totally unrelated to the purpose of the statute. As long as there is a sufficient relationship with a proper legislative purpose, the statute unusually will be upheld, even though other purposes might be attributed to the statute which would be improper.

Very closely related to the constitutional provision of the equal protection of the laws is the right to travel.

The right to travel originated in English common law. Chapter 42 of the Magna Charta allowed every man to leave England except during wars.

In the United States, the Articles of Confederation provided in Article IV that the people of each state shall have free ingress and egress to and from any other state. When the Constitution was drafted, however, there was no mention of a right to travel. Since the right was not discussed during the constitutional convention, it is likely that travel was assumed to be so fundamental that it was implicit in the Constitution, rather than rejected.

Reference to a right to travel in Supreme Court decisions occurred intermittently. U. S. v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 41 S.Ct. 133, 65 L.Ed. 270 (1920); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186 (1900); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 18 L.Ed. 744 (1867); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 491-92, 12 L.Ed. 702, 789-90 (1849). Although there has been no dispute in the Supreme Court concerning the existence of the right to travel, controversy has loomed concerning its constitutional source. The sources that have been suggested are the privileges and immunities section of either Article IV or the Fourteenth Amendment, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth...