Kreutz v. Oracle Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | CV 12-57-BU-DLC |
| Parties | JEFFREY KREUTZ, Plaintiff, v. ORACLE AMERICA, INC. and ORACLE CORPORATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Montana |
On May 22, 2014, United States Magistrate Judge Richard Anderson entered his findings and recommendations on Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Plaintiff Jeffrey Kreutz ("Kreutz") timely filed objections on June 5, 2014. Defendant Oracle America, Inc. and Oracle Corporation ("Oracle") responded to Plaintiff's objections on June 19th, 2014, but did not object to Judge Anderson's findings and recommendations.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(C) the Court reviews de novo the specified findings or recommendations to which a party objects. The portion of the findings and recommendations not specifically objected to will be reviewed forclear error. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Commodore Bus. Mach., Inc., 656 F.2d 1309, 1313 (9th Cir. 1981). For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts Judge Anderson's findings and recommendations in full. Because the parties are familiar with the procedural and factual background of this case, it will only be briefly restated here.
Background
RightNow Technologies ("RightNow"), was a technology corporation based in Bozeman, Montana. Kreutz went to work for RightNow in 2004 as Product Manager and was promoted to Vice President, Product Development, Operations on January 23, 2008.
Upon promotion to Vice President, Kreutz entered into a hire letter on January 23, 2008, which contained the following provisions:
(Doc. 62 at 2).
"Good Reason" is defined, in pertinent part, as:
(Id. at 2).
Oracle Corporation acquired RightNow on January 25, 2012. On the same date, there was a change in control when RightNow became a wholly-owned subsidiary of Oracle. Following the change in control, certain changes were made with respect to Kreutz's job responsibilities, including a change to Kreutz's job title. On February 13, 2012, Kreutz notified Oracle that he was involuntarily terminating his employment for "Good Reason," contending that the change in his duties and responsibilities entitled him to the severance benefits under theRightNow hire letter. Kreutz thereafter filed his claim for severance benefits through a letter submitted to Oracle. Oracle eventually denied the claim.
Kreutz then sued Oracle for breach of contract and breach of good faith and fair dealing. Kreutz moves for summary judgment on these claims and Oracle moves for partial summary judgment on any claim for breach of contract based on salary reduction. Judge Anderson recommended denying the motions.
Kreutz objects to Judge Anderson's findings and asserts that after the change in control his responsibilities were reduced, employees were removed from his supervision, his authority over budget and staffing was diminished, and, as a result, his position was not substantially comparable to the position he held at RightNow. Kreutz asserts that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Kreutz also asserts that Oracle breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by requiring him to sign an arbitration agreement and dishonestly handling his severance claim. He asserts that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on this issue as well.
Oracle contends genuine factual disputes preclude summary judgment on both claims.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party demonstrates "that there isno genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The movant bears the initial burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The movant's burden is satisfied when the documentary evidence produced by the parties permits only one conclusion. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). Where the moving party has met its initial burden, the party opposing the motion "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but . . . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 248 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Kreutz raises five separate objections to Judge Anderson's recommendation that summary judgment be denied. While Kreutz's objections are interrelated and overlap considerably, the Court will review each of these objections individually.
Judge Anderson found that a material dispute of fact existed regarding thetiming of the removal of the upgrade and engineering team from Kruetz's duties. Kreutz acknowledges in his objections that there is a dispute about the timing and reason for the removal of this team from his responsibilities, but contends that this dispute is immaterial in light of the other changes to his duties and responsibilities.
The Court disagrees. Whether Kreutz's job before and after the change in control was "substantially comparable" depends, in part, on whether the changes to Kreutz's duties include the removal of the upgrade and engineering team from Kreutz's responsibilities. Thus, the timing and reason for this change is a material fact issue. Kreutz's first objection is overruled.
Kreutz contends that it is immaterial whether the changes to his position were temporary. Kreutz also contends that the hire letter is unambiguous and entitles Kruetz to severance benefits whenever there is a substantial change in job duties, regardless of the temporary nature of the changes.
The Court disagrees. First, Oracle provides evidence that many of the changes to Kreutz's duties and responsibilities were temporary. Second, the hire letter's key language triggering entitlement to severance benefits, "substantially comparable," is ambiguous. The "substantially comparable" standard leaves room for different interpretations, including detailed comparisons over how variouschanges to Kreutz's responsibilities and duties affect the overall position. These factual interpretations require further inquiry and must be resolved by the trier of fact. Blackfeet Tribe of Blackfeet Indian Reserv. v. Blaze Constr. Inc., 108 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1135 (D. Mont. 2000), Klawitter v. Dettmann, 886 P.2d 416, 420 (Mont. 1994). Accordingly, Kreutz's second objection is overruled.
Judge Anderson determined that there is a material dispute of fact whether the changes in Kreutz's duties and responsibilities constituted a substantial change. Kreutz argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because the facts demonstrate he was assigned duties and responsibilities that were not substantially comparable in responsibility and status to his prior position. Oracle argues that none of the changes made to Kreutz's position are substantial and that each of the changes represent duties and responsibilities largely similar to those Kreutz held at RightNow.
Kreutz contends that his employment responsibilities and duties changed in the following respects: (1) the documentation team he managed at RightNow was removed from his duties; (2) Kreutz's budget and staff management authority was suspended; (3) the upgrade and engineering team was removed from his duties; (4) Oracle added a team of quality assurance engineers; and (5) Oracle changed hisjob title.
Oracle responds that the position offered to Kreutz was substantially comparable to his prior position at RightNow. Specifically, Oracle disputes each issue raised by Kreutz as follows: (1) the documentation team responsibilities were removed, but Oracle added a larger team of...
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