Krieser v. Hobbs

• Decision Date: 28 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. 98-60016,98-60016
• Parties: Robert KRIESER, as heir and wrongful death beneficiary of Cynthia Renee Krieser (Deceased), Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Milton D. HOBBS; et al., Defendants, Baptist Memorial Hospital, North Mississippi, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 736

166 F.3d 736

Robert KRIESER, as heir and wrongful death beneficiary of Cynthia Renee Krieser (Deceased), Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Milton D. HOBBS; et al., Defendants Baptist Memorial Hospital, North Mississippi, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 98-60016.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Jan. 28, 1999.

Charles M. Merkel, John H. Cocke, Merkel & Cocke, Clarksdale, MS, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

John Hand Dunbar, Dunbar Williams, PLLC, Oxford, MS, for Defendant-Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before WISDOM, DAVIS and BARKSDALE, Circuit Judges.

RHESA HAWKINS BARKSDALE, Circuit Judge:

Concerning the wrongful death of the daughter of Robert Krieser, the jury in this Mississippi diversity action having found Baptist Memorial Hospital-North Mississippi and a doctor in its emergency room (the doctor had settled and been dismissed early in the trial) at fault, and having apportioned the total $200,000 in damages equally between the doctor and the hospital, chiefly at issue in Baptist Memorial's appeal is whether plaintiff's earlier $650,000 settlement with that defendant doctor should reduce Baptist Memorial's liability for the $100,000 in damages apportioned to it by the jury. We AFFIRM, agreeing with the district court that, under Mississippi's statute for apportionment of tortfeasor damages, MISS.CODE ANN. § 85-5-7, where fault has been apportioned between settling and non-settling defendants, then, notwithstanding the settlement, the non-settling defendant remains liable for the amount of damages allocated to him in direct proportion to his percentage of fault.

Also at issue is the date from which postjudgment interest should run. Concluding, on this record, that it should run from the July 1995 entry of the original judgment, we REFORM the amended judgment in that respect.

I.

In early 1990, Cynthia Renee Krieser, a college student, became extremely ill and was taken to the emergency room at Baptist Memorial. She was treated in the emergency room by Dr. Rogness.

After several hours of observation, Ms. Krieser was placed under the care of Dr. Hobbs in another part of the hospital. After diagnostic tests revealed an aortic dissection, Ms. Krieser was flown to a hospital in Memphis, Tennessee, for treatment.

Ms. Krieser's condition had become irreparable. She died nine days later.

In 1992, Robert Krieser, the father of Ms. Krieser, filed this diversity action against Baptist Memorial (claiming negligence by its emergency medical technicians, emergency room nurses, and floor nurses), and Drs. Rogness and Hobbs (claiming negligence in diagnosis and treatment). The case was tried in early 1995.

On the third day of the eight-day trial, Krieser settled with Dr. Rogness for $650,000. Dr. Rogness was dismissed from the action that day.

As part of the jury instructions, the jury was informed about the settlement with Dr. Rogness, but not its size, and was instructed that the settlement should not affect its deliberations.

Pursuant to special interrogatories, the jury was to determine whether Dr. Rogness, Dr. Hobbs and/or Baptist Memorial were at fault; that is, had any been negligent, and if so, did such negligence proximately contribute to Ms. Krieser's death. For any defendant found at fault, the jury was to determine the percentage of the total damages attributable to that fault, after having first assessed the total damages.

On 8 March 1995, the jury assessed no fault as to Dr. Hobbs (the second treating physician at Baptist Memorial). It found fault as to Dr. Rogness (who had settled) and Baptist Memorial; assessed total damages at $200,000; and apportioned 50% of the damages to the fault of Dr. Rogness and 50% to the fault of Baptist Memorial.

The judgment, prepared pursuant to FED R. CIV. P. 58 by the district court clerk, was dated 8 March 1995, the same day as the verdict. But, that judgment provided erroneously that Dr. Rogness (who, as noted, had been dismissed during trial as a result of his settlement) was liable for $100,000 in damages, as was Baptist Memorial. Pursuant to the district judge's instructions, the judgment was not entered until 3 July 1995. Krieser v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-North Mississippi, 984 F.Supp. 463, 466 & n. 3 (N.D.Miss.1997).

Post-trial, Baptist Memorial moved to credit Dr. Rogness' $650,000 settlement against its $100,000 liability, and to remove the error in the judgment regarding the liability of Dr. Rogness; Krieser moved for a new trial on damages based on their inadequacy, and for postjudgment interest from the date of the verdict, rather than the delayed entry of judgment. The district court delayed ruling on these motions until December 1997.

Baptist Memorial's motion for a credit as to the settlement and Krieser's motion for a new trial on damages were denied. An amended judgment, entered on 16 December 1997, removed the reference to Dr. Rogness and provided for postjudgment interest from the date of the verdict, 8 March 1995.

II.

Baptist Memorial contends that the $650,000 settlement should be credited against the $100,000 for which it is liable; and that postjudgment interest should run only from the entry of the amended judgment.

A.

In support of the claimed settlement credit, Baptist Memorial urges that Mississippi's "one-recovery" or "one-satisfaction" rule bars a plaintiff from recovering more than the total awarded damages. Krieser counters that Mississippi's 1989 tort reform statute, MISS.CODE ANN. § 85-5-7, pursuant to which the damages were apportioned, undermines the application of the one-recovery rule.

It goes without saying that, for a diversity action, we apply state substantive law, e.g., Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427, 116 S.Ct. 2211, 135 L.Ed.2d 659 (1996); and that we review de novo the district court's conclusions of law, such as the effect to be given a settlement under Mississippi law, e.g., Bertram v. Freeport McMoran, Inc., 35 F.3d 1008, 1019 (5th Cir.1994). But, because the Mississippi Supreme Court has not addressed the impact of § 85-5-7 on a settlement's effect on a later judgment, we must make an "Erie guess" how that court would decide the issue, as per Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). E.g., H.E. Butt Grocery Co. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir.1998); Farm Credit Bank of Texas v. Guidry, 110 F.3d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir.1997).

Moreover, under different tort liability schemes, a settlement with one tortfeasor affects a judgment against non-settling defendants in different ways. See generally McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202, 208-21, 114 S.Ct. 1461, 128 L.Ed.2d 148 (1994) (summarizing approaches in the context of a decision on admiralty law). The two broad alternatives are (1) pro-tanto ("to the same extent") reduction, under which a settlement reduces the judgment against remaining defendants dollar for dollar; and (2) proportionate share reduction, under which a settlement reduces the judgment in proportion to the settling tortfeasor's fault. Id. at 208-09, 114 S.Ct. 1461. A pro-tanto regime may or may not allow a contribution action by a non-settling defendant against a settling defendant who paid an inadequate share. Id.

Various other schemes are possible as well. For example, New York uses whichever method is greater, see N.Y.G.O.L. § 15-108; while in Texas, a defendant may elect between a pro-tanto rule and a complicated schedule, see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.CODE ANN. §§ 33.012, 33.014. It is also possible to reduce a judgment in proportion to the number of settling tortfeasors, rather than by their fault; such a scheme is often called "pro rata " reduction, though it is more informatively termed "per capita ". See McDermott, 511 U.S. at 210 & n. 9, 114 S.Ct. 1461; Dobson v. Camden, 705 F.2d 759, 762 (5th Cir.1983).

The choice among methods represents a policy choice for the State of Mississippi. The only legislation touching directly upon the effect of a settlement, MISS.CODE ANN. § 85-5-1, applies to settlements in cases of "joint or joint and several indebtedness". While some courts refer to this section in discussing tortfeasors more generally, rather than debtors per se, e.g., Smith v. Falke, 474 So.2d 1044, 1045 (Miss.1985), this much is clear: "joint or joint and several indebtedness" does not include the "several only" liability contemplated in § 85-5-7, Mississippi's earlier-cited tort reform statute. And, as explained below, § 85-5-7 applies to the question at hand.

Beyond the legislature, of course, Mississippi courts have long assumed a gap-filling role in specifying the effects of settlements. Almost a century ago, the traditional pro-tanto rule was stated in Bailey v. Delta Electric Light, Power, & Mfg. Co., 86 Miss. 634, 38 So. 354, 355 (Miss.1905) It is a universally established principle of law that joint tort feasors are both jointly and severally liable, and may be proceeded against either singly or jointly, individually, or all combined. It is also well settled that, where a party has once received full satisfaction and compensation for an injury inflicted, no matter from which one of several tort feasors, all are thereby released.

...

... [A non-settling defendant] would have the right to claim, should its liability be established, ... to have credited the amount received by the [plaintiff] from the [settling tortfeasor] upon the amount of damages which the [plaintiff] may have sustained.

Bailey 's logic flows from the premise with which it begins: joint-and-several liability. The rule under joint-and-several liability--and its rootedness in such regimes of liability--are illustrated well by Medley v. Webb, 288 So.2d 846 (Miss.1974). There, after a verdict, the plaintiff settled with one defendant, who paid all but $2.00 of the judgment, while apparently agreeing that the plaintiff could seek recovery in...