Krenik v. County of Le Sueur

Decision Date13 February 1995
Docket NumberNo. 93-4056,93-4056
Citation47 F.3d 953
Parties67 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 312, 66 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 43,553, 129 Lab.Cas. P 33,206, 2 Wage & Hour Cas.2d (BNA) 1038 Donna KRENIK, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF Le SUEUR, Appellee.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

William P. Skemp, LaCrosse, WI, argued, for appellant.

Terrance J. Foy, Minneapolis, MN, argued, for appellee.

Before BOWMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges, and STEVENS, * District Judge.

STEVENS, District Judge.

Donna Krenik appeals from a final judgment entered by the district court, 1 granting summary judgment in favor of County of Le Sueur. The district court held that appellant had failed to carry her burden on her claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Equal Pay Act. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

Le Sueur County ("County") employs a building maintenance engineer ("maintenance engineer") and an assistant building maintenance engineer ("assistant") to care for the County's two buildings, the courthouse and the jail. The maintenance engineer and the assistant share the task of cleaning the two buildings. The practice has been each week for one employee to clean the jail while the other cleans the courthouse, then they switch buildings the following week. The maintenance engineer's duties also include operating and maintaining the boiler and air conditioning equipment, minor electrical and mechanical repair, and supervising the assistant. The maintenance engineer receives $11.64 per hour and the assistant receives $7.15 per hour.

Donna Krenik has served as the assistant building maintenance engineer since 1986. In 1992 her supervisor Paul Ehmke resigned from the maintenance engineer position. The County advertised the position and Krenik applied.

The County received forty-three applications and selected eleven candidates for interviews on the basis of their qualifications. After interviewing the eleven candidates, the Le Sueur County Board of Commissioners chose three finalists. They included Donna Krenik, a 42 year old female; James McMillen, a younger male; and a third individual. All three returned for a final round of interviews before the County filled the position. The Commissioners questioned each finalist about mechanical, electrical and plumbing maintenance. McMillen gave detailed answers which revealed a thorough knowledge of these areas. Krenik's answers showed only a basic knowledge.

The County Commissioners met on February 28, 1993 to discuss filling the maintenance engineer position. One Commissioner, Robert Casey, moved that the board hire Donna Krenik. He believed that the County should support its longtime employees. Casey's motion died for lack of a second. A motion was then made to offer the position to James McMillen. This measure passed by a vote of four to one, with Casey voting against.

Krenik filed suit in federal district court under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA") and the Equal Pay Act ("EPA"). She claimed that the County discriminated against her on the basis of sex and age when it selected McMillen for the position. She also claimed that the maintenance engineer and the assistant positions were essentially identical and that the County violated the EPA by paying the male maintenance engineer more than the female assistant.

The County moved for summary judgment. It admitted that Krenik had established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII and the ADEA but argued that its decision was justified because McMillen was the best candidate. The County also argued that the supervisory duties of the maintenance engineer position distinguished it from the assistant position and justified the difference in pay. The district court granted the County's motion for summary judgment. The court found that Krenik had failed to show that the County's proffered reason was pretextual. On the EPA claim the court held that Krenik had failed to prove that the two positions were equal under the act.

II. TITLE VII AND ADEA CLAIMS

Appellant contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for appellee on her Title VII and ADEA claims. She has three arguments. First, she claims that summary judgment was inappropriate because satisfaction by both parties of their initial burdens creates a genuine issue for trial which precludes summary judgment. Second, she claims that the limitations which summary judgment imposes on the production and presentation of evidence unfairly restrict her access to trial. Third, she argues that summary judgment is inappropriate where intent and motive are at issue. The legal issues raised by these arguments involve the interconnection between the analytical framework which the Supreme Court has developed for employment discrimination cases, and the summary judgment standard which the Court has established under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

The standard of review for summary judgment motions is well established. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that when a party moves for summary judgment:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, show that there is no genuine issue as to a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Any inferences to be drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). The nonmoving party may not, however, "rest on mere allegations or denials" but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Such an issue exists and summary judgment must be denied if on the record then before it the court determines that there will be sufficient evidence for a jury to return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) the Supreme Court set out the now familiar burden-shifting framework which establishes the "order and allocation of proof" in the trial of employment discrimination suits. This framework applies to cases under both ADEA and Title VII. Gaworski v. ITT Commercial Finance Corp., 17 F.3d 1104, 1108 n. 3 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 355, 130 L.Ed.2d 310 (1994); and see e.g., Bashara v. Black Hills Corp., 26 F.3d 820, 823 (8th Cir.1994) (ADEA); Kobrin v. University of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 701 (8th Cir.1994) (Title VII). Expressed in terms of the standards applicable to summary judgment, the three parts of McDonnell Douglas analysis are as follows. First, the plaintiff must demonstrate the ability to prove the four elements of a prima facie case. To make this showing, not a difficult or onerous burden, Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093-94, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981), the record must demonstrate that plaintiff can prove: 1) that she is a member of a protected class; 2) that she applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; 3) that she was rejected; and 4) that after rejecting plaintiff the employer continued to seek applicants with plaintiff's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S.Ct. at 1824. This fourth element of the prima facie case is slightly different for each of this appellant's two discrimination claims. Under Title VII she must show that the employer hired a man for the position. Kobrin, 34 F.3d at 702. Under ADEA she must show that the employer hired a younger individual. Rinehart v. City of Independence, 35 F.3d 1263, 1265-66 (8th Cir.1994); Hillebrand v. M-Tron Indus., 827 F.2d 363, 366 n. 6 (8th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1004, 109 S.Ct. 782, 102 L.Ed.2d 774 (1989). The prima facie case, in the absence of an explanation from the employer, creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S.Ct. at 1094.

In the second part of the McDonnell Douglas analysis the burden shifts to the defendant who must rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence, "that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason." Id. This is a burden of production not proof. The defendant need not persuade the court, it must simply provide evidence sufficient to sustain a judgment in its favor. In the third and final part of the analysis, the burden shifts back to plaintiff once the defendant has met its burden of production. Plaintiff must then establish the existence of facts which if proven at trial would permit a jury to conclude that the defendant's proffered reason is pretextual and that intentional discrimination was the true reason for the defendant's actions. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2747, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993).

A.

Krenik first argues that the opposing contentions of her prima facie case and the County's proffered nondiscriminatory reason create a genuine issue for trial which precludes summary judgment. Krenik argues that the Supreme Court recognized this position in St. Mary's Honor Center. The Court, in that case, observed that once the defendant has met its burden,

The presumption [of discrimination], having fulfilled its role of forcing the defendant to come forward with some response, simply drops out of the picture. The defendant's "production" (whatever its persuasive effect) having been made, the trier of fact proceeds to decide the ultimate question: whether plaintiff has proven "that the defendant intentionally discriminated...

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