Krise v. State
| Decision Date | 09 May 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 16S05-0002-CR-118.,16S05-0002-CR-118. |
| Citation | 746 N.E.2d 957 |
| Parties | Jewell K. KRISE, Appellant (Defendant below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John H. Watson, Mark E. Jones, Batesville, IN, Attorneys for Appellant.
Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General of Indiana, James A. Garrard, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
ON PETITION TO TRANSFER
Defendant Jewell K. Krise and Charles Tungate lived in the same house. Tungate consented to a general search of the house, which ultimately led to the discovery and search of Krise's purse. We agree with Krise that the warrantless search of her purse without her consent violated her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
On May 5, 1997, Officer Howard Ayers and Deputy Sheriff Michael Woodhull arrived at the home of Defendant Jewell Krise and Charles Tungate to serve a civil writ of body attachment on Krise.1 Krise allowed the officers to enter her house to discuss the validity of the writ.
While inside the home, Officer Ayers noticed a pipe resting on the base of lamp in the living room. After examining it, he detected the scent of burnt marijuana. Officer Ayers questioned Krise about the pipe, but she said that she did not know anything about it. Deputy Darin Lucas then transported Krise to the Decatur County jail whereupon the officers learned that the writ was stale.
Officer Ayers questioned Tungate about the pipe. Tungate ordered the officers out of his house, but the officers did not respond to his request. Instead, Officer Ayers asked Tungate several times if they could search the home for drugs.2 Tungate told the officers to obtain a warrant to search the home. Tungate nevertheless eventually agreed to the search of the home. Although Tungate refused to give a written consent, Officer Robert Ewing recorded on audiotape Tungate's verbal consent to search. No search warrant had been issued.
Officer Rick Underhill arrived at the scene to assist in searching the home. While searching the bathroom, Officer Underhill noticed a purse lying on top of the commode. Without the consent of either Tungate or Krise, Officer Underhill opened the purse and found a small leather pouch. Inside the pouch, he discovered a small wooden case holding marijuana and a plastic bag containing white powder, later identified as methamphetamine. Officer Underhill also found Krise's driver's license inside the purse. Krise never consented to the search of her purse.
The State charged Krise with Possession of a Schedule II Controlled Substance within 1,000 Feet of a Public Park, a Class C felony.3 Krise filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained during the search of her home. The trial court denied the motion on January 14, 1998. A jury convicted Krise as charged on June 2, 1998. The trial court sentenced Krise to the presumptive sentence of four years incarceration, with two years suspended to probation.
transfer not sought).
Krise contends that the trial court erred when it denied her motion to suppress because the warrantless search of her home, which led to the warrantless search of her purse, violated her Fourth Amendment4 rights. The State argues, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred since the police officers obtained a voluntary consent from Tungate whom the police officers reasonably believed had authority over the premises. It is important to emphasize that the State argues that the validity of the search came from Tungate's authority to consent to the search of the home, not probable cause. We also point out that the record contains no court explanation on the denial of the motion to suppress.
The Fourth Amendment protects persons from unreasonable search and seizure and this protection has been extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 650, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). Warrantless searches and seizures inside the home are presumptively unreasonable. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980)
. When a search is conducted without a warrant, the State has the burden of proving that an exception to the warrant requirement existed at the time of the search. See Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462, 465 (Ind.1998) (citing Brown v. State, 691 N.E.2d 438, 443 (Ind.1998)). One well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement is a voluntary and knowing consent to search. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); Stallings v. State, 508 N.E.2d 550, 552 (Ind.1987).
The twists and turns of Fourth Amendment law are often difficult to negotiate, with variations in fact patterns often determinative of the outcome of cases involving warrantless searches. Here we perceive four variables in the facts that require particular attention. First, as already noted, the warrantless search was made pursuant to consent (rather than probable cause as in many reported cases). Second, the search was of a home (rather than a vehicle). Third, the search was of a purse. And fourth, the person consenting to the search was not the owner of the purse.
The United States Supreme Court has not passed on the constitutionality of a warrantless search involving this precise array of variables, but it has decided cases involving some of them. We begin our analysis with a review of those cases. After extracting what guidance we can from them, we apply their teaching to the fact pattern we face here.
Our analysis begins by examining the recent United States Supreme Court decision, Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999), in which the Court upheld a warrantless search of a passenger's purse based on probable cause to search an entire automobile. We initially point out that while both Houghton and this case involve a warrantless search of a purse, the searches were justified under different exceptions to the warrant requirement: the search in Houghton was validated by probable cause; the search in this case was justified by consent. As such, an examination of the two exceptions is necessary to determine Houghton's applicability. We begin with the scope of probable cause and consent searches.
In Houghton, an officer stopped a vehicle for speeding and driving with a faulty brake light. 526 U.S. at 297, 119 S.Ct. 1297. During the stop, the officer noticed a syringe in the driver's shirt pocket. Id. at 298, 119 S.Ct. 1297. When questioned about the syringe, the driver admitted that he used it to take illegal drugs. Id. The officer ordered the driver and two female passengers out of the car and then conducted a probable cause search of the car for contraband. Id. During the search, the officer found a purse on the back seat, searched it, and discovered drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine. Id. Passenger Houghton admitted the purse belonged to her. Id. In upholding the search of the passenger's purse, the United States Supreme Court found, "When there is probable cause to search for contraband in a car, it is reasonable for police officers ... to examine packages and containers without showing of individualized probable cause for each one." Id. at 302, 119 S.Ct. 1297. The Court refused to distinguish between a passenger's belongings and the driver's belongings even though the officer's suspicion of the driver's criminal conduct was the basis of the search. Id. at 302-06, 119 S.Ct. 1297. The Court reasoned in part that its decision not to distinguish between containers during a probable cause search of a vehicle was based upon the scope of warrantless search principles articulated in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982). Id. at 302, 119 S.Ct. 1297.
Ross had held that where probable cause justified the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justified the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search. 456 U.S. at 825, 102 S.Ct. 2157. Ross determined that "[t]he scope of a warrantless search based on probable cause is no narrower—and no broader—than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant supported by probable cause." Id. at 823, 102 S.Ct. 2157. Thus, the Court concluded that the scope of a warrantless search of an automobile is not defined by the nature of the container, but rather is defined by the object of the search and the places in which there is probable cause to believe that it may be found. Id. at 824, 102 S.Ct. 2157. For example, probable cause to search for undocumented illegal aliens would not justify opening a suitcase. Id.
Because this case involves a search of a purse within a home rather than a vehicle, it is important to acknowledge that although both Houghton and Ross involved vehicle searches, they purported to address searches supported by a warrant of fixed premises in general and closed containers discovered therein. The Court in Ross stated:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Jackson
...implicate privacy interests in a closed container that are distinct from those the third party had in the premises. See Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 967–68 (Ind.2001). We reject the notion that a guest assumes the risk the government might unreasonably intrude upon a privacy interest in ......
-
White v. Commonwealth
...to a search of the bag.” Id. at 133, 654 S.E.2d at 915.The Supreme Court contrasted this situation with the facts in Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind.2001), which involved a man and a woman who shared an apartment. Glenn, 275 Va. at 136 n. 3, 654 S.E.2d at 916 n. 3. The police obtained c......
-
Marganet v. State
...in which officers justifiably supposed that the person authorizing the search had the authority that he purported to have); Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind.2001) (male housemate could not validly consent to a search of a female housemate's purse, even though the purse was found in a bat......
-
Overstreet v. State
...extent that the contested search was authorized by consent, Melissa could limit or restrict the search as she chose. See Krise v. State, 746 N.E.2d 957, 964 (Ind.2001); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 657, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (ruling that consent searches a......
-
Reconstructing consent.
...refused to consent, but eventually consented after being asked several times; court found it voluntary), rev'd on other grounds, 746 N.E.2d 957 (Ind. 2001) (Supreme Court held that roommate did not have actual or apparent authority to consent to search of defendant's purse); see also United......