Krentz v. Robertson Fire Protection District
| Decision Date | 15 June 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 99-4235,99-4235 |
| Citation | 228 F.3d 897 |
| Parties | (8th Cir. 2000) RONALD A. KRENTZ, APPELLANT, v. ROBERTSON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; STEPHEN E. KIRWAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR AND PRESIDENT OF THE ROBERTSON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; ROBERT S. ZOELLNER, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR AND SECRETARY OF THE ROBERTSON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT; VINCE GRILLO, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS MEMBER AND TREASURER OF THE ROBERTSON FIRE PROTECTION DISTRICT, APPELLEES. Submitted: |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri
[Copyrighted Material Omitted]
[Copyrighted Material Omitted] Before Wollman, Chief Judge, Beam and Bye, Circuit Judges.
Ronald Krentz was fired as chief of the Robertson Fire Protection District (the District) roughly ten months into a seven-year contract. Krentz filed suit against the District, its three governing board members, and their attorney alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights, breach of contract, and several Missouri law claims. In an omnibus order disposing of all of Krentz's claims, the district court 1 dismissed some claims, and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on others. We affirm.
The District is managed by a board consisting of three elected members. These members decide personnel matters, make policy for the District, and resolve the range of issues that require managerial oversight.
Krentz became chief of the District in 1987. Almost a decade later, on January 4, 1997, the District signed Krentz to a new seven-year contract. Although the board apparently found Krentz's performance satisfactory during his first decade as chief, the Board became increasingly disenchanted with Krentz's performance during the first half of 1997.
In June 1997, the board informed Krentz at an executive session that the District suffered from a severe morale problem. The board asked Krentz to present a plan to remedy the firefighters' lack of morale. Krentz never responded. At roughly the same time, the board began to question whether Krentz and other officials used District cellular phones to place personal calls.
On September 23, 1997, virtually all of the District's firefighters presented the board with a signed petition expressing a lack of confidence in Krentz. The petition asked for Krentz's removal. At least one employee specifically complained that Krentz had passed him over for promotion improperly. Finally, on September 29, 1997, the board placed Krentz on paid leave based upon the allegation that Krentz had offered jobs to two firefighters without board approval.
Krentz attributed the board's changing attitude toward him to its new membership. In the spring of 1997, Robert Zoellner was elected to the board. During the election, Zoellner's campaign had received the support of a firefighter's union. Perhaps because of his union affiliation, Zoellner disliked the fact that several fire officials in the district -- including Krentz -- received long-term employment contracts. Krentz felt that Zoellner unfairly targeted him because of his long-term contract with the District.
On November 6, 1997, following an investigation, the board sent Krentz a letter detailing his substandard performance in the preceding months. In that letter, the board announced its decision to terminate Krentz's employment. The board offered Krentz an opportunity to present arguments and evidence in his defense at a special board meeting scheduled for November 16. The letter demanded that Krentz return District property in his possession by November 20 -- unless the board changed its mind about his termination.
Krentz attended the November 16 special board meeting with his attorney. Krentz's attorney advised the board, in a hand-delivered letter, that he objected to the procedures employed by the board. The letter did not dispute the substantive allegations levied against Krentz and his management regime. Krentz stated that he wanted to hear the board members' view of the situation, but the board's attorney, Stuart Berkowitz, insisted on speaking for the board at the meeting. Krentz's attorney attempted to explain Krentz's side of the story, but the board demanded to hear from
Krentz personally. Because Krentz refused to address the board or answer questions, he and his attorney left the meeting.2 The District removed Krentz from its payroll on November 20, 1997.
Krentz filed suit in district court on July 24, 1998. He named five defendants:
(1) Robertson Fire Protection District;
(2) Stephen Kirwan, both individually and in his official capacity as a District board member;
(3) Zoellner, both individually and in his official capacity as a District board member;
(4) Vince Grillo, both individually and in his official capacity as a District board member; and
(5) Berkowitz, both individually and in his official capacity as the District's attorney.
Krentz stated five separate sets of claims:
(1) Violations of his due process and equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment committed by Kirwan, Zoellner, Grillo and Berkowitz;
(2) Violations of his free speech, due process and equal protection rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments committed by the District;
(3) Breach of contract committed by the District;
(4) Tortious interference with a contractual relationship committed by Zoellner and Berkowitz (a state-law claim); and
(5) Intentional infliction of emotional distress against Kirwan, Zoellner and Berkowitz (a state-law claim).
Shortly after Krentz filed suit, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss the claims. The district court did not immediately resolve the motion. After engaging in discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On August 25, 1999, the court disposed of all of Krentz's claims (some by dismissal, others by summary judgment) and entered judgment against him.
Almost two weeks later, on September 7, 1999, Krentz filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment (in effect, a motion for reconsideration) under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The district court denied Krentz's Rule 59(e) motion in an order filed October 18, 1999.
Krentz timely appealed discrete portions of the claims raised in his first three counts -- certain procedural due process issues and the state-law breach of contract claim. Krentz does not challenge the district court's rulings on two of his state-law claims (claims (4) and (5)). Krentz also leaves unchallenged many of the federal claims, including the equal protection claims and the free speech claim.
Krentz argues that the district court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment on his procedural due process claims. We review de novo a district court's grant of summary judgment by applying the same standard as the district court. See Treanor v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 200 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2000). Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence -- viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party -- demonstrates that there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
The Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment provides that, "[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, 1. Procedural due process claims require a two-step analysis. Initially, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the state deprived him of some "life, liberty, or property" interest. If successful, the plaintiff must then establish that the state deprived him of that interest without sufficient "process."
Krentz can establish a property interest in his job as fire chief because his contract with the District anticipated a term of seven years. 3 When a state deprives a public employee of a contractually-created property right to continued employment, that deprivation "must be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950)). Loudermill divides procedural due process claims into three stages. Initially, an employee receives notice that he will be terminated, and he is given an opportunity to respond: that is "pretermination process." Then, the employer actually fires the employee. Finally, in the third stage, an employee has an opportunity to receive some measure of post-termination process, usually a hearing with heightened procedural safeguards. Loudermill instructs us that extensive post-termination proceedings may cure inadequate pretermination proceedings. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-48.
We have interpreted Loudermill to require only limited pretermination process especially if post-termination proceedings are available and extensive.
The indispensable requirements of a pretermination hearing are notice of the charges, an explanation of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to present his side of the story. The hearing does not have to precede the termination decision, but only must precede the termination of benefits. It does not have to be a formal hearing; informal meetings with supervisors are sufficient. The Loudermill Court emphasized that as long as there are adequate post-termination hearings available, the pre-termination hearing need not be extensive.
Schleck v. Ramsey County, 939 F.2d 638, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1991) () (internal citations omitted).
In sum, although a public employee should receive a hearing, that hearing ...
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