Krennerich v. Inhabitants of Town of Bristol
| Decision Date | 24 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 95-352-P-C. |
| Citation | 943 F.Supp. 1345 |
| Parties | William KRENNERICH, Plaintiff, v. INHABITANTS OF the TOWN OF BRISTOL, Town of Bristol Parks and Recreation Department, Bristol Parks and Recreation Commission, Shirley Geyer, John Allan, and Nancy Johanson, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
Francis Jackson, Portland, ME, for Plaintiff.
Thomas F. Monaghan, Christopher C. Dinan, Monaghan, Leahy, Hochadel & Libby, Portland, ME, Ervin D. Snyder, Snyder & Jumper, Wiscasset, ME, for Defendants.
The Court now has before it Defendants Inhabitants of the Town of Bristol, Town of Bristol Parks and Recreation, Bristol Parks and Recreation Commission, Shirley Geyer, John Allan, and Nancy Johanson's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 4). Plaintiff William Krennerich has alleged claims for violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq. (Count I), his federal Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count II), and emotional distress. Defendants move for summary judgment on all counts of Plaintiff's Complaint. For reasons that will be explained below, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted in part and denied in part.
In May 1992 the Bristol Parks and Recreation Commission hired Mr. Krennerich as the Park Manager. Affidavit of John Allan ¶ 2; Affidavit of William Krennerich ¶ 2. The Park Manager oversees the operations of the Town's five parks: Pemaquid Point Lighthouse; Pemaquid Beach Park; the swimming hole at Bristol Mills; Rock School House; and the Public Facility for boat launching at Round Pond.1 Allan Aff. ¶ 1. Mr. Krennerich was the first full-time, year-round Park Manager and, as such, Krennerich was the only full-time, year-round employee for the Bristol Park Commission. Allan Aff. ¶ 5; Krennerich Aff. ¶¶ 2, 4. The Park Manager's duties vary with the time of year. From Memorial Day until Labor Day the Park Manager's duties include: supervising eight to ten seasonal employees; raking the beaches each morning; overseeing and participating in mowing of lawns, landscaping; repairing and maintaining the buildings, fences and decks. Krennerich Deposition Ex. 1. Immediately after the parks close in the fall and just prior to opening the parks in the spring, the Park Manager has additional duties such as storing and replacing picnic tables and trash receptacles. Krennerich Dep. at 30-31; Krennerich Dep. Ex. 1. All of these activities involve physical exertion. After the parks closed each Fall, Krennerich was responsible for checking each facility on a regular basis for damage or potential problems. Krennerich Dep. Ex. 1.
In December 1993 Mr. Krennerich was injured when he lifted a compressor weighing approximately 200 pounds onto a truck. Krennerich Dep. at 26; Krennerich Aff. ¶ 7. Immediately thereafter, he experienced an "excruciating sharp pain" in his back and down his hip and leg. Krennerich Dep. at 26. On February 28, 1994, Mr. Krennerich was examined by Dr. Richard Phelps. Krennerich Dep. at 38. Mr. Krennerich informed John Allan,2 the Bristol Parks Commissioner, of his condition the same day. Krennerich Dep. at 39; Allan Dep. at 18. Mr. Krennerich's pay was stopped on March 4, 1994, and the notation "final" was made on his timecard.3 Krennerich Aff. ¶ 8.
On March 8, 1994, Krennerich attended a meeting of the Commission. Krennerich Aff. ¶ 9. The events that transpired at the meeting are in dispute. The next day, March 9, 1994, Mr. Krennerich sent a letter to the Park Commission stating that he had a "multilevel degenerative disk disease." and that he "[could] not continue at my job or any work which would consist of bending, twisting, lifting, using vibrating tools or riding any equipment which would cause vibration." Krennerich Dep. Ex. 2; Krennerich Aff. ¶ 17. Mr. Krennerich sent an additional letter on March 10, 1994, to the Commission stating that he wanted a letter Krennerich Dep. Ex. 4.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has recently explained once again the workings and purposes of the summary judgment procedure:
Summary judgment has a special niche in civil litigation. Its "role is to pierce the boilerplate of the pleadings and assay the parties' proof in order to determine whether trial is actually required." Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 976 F.2d 791, 794 (1st Cir.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1030, 113 S.Ct. 1845, 123 L.Ed.2d 470 (1993). The device allows courts and litigants to avoid full-blown trials in unwinnable cases, thus conserving the parties' time and money, and permitting courts to husband scarce judicial resources.
A court may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)....
Once a properly documented motion has engaged the gears of Rule 56, the party to whom the motion is directed can shut down the machinery only by showing that a trial-worthy issue exists. See National Amusements [v. Town of Dedham], 43 F.3d [731,] 735 [(1st Cir.1995)]. As to issues on which the summary judgment target bears the ultimate burden of proof, [he] cannot rely on an absence of competent evidence, but must affirmatively point to specific facts that demonstrate the existence of an authentic dispute. See Garside [v. Osco Drug, Inc.], 895 F.2d [46,] 48 [ (1st. Cir. 1990) ]. Not every factual dispute is sufficient to thwart summary judgment; the contested fact must be "material" and the dispute over it must be "genuine." In this regard, "material" means that a contested fact has the potential to change the outcome of the suit under the governing law if the dispute over it is resolved favorably to the nonmovant. See [United States v.] One Parcel [of Real Property with Buildings], 960 F.2d [200,] 204 [(1st Cir.1992)]. By like token, "genuine" means that "the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party...." Id.
When all is said and done, the trial court must "view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor," Griggs-Ryan [v. Smith], 904 F.2d [112,] 115 [(1st Cir.1990)], but paying no heed to "conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, [or] unsupported speculation," Medina-Munoz [v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.], 896 F.2d [5,] 8 [(1st Cir.1990) ]. If no genuine issue of material fact emerges, then the motion for summary judgment may be granted.
... [T]he summary judgment standard requires the trial court to make an essentially legal determination rather than to engage in differential factfinding....
McCarthy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56 F.3d 313, 314-15 (1st Cir.1995).
The ADA provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). To sustain a claim under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish:
(1) [T]hat he is a disabled person within the meaning of the Act; (2) that [he is qualified, that is,] with or without reasonable accommodation he is able to perform the essential functions of his job; and (3) that the employer discharged him in whole or in part because of his disability.
Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 30 (1st Cir.1996). As to the first element of the ADA inquiry, there is no disagreement regarding Mr. Krennerich's disability.4 Regarding the third element of a successful ADA claim, there is an issue of fact which the Court addresses infra section II.B.1. Nevertheless, the Court will grant Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment because it concludes that Plaintiff is unable to satisfy the second element of the ADA inquiry.
Defendants contend that Mr. Krennerich is not a "qualified individual with a disability" because he is unable to perform the essential functions of the job and no reasonable accommodation would permit him to perform those functions. Motion for Summary Judgment by Town of Bristol Defendants (Docket No. 4) at 6. Plaintiff responds that he is capable of performing as the Park Manager if reasonable accommodation is made for his disability by the Town.
An employee is "qualified" if he satisfies "the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements" of the employment position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). The ADA requires that in order for someone to be considered a "qualified individual with a disability," he must be able to perform the "essential functions" of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). Regulations of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission state that "essential functions" are "fundamental job duties" and not "marginal functions of the position." 29 C.F.R. § 1630(n). In determining whether a function is "essential," the Court must consider whether the position in question exists to perform that function, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i), whether the employer has only a limited number of employees available among whom he can distribute this function, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(ii), and whether the employer believes the function is "essential", 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i). The Court must also consider the...
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