Kristan v. Belmont Community Hospital

• Decision Date: 08 August 1977
• Docket Number: No. 62160,62160
• Citation: 51 Ill.App.3d 523,9 Ill.Dec. 557,366 N.E.2d 1068
• Parties: , 9 Ill.Dec. 557 Marie KRISTAN, Administrator of the Estate of Charles Steven Kristan, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BELMONT COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1068

366 N.E.2d 1068

51 Ill.App.3d 523, 9 Ill.Dec. 557

Marie KRISTAN, Administrator of the Estate of Charles Steven Kristan, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. BELMONT COMMUNITY HOSPITAL, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 62160.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

Aug. 8, 1977.

Louis M. March, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.

Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago (Gary M. Elden and Joel F. Handler, Chicago, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.

GOLDBERG, Presiding Justice.

The problem presented by this record requires most careful examination of section 24 of the Limitations Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 24.) The decedent, Charles Steven Kristan, became a patient at the Belmont Community Hospital (defendant) on March 9, 1967. On that same day, he died in the hospital. On March 3, 1969, Marie Kristan (plaintiff) was appointed administrator of his estate. On March 7, 1969, plaintiff filed an action for wrongful death on the theory that medical malpractice by defendant was the cause of death. On October 5, 1972, on the regular call of cases for trial, the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution.

On September 11, 1973, plaintiff filed a new suit restating the same cause of action. Defendant filed an answer to the complaint. Approximately one year and five months later, defendant also filed a motion to dismiss the new complaint on the theory that it had not been filed within the statutory period of two years contained in the wrongful death statute. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 70, par. 2(c).) The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the suit with prejudice. Plaintiff has appealed.

In this court, plaintiff contends that section 24 of the Limitations Act authorized the filing of the second action within one year after the dismissal of the initial suit for want of prosecution and that the filing of defendant's answer, never withdrawn, was a waiver of defendant's right to attack the complaint for insufficiency. Defendant urges that section 24 of the Limitations Act does not apply to actions brought under the Illinois Wrongful Death Act; since the technical objection regarding filing of defendant's answer was not raised in the trial court, it was waived and that the order appealed from should be affirmed in any event because commencement of the Wrongful Death Act within the two year statutory period was a substantive element in plaintiff's alleged cause of action and therefore a condition precedent to recovery.

Section 24 of the Limitations Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 83, par. 24a) provides:

"In the actions specified in this Act or any other act or contract where the time for commencing an action is limited, if * * * the action is dismissed for want of prosecution then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires during the pendency of such suit, the plaintiff, his heirs, executors or administrators may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is greater, after * * * the action is dismissed for want of prosecution."

This statute was recently the subject of two supreme court decisions which require comment. In Franzese v. Trinko (1977), 66 Ill.2d 136, 5 Ill.Dec. 262, 264, 361 N.E.2d 585, the circuit court dismissed a personal injury action which had been refiled after dismissal of a previous identical suit for want of prosecution. This court affirmed Franzese v. Trinko (1976), 38 Ill.App.3d 152, 347 N.E.2d 844. The supreme court reversed those decisions. The court held that the language of section 24 "must be given its plain and ordinary meaning" and that the statute is "clear and unambiguous." (66 Ill.2d 136, 139-40, 5 Ill.Dec. 262, 264, 361 N.E.2d 585, 587.) The court refused to graft upon this section of the Limitations Act any intent to refuse suitors who might have been lacking in diligence the beneficial remedy offered by the statute.

Shortly thereafter, in Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp. (1977), 66 Ill.2d 616, 6 Ill.Dec. 849, 363 N.E.2d 796, the circuit court dismissed a suit for personal injuries similarly filed under the authority of section 24. This court affirmed Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp. (1976), 35 Ill.App.3d 902, 342 N.E.2d 830. The supreme court held that since the previous action "was dismissed for want of prosecution plaintiff clearly had the right to refile * * * within the time specified in section 24." (66 Ill.2d 616, 620, 6 Ill.Dec. 849, 851, 363 N.E.2d 796, 798.) In a special concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Dooley pointed out that section 24 was remedial and therefore should be liberally construed. In this regard, the court cited additional authorities which hold a liberal rule of construction should be applied so that a plaintiff may have an opportunity to try his case on its merits. The court cited Geneva Construction Co. v. Martin Transfer & Storage Co. (1954), 4 Ill.2d 273, 289-90, 122 N.E.2d 540 and Roth v. Northern Assurance Co. (1964), 32 Ill.2d 40, 203 N.E.2d 415.

A most careful reexamination of section 24a convinces us that it should be applied to actions brought under the wrongful death statute. Section 24 was amended a number of times before it attained its present form. The particular words "or any other act or in any contract where the time of commencement of any action is limited" were added by an amendment approved July 17, 1959. (See 1959 Ill.Laws, p. 1460.) In 1967 the statute was further amended by inserting the words which now remain, "or the action is dismissed for want of prosecution." At that time the phrase "if the time limited for bringing such action shall have expired" was altered to its present form "whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action expires." These amendments were accomplished by an act approved May 25, 1967. See 1967 Ill. Laws, p. 615.

These amendments indicate a steady progression by the legislature in liberalizing this remedial piece of litigation by expanding the field of its operation. The 1967 amendment specifically covers the situation in the case before us in which the original action was dismissed for want of prosecution. The important language added in 1959 greatly enlarged the scope of this section so as to cover "any other act or contract where the time of commencement of any action is limited." ¹ The use of the words "or contract" is important because it evidences an intention by the legislature to make the beneficial effect of the statute available even in cases where the time for bringing an action is limited by plaintiff's own contract.

Other thought and analysis confirms the position that the wrongful death action is within this section. It is correct, as defendant urges, that the statement of the time within which a cause of action for wrongful death must be filed is considered a condition precedent to the right to sue rather than a pure statute of limitations. The pertinent statute uses the language, "Every such action shall be commenced within two years after the death of such person." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1975, ch. 70, par. 2(c).) Defendant cites a number of authorities which support this theory. In Wilson v. Tromly (1949), 404 Ill. 307, 310, 89 N.E.2d 22-24, the court held that the time fixed in the statute "is a condition of liability, and operates as a limitation of the liability itself, and not the remedy alone." In Country Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Bank of Decatur (1969), 109 Ill.App.2d 133, 139, 248 N.E.2d 299, 303, this court held that the wrongful death action is wholly statutory and that the requirement of bringing the action "within the specified time is a condition attached to the right to sue and is not merely a statute of limitations." The court pointed out that unlike a general statute of limitations, the time requirement was "a condition of the statute of any right to liability whatsoever."

However, we find no inconsistency between the wrongful death statute as thus construed and the result that section 24 of the Limitations Act is operative here. In Halberstadt v. Harris Tr. & Sav. Bank (1973), 55 Ill.2d 121, 125, 302 N.E.2d 64-66, the supreme court cited Geneva Construction Co., to the effect that, "the policy attendant to statutes of limitation is to provide defendant a sufficient opportunity to investigate the factors upon which his liability may be based while such evidence is still ascertainable. (4 Ill.2d at 289-90, 122 N.E.2d 540.)" The same thought is expressed in Roth, where the court pointed out that the purpose underlying section 24 is the same purpose behind section 46 of the Civil Practice Act (...