Krishnan v. Beuning

• Decision Date: 30 August 2021
• Docket Number: A20-1462
• Citation: Krishnan v. Beuning, A20-1462 (Minn. App. Aug 30, 2021)
• Parties: In re the Marriage of: Stephanie Joy Krishnan, f/k/a Beuning, petitioner, Appellant, v. Eric James Beuning, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Court of Appeals

In re the Marriage of: Stephanie Joy Krishnan, f/k/a Beuning, petitioner, Appellant, v. Eric James Beuning, Respondent.

No. A20-1462

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

August 30, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Morrison County District Court File No. 49-FA-16-840

Richard D. Crabb, Hill Crabb, LLC, Edina, Minnesota (for appellant)

Kristi D. Stanislawski, Lori L. Athmann, Jovanovich, Dege &amp Athmann, PA, St. Cloud, Minnesota (for respondent)

Considered and decided by Bryan, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Slieter, Judge.

REILLY, JUDGE

In this parenting dispute, appellant-mother challenges the district court's decision (1) denying her motion to change the child's school, (2) awarding respondent-father sole physical custody, (3) modifying custody without an evidentiary hearing, (4) declining to appoint a guardian ad litem, (5) modifying the child's primary residence, and (6) modifying parenting time. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying mother's motion to change the child's school and affirm this portion of the district court's order. But because the district court did not clearly analyze the motions related to custody, parenting time, and the child's residence, we reverse and remand these portions of the district court's order. We do not reach mother's arguments about the evidentiary hearing and appointment of a guardian ad litem because the district court will address these issues on remand, and determine whether it needs to conduct an evidentiary hearing and appoint a guardian ad litem. Thus, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

FACTS

The stipulated 2016 judgment dissolving the parties' marriage awarded them joint legal and joint physical custody of their minor child, and set an equal parenting-time schedule. The child was born in 2013 and attended school in the Sauk Rapids School District during the relevant time.

The judgment did not designate the child's primary physical residence, but did designate that the child was to attend the Sauk Rapids Schools. Mother originally lived in the Sauk Rapids School District and father lived in St. Cloud, within five miles of the child's school. Father bought his home to be close to the child's school. Father claims that because of his proximity to the school and his flexible work schedule, he was primarily responsible for scheduling and taking the child to doctor and dental appointments, school events, school conferences, and communicating with her teachers.

Mother remarried in 2018 and, in 2019, moved to a new home about 57 miles away from the child's current school and from father. Mother wanted the child to attend school in the Wayzata Public School District. Father objected to this proposed change. In November 2019, mother moved the district court to, among other things, change the child's school from the Sauk Rapids School District to the Wayzata Public School District; and modify the parenting-time schedule contingent on two events occurring: (1) the district court granting mother's motion to enroll the child in the Wayzata Public School District, and (2) father refusing to transport the child to her Wayzata school. Father opposed mother's motion and moved the district court to, among other things, award father primary care of the child during the school year, if the court modified the existing parenting-time schedule.

The district court held a hearing and later filed an order denying mother's motion to change the child's school, determining that granting mother's motion "would cause extreme strain on the [child's] relationship to both parties." The district court granted father's motion awarding him primary care of the child during the school year, which modified the parenting-time schedule.^[1] The district court called father's motion a "[d]e facto motion for a change of custody." Mother moved for amended findings and sought appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL). The district court denied mother's motions without a hearing. The district court filed an amended order, reiterating that it denied mother's motion to change the child's school. The district court also denied father's motion to modify child support and maintained the 50-50 parenting-time schedule until the child returned to in-person learning.

Mother appeals.

DECISION

I. We affirm the district court's order denying mother's motion to change the child's school.

Mother challenges the district court order denying her motion to change the child's school. The stipulated judgment not only awards the parties joint legal custody but states that the parties agreed that "the child shall attend school in the Sauk Rapids School District unless the parties subsequently agree otherwise." Joint legal custody gives parents equal rights and responsibilities regarding educational decisions, including the decision about where a child should attend school. Minn. Stat. § 518.003, subd. 3(b) (2020); see Novak v. Novak, 446 N.W.2d 422, 424-25 (Minn.App. 1989) (noting that choice of child's school is a question of legal custody), review denied (Minn. Dec. 1, 1989). Courts resolve disagreements between joint legal custodians considering the best interests of the child. Novak, 446 N.W.2d at 424. The best interest of the child means all "relevant factors" to be "consider[ed] and evaluate[d]" by the court including twelve statutory factors. Minn. Stat. § 518.17, subd. 1(a)(1)-(12) (2020).

The district court must make detailed findings on each factor based on the evidence presented and "explain how each factor led to its conclusions and to the determination of custody and parenting time." Id., subd. 1(b)(1) (2020). We review the district court's balancing of the best-interests factors for an abuse of discretion. Thornton v. Bosquez, 933 N.W.2d 781, 794 (Minn. 2019). "[T]he [district] court abuse[s] its discretion by making findings unsupported by the evidence or by improperly applying the law." Sefkow v. Sefkow, 427 N.W.2d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (quotation omitted). A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if "an appellate court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Goldman v. Greenwood, 748 N.W.2d 279, 284 (Minn. 2008) (quotation omitted). We also review the district court's decision in the light most favorable to the decision and defer to the district court's credibility determinations. Vangsness v. Vangsness, 607 N.W.2d 468, 474 (Minn.App. 2000).

Here, the district court analyzed and made detailed findings addressing each factor. The district court determined that the second, third, fourth, fifth, eleventh, and twelfth factors were either irrelevant or neutral and favored neither parent. But the district court determined that the first, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and tenth factors weighed in father's favor and against changing the child's school. Based on our careful review of the record, we conclude that the record supports the findings of fact the district court made on the bestinterests factors that favor father. See In re Civil Commitment of Kenney, N.W.2d,, No. A20-1007, 2021 WL 3641450, at *5 (Minn. Aug. 18, 2021) (advising that an appellate court need not "go into an extended discussion of the evidence to prove or demonstrate the correctness of the findings of the trial court" and stating that an appellate court's "duty is fully performed after it has fairly considered all the evidence and has determined that the evidence reasonably supports the decision" (citation and quotations omitted)).

The district court provided detailed findings supporting each of the twelve bestinterests factors. Based on its analysis of the statutory factors, the district court determined it was in the best interests of the child to deny mother's motion to move the child's school. Because we defer to the district court's credibility determinations and because the record contains substantial evidence that supports the district court's findings, we conclude there is no clear error and the district court's order was not an abuse of discretion. We therefore affirm the district court order denying mother's request to change the child's school.^[2]

II. We reverse and remand the district court's order relating to custody, parenting time, and the child's residence.

We next turn to the district court's order addressing custody, parenting time, and the child's residence. The district court denied mother's motion to change the child's school but stated that "[mother's] relocation has now forced a review of the parties' circumstances" as to the child. The district court stated, "[t]here is a de facto motion to modify physical custody." We do not know which motion the district court construed that way. There are multiple possibilities: (1) mother's parenting-time motion, which depended on granting the change of school;^[3] (2) father's parenting-time schedule; (3) father's primary-care motion; or (4) some combination of the above.

A motion to modify parenting time constitutes a de facto motion to modify custody when, under "the totality of the circumstances," "the proposed modification is a substantial change that would modify the parties' custodial arrangement." In re Custody of M.J.H., 913 N.W.2d 437, 443 (Minn. 2018). "The factors considered [when assessing whether a modification of parenting time constitutes a de facto modification of physical custody] may include the apportionment of parenting time, the child's age, the child's school schedule, and the distance between the parties' homes, but these factors are not exhaustive." Id.

Here the district court granted what it said was father's de facto motion to modify physical custody. While the district court stated, "the matter must...