Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., No. 11191.

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtDUFFY, , and FINNEGAN and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit
Citation225 F.2d 579
Docket NumberNo. 11191.
Decision Date10 August 1955
PartiesLazarus KRINSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. UNITED ARTISTS CORP., Defendant-Appellee, and Frances Papas et al., Adm., etc., et al., Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellants.

225 F.2d 579 (1955)

Lazarus KRINSLEY, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
UNITED ARTISTS CORP., Defendant-Appellee, and
Frances Papas et al., Adm., etc., et al., Defendants-Cross-Claimants-Appellants.

No. 11191.

United States Court of Appeals Seventh Circuit.

August 10, 1955.


Thomas C. McConnell, Chicago, Ill., James O. Smith, Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

David Levinson, Harold D. Shapiro, Raymond Harkrider, Chicago, Ill., Walter S. Beck, New York City, Harold D. Shapiro, Chicago, Ill., of counsel, for appellees.

Before DUFFY, Chief Judge, and FINNEGAN and SCHNACKENBERG, Circuit Judges.

225 F.2d 580

FINNEGAN, Circuit Judge.

In his interpleader action filed July 21, 1950, under 28 U.S.C. § 1355, plaintiff Krinsley joined as party defendants United Artists Corporation, C. J. Papas, Milwaukee Towne Corporation (formerly named Miller Theater Corporation), John S. Papas, Spiro J. Papas, Andrew M. Spheeris, Andrew J. Spheeris and George J. Spheeris. These defendants cross-claimed in their consolidated answer to Krinsley's complaint. The gist of the initial pleading pivots on Krinsley's position as escrowee established by an agreement, dated September 17, 1946, between himself, United Artists Corporation and C. J. Papas. These latter two parties deposited three executed contracts with their escrowee, all of which were dated June 11, 1946 and constituted three separate agreements between: (i) United Artists Corporation and John S. Papas, C. J. Papas, Spiro J. Papas, Andrew M. Spheeris, Andrew J. Spheeris, George J. Spheeris, (ii) Miller Theater Corporation and United Artists Corporation and, (iii) Miller Theater Corporation and C. J. Papas.

Stripped of all other commitments the pith of the problem engendered by the escrow arrangement lies in this provision of the escrow agreement:

"In the event a final decree is entered in any court of competent jurisdiction against the United Artists Corporation declaring that the agreements * * * (ed: the three already itemized) * * * is or are unlawful, the Escrowee shall tear off the signatures on the * * * agreements, mark each said agreement `Void\' and shall * * * mail one set * * * to * * * (United Artists Corporation) * * * and shall mail the other set to Papas * * *. If, however, no such decree is entered within two * * * years from June 11, 1946, then the Escrowee shall mail one set to * * * (United Artists and the other to Papas) * * * and said agreements shall thereupon become effective as of their respective dates, towit June 11, 1946." (Italics supplied.)

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 1948, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260 precipitated Krinsley's dilemma because Papas directed him to tear off the signatures on all contracts deposited with him, on the theory they were unlawful under that decision. On the other hand Krinsley was instructed by United Artists to turn over the three contracts to it intact. Caught in this conflict, Krinsley sought construction of the escrow agreement below.

In their cross-claim, defendants (except United Artists Corporation) allege that United Artists, in combination with various other producers, exhibitors and distributors engaged in a conspiracy to monopolize the exhibition of motion pictures and the operation of motion picture theaters in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, violative of §§ 1-2, Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-2. That conspiracy, according to cross-claimants, supplied the economic coercion for and environment of duress under and by which the three contracts were executed. They also alleged that acquisition of stock contemplated in those agreements was illegal under the holding in United States v. Paramount Pictures, 1948, 334 U.S. 131, 68 S.Ct. 915, 92 L.Ed. 1260. Accordingly, cross-claimants sought a decree, below, enjoining enforcement of the three agreements, on deposit, and requiring cancellation of shares held by United Artists in Milwaukee Towne Corporation.

United Artists' motion to dismiss this cross-claim was denied after a hearing and briefing. Its attack on the cross-claim rested upon these grounds, summarized by the district judge 94 F. Supp. 480: "(1) It does not state a claim under the anti-trust laws of the United States; (2) It prays for cancellation of shares of stock allegedly acquired in violation of the anti-trust laws, which is not a remedy provided for in the pertinent statutes; (3) It fails to allege a claim for rescission of the transaction

225 F.2d 581
alleged; (4) It alleges facts showing that cross-claimants' remedy at law...

To continue reading

Request your trial
12 practice notes
  • United States v. 15.3 ACRES OF LAND, ETC., Civ. A. No. 5051.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • August 15, 1957
    ...177, 94 L.Ed. 150. Obviously this is not an invitation to abdicate the judicial function. Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 7 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 579, at page 583. The purpose of a finding of fact is to distill from the evidence the pertinent facts to which relevant rules of law may be app......
  • Ruiz v. Estelle, Nos. 81-2224
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • June 23, 1982
    ...Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d at 289 ("state counsel were unable to participate or to be heard"). 249 See Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 225 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1955) ("clearly erroneous" rule applies to "findings of fact made after hearings, by masters") (emphasis added). See generall......
  • Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corporation, No. 17730
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 15, 1970
    ...that rule is not "an invitation to abdicate the judicial function upon receiving a master's report." Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 225 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1955). It is incumbent upon us to determine whether or not the district court correctly applied the clearly erroneous test to th......
  • Dooley v. Quick, Civ. A. No. 84-0057 S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island
    • November 19, 1984
    ...unless clearly erroneous." Id. See N.L.R.B. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir.1976); Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 225 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir.1955); In re Rice Barton Corp., 312 F.Supp. 1316, 1318 (D.Mass. 1970). The parties excepting to the factual findings of a maste......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
12 cases
  • United States v. 15.3 ACRES OF LAND, ETC., Civ. A. No. 5051.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 3th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • August 15, 1957
    ...177, 94 L.Ed. 150. Obviously this is not an invitation to abdicate the judicial function. Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 7 Cir., 1955, 225 F.2d 579, at page 583. The purpose of a finding of fact is to distill from the evidence the pertinent facts to which relevant rules of law may be app......
  • Ruiz v. Estelle, Nos. 81-2224
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (5th Circuit)
    • June 23, 1982
    ...Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d at 289 ("state counsel were unable to participate or to be heard"). 249 See Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 225 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir. 1955) ("clearly erroneous" rule applies to "findings of fact made after hearings, by masters") (emphasis added). See generall......
  • Locklin v. Day-Glo Color Corporation, No. 17730
    • United States
    • United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (7th Circuit)
    • September 15, 1970
    ...that rule is not "an invitation to abdicate the judicial function upon receiving a master's report." Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 225 F.2d 579, 583 (7th Cir. 1955). It is incumbent upon us to determine whether or not the district court correctly applied the clearly erroneous test to th......
  • Dooley v. Quick, Civ. A. No. 84-0057 S.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. United States District Courts. 1st Circuit. District of Rhode Island
    • November 19, 1984
    ...unless clearly erroneous." Id. See N.L.R.B. v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 538 F.2d 1152, 1160 (5th Cir.1976); Krinsley v. United Artists Corp., 225 F.2d 579, 582 (7th Cir.1955); In re Rice Barton Corp., 312 F.Supp. 1316, 1318 (D.Mass. 1970). The parties excepting to the factual findings of a maste......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT