Kressner v. Town of Malta

• Decision Date: 10 January 1991
• Parties: In the Matter of Jutta KRESSNER, Respondent, v. TOWN OF MALTA, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 643

564 N.Y.S.2d 643

169 A.D.2d 927

In the Matter of Jutta KRESSNER, Respondent, v. TOWN OF MALTA, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Jan. 10, 1991.

Horigan, Horigan, Pennock & Lombardo (Douglas Landon, of counsel), Amsterdam, for appellant.

Grasso, Rodriguez, Putorti & Grasso (Lawrence J. Zyra, of counsel), Schenectady, for respondent.

Before MAHONEY, P.J., and WEISS, MIKOLL, YESAWICH and HARVEY, JJ.

WEISS, Justice.

Appeal from an amended order of the Supreme Court (Brown, J.), entered October 12, 1989 in Saratoga County, which granted petitioner's application pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50-e(5) for leave to serve a late notice of claim.

Petitioner fell in the vicinity of her driveway and mailbox on December 31, 1988. She contends that her fall was a result of accumulation of ice and moisture resulting from respondent's improper plowing of the roadway which caused a diversion of water and ice. Her injuries included fractures of her arm and wrist requiring a cast for 10 weeks following one week of hospitalization. She thereafter received physical therapy until April 1989.

Petitioner mailed a motion for leave to serve a late notice of claim to respondent ¹ at the end of June 1989 or during early July 1989. This was the first notification respondent received of the incident and petitioner's injuries. Petitioner contended that she was unaware of the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal Law § 50-e and that her ability to travel was limited by her injuries. Supreme Court granted the application and respondent now appeals.

The standards governing applications for leave to file a late notice of claim have purposely been made elastic in order to afford courts broad discretion. The statute requires that particular attention be given to whether the municipality acquired actual notice of the essential facts constituting the claim within 90 days or within a reasonable time thereafter, and whether the delay substantially prejudiced preparation of a defense (General Municipal Law § 50-e[5]; see, Matter of Delzotto v. County of Warren, 137 A.D.2d 950, 951, 525 N.Y.S.2d 373; see also, Matter of Strevell v. South Colonie Cent. School Dist., 144 A.D.2d 733, 734, 535 N.Y.S.2d 147). Here, actual knowledge has not been shown and changed conditions may prevent an accurate reconstruction of the circumstances of the accident (see, Kravitz v. County of Rockland, 112 A.D.2d 352, 491 N.Y.S.2d 802, affd. 67 N.Y.2d 685, 499 N.Y.S.2d 941, 490 N.E.2d 860). Moreover, ignorance of the statute has been held not to constitute a valid excuse (see, Matter of Andrews v. Village of Sherburne, 140 A.D.2d 790, 791, 527 N.Y.S.2d 662, lv. denied 72 N.Y.2d 807, 533 N.Y.S.2d 56, 529 N.E.2d 424). Additionally, petitioner has neither documented nor specified her disabilities (see, Matter of Mallory v. City of New York, 135 A.D.2d 636, 637, 522 N.Y.S.2d 215, lv. denied 72 N.Y.2d 803, 532 N.Y.S.2d 369, 528 N.E.2d 521). While the discretion of Supreme Court will generally be upheld absent demonstrated abuse (see, Benjamin v. County of Warren, 128 A.D.2d 973,...