Kristiansen v. Town of Kittery
| Decision Date | 06 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:18-cv-00420-JHR |
| Parties | KATHLEEN A. KRISTIANSEN, Plaintiff v. TOWN OF KITTERY et al., Defendants |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maine |
In this civil rights action, the plaintiff alleges that various officers of the Kittery Police Department failed to arrest a man who sexually assaulted her when she was a minor in the late 1970s and withheld that man's written confession from her until 2011, when it was too late to prosecute him. See Complaint for a Civil Suit (“Complaint”) (ECF No. 1). She seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for what she claims were violations of her constitutional rights and a conspiracy to cover up her assault. See Id. at 9. The defendants remaining in this case - the Town of Kittery, Edward F Strong, Robert S. Hundley, and Steve Hamel - have filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. See Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) (ECF No. 57) at 1. Because I conclude that the plaintiff's claims are time-barred, I grant the defendants' motion.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Ahmed v. Johnson, 752 F.3d 490 495 (1st Cir. 2014). “A dispute is genuine if ‘the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.'” Johnson v. Univ. of P.R., 714 F.3d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Thompson v. Coca-Cola Co., 522 F.3d 168, 175 (1st Cir. 2008)). “A fact is material if it has the potential of determining the outcome of the litigation.” Id. (quoting Maymi v. P.R. Ports Auth., 515 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2008)).
The party moving for summary judgment must demonstrate an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). In determining whether this burden is met, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences in its favor. Johnson, 714 F.3d at 52. Once the moving party has made a preliminary showing that no genuine issue of material fact exists, the nonmovant must “produce specific facts, in suitable evidentiary form, to establish the presence of a trialworthy issue.” Brooks v. AIG SunAm. Life Assur. Co., 480 F.3d 579, 586 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Clifford v. Barnhart, 449 F.3d 276, 280 (1st Cir. 2006) (emphasis omitted)); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). “As to any essential factual element of its claim on which the nonmovant would bear the burden of proof at trial, its failure to come forward with sufficient evidence to generate a trialworthy issue warrants summary judgment to the moving party.” In re Spigel, 260 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2001) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).
The evidence that the court may consider in deciding whether genuine issues of material fact exist for purposes of summary judgment is circumscribed by the local rules of this district. See Local Rule 56. The moving party must first file a statement of material facts that it claims are not in dispute. See Local Rule 56(b). Each fact must be set forth in a numbered paragraph and supported by a specific record citation. See id. The nonmoving party must then submit a responsive “separate, short, and concise” statement of material facts in which it must “admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party's statement of material facts[.]” Local Rule 56(c). The nonmovant likewise must support each denial or qualification with an appropriate record citation. See id. The nonmoving party may also submit its own additional statement of material facts that it contends are not in dispute, each supported by a specific record citation. See id. The movant then must respond to the nonmoving party's statement of additional facts, if any, by way of a reply statement of material facts in which it must “admit, deny or qualify such additional facts by reference to the numbered paragraphs” of the nonmovant's statement. See Local Rule 56(d). Again, each denial or qualification must be supported by an appropriate record citation. See id.
Local Rule 56(f) directs that “[f]acts contained in a supporting or opposing statement of material facts, if supported by record citations as required by this rule, shall be deemed admitted unless properly controverted.” In addition, “[t]he court may disregard any statement of fact not supported by a specific citation to record material properly considered on summary judgment” and has “no independent duty to search or consider any part of the record not specifically referenced in the parties' separate statement of fact.” Id.; see also, e.g., Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)(2) (“If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion[.]”).
The plaintiff filed her pro se complaint on October 11, 2018. See Complaint. Two defendants - the Town of Kittery and the Kittery Police Department - filed a motion to dismiss the claims against them, see Defendants Town of Kittery and Kittery Police Department's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 8), which was granted with respect to the Kittery Police Department and denied with respect to the Town of Kittery, see Recommended Decision on Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 11); Order Affirming Recommended Decision (ECF No. 20). Thereafter, the parties consented to have me preside over all proceedings in this action, including the entry of judgment. See Consent to Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 31).
The plaintiff obtained counsel, who entered his appearance in June 2020. See Notice of Appearance by James P. Loring (ECF No. 41). In October 2020, the defendants filed a notice of their intent to move for summary judgment, see Defendants' Notice of Intent to File Summary Judgment Motion and Request for Pre-Filing Conference (ECF No. 47), and I conducted a pre-filing conference in November 2020 pursuant to Local Rule 56(h), see Report of Pre-Filing Conference Under Local Rule 56(h) (ECF No. 56). The defendants filed their motion for summary judgment and accompanying statement of material facts in January 2021. See Motion; Defendants' Statement of Material Facts (DSMF) (ECF No. 60). Subsequently, the plaintiff's attorney moved to withdraw. See Assented-to Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for the Plaintiff (ECF No. 61). While that motion to withdraw was pending, the plaintiff filed a pro se response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment. See [Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment] (“Response”) (ECF No. 63).
I held a hearing on the motion to withdraw in February 2021, see Minute Entry (ECF No. 67), during which I indicated to the plaintiff that I would not normally permit counsel to withdraw in the midst of summary judgment briefing due to the technical nature of the process. The plaintiff and her attorney represented that when the attorney had become ill with COVID-19, the plaintiff opted to draft her response to the defendants' motion herself rather than request an extension of time. They also assured me that (i) their parting was amicable, (ii) the attorney had been available to the plaintiff during the drafting of her response had she asked for assistance with the more technical aspects of summary judgment, (iii) the plaintiff was comfortable proceeding with her case on a pro se basis, and (iv) she was satisfied with her response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment as she had drafted it. Based on those representations, I granted the motion to withdraw. See Order Granting without Objection Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (ECF No. 68).
The following month, the defendants filed their reply to the plaintiff's response. See Defendants' Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (“Reply”) (ECF No. 69). They pointed out that the plaintiff had failed to admit, deny, or qualify any of the facts contained in their statement of material facts in accordance with Local Rule 56(c) and argued that their facts should, therefore, be deemed admitted. See Id. at 1. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a document styled as an amended response to the defendants' motion for summary judgment in which she attempted to address the technical deficiencies identified by the defendants. See Plaintiff's Amended [Response] to Defendants['] Motion for Summary Judgment with Opposing Facts (“Amended Response”) (ECF No. 73). I subsequently permitted the defendants to file a limited response in opposition to the plaintiff's amended response, which they did in late April 2021. See Order Granting Motion for Leave to File Limited Response (ECF No. 79); Defendants' Limited Response to Plaintiff's Amended and Supplemental Summary Judgment Filings (“Defendants' Limited Response”) (ECF No. 80).
Before outlining the facts, I must first address the defendants' assertion that the plaintiff has failed to abide by Local Rule 56 in her summary judgment briefing and, if the defendants are correct, how that failure impacts the facts I consider in deciding their motion.
By way of background, the First Circuit has frequently emphasized the importance of local summary judgment rules such as Local Rule 56. See, e.g., Cabán Hernández v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 486 F.3d 1 7 (1st Cir. 2007). The procedural requirements of Local Rule 56,...
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