Kristine H. v. Lisa R.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. S126945.,S126945.
• Citation: Kristine H. v. Lisa R., 37 Cal. 4th 156, 117 P.3d 690, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 81 (Cal. 2005)
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: KRISTINE H., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LISA R., Defendant and Respondent.

117 P.3d 690

33 Cal.Rptr.3d 81

KRISTINE H., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. LISA R., Defendant and Respondent.

No. S126945.

Supreme Court of California.

August 22, 2005.

Superior Court, Los Angeles County; Richard A. Curtis, Temporary Judge^*.

Honey Kessler Amado and Lynn Langley, Beverly Hills, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Liberty Counsel, Mathew D. Staver, Rena M. Lindevaldsen and Mary E. McAlister, San Luis Obispo, for Kristina Sica as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Leslie Ellen Shear; Goodman & Metz and Diane M. Goodman, Encino, for Defendant and Respondent.

Law Offices of Robert S. Scuderi, Robert S. Scuderi, Sherman Oaks; Law Offices of Emanuel Sedacca and Emanuel Sedacca as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Shannon Minter, Courtney Joslin, San Francisco; Jennifer C. Pizer and Amber Garza for Children of Lesbians and Gays Everywhere, Equality California, Family Matters, Family Pride Coalition, Growing Generations, Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Our Family Coalition, the Pop Luck Club and Southern California Assisted Reproduction Attorneys as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Clare Pastore, Los Angeles, Christine Sun, San Francisco, Martha Matthews, Los Angeles; ACLU Foundation of Northern California, Alan Schlosser, San Francisco, Tamara Lange; ACLU Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, Jordan Budd, Elvira Cacciavillani; ACLU Foundation, Inc., Romana Mancini; Lesbian and Gay Rights Project, James Esseks; Manatt Phelps & Phillips, Vanessa H. Eiseman; Maxie Rheinheimer Stephens & Vrevich and Darin L. Wessel, Los Angeles, for the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern California, the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California, the American Civil Liberties Union of San Diego and Imperial Counties and the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Maxie Rheinheimer Stephens & Vrevich, Darin L. Wessel, Los Angeles; Laura J. Maechtlen, Sacramento; and Vanessa H. Eisemann, Pasadena, for Tom Homann Law Association, Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom, Lesbian and Gay Lawyers Association of Los Angeles, and Sacramento Lawyers for the Equality of Gays and Lesbians as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Shannan Wilber, San Francisco; Diane Michelsen, Lafayette; Van Deusen, Youmans and Walmsley and Robert R. Walmsley, Santa Ana, for Legal Services for Children as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Debra Back Marley and Robert C. Fellmeth for Children's Advocacy Institute as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Katina Ancar for National Center for Youth Law as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Law Offices of Willard K. Halm and Willard K. Halm, Irwindale, for Southern California Assisted Reproduction Attorneys, Family Pride Coalition and the Los Angeles Gay and Lesbian Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent.

Alice Bussiere for The Center for Children's Rights at Whittier Law School, The Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles, The National Center for Youth Law, The Youth Law Center and Joan Heifetz Hollinger and the Children's Advocacy Project, Boalt Hall as Amici Curiae on behalf of Defendant and Respondent and Minors.

Donna Wickham Furth, San Francisco; Wilke, Fleury, Hoffelt, Gould & Birney and William A. Gould, Jr., Sacramento, for Northern California Association of Counsel for Children, National Association of Counsel for Children and The California Psychological Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors.

Geragos & Geragos, Gregory R. Ellis, San Francisco; and Rebekah A. Fye for The Los Angeles County Bar Association, The San Fernando Valley Bar Association and its Family Law Center, The Family Law Section of the Beverly Hills Bar Association, The Bar Association of San Francisco, The Association of Certified Law Specialists and Women Lawyers Association of Los Angeles as Amici Curiae on behalf of Minors.

Morrison & Foerster, Ruth N. Borenstein and Johnathan E. Mansfield, San Francisco for California NOW, Inc., and California Women's Law Center as Amici Curiae.

MORENO, J.

We granted review in this case as well as in Elisa B. v. Superior Court (Aug. 22, 2005, S125912) ___ Cal.4th ___, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 46, 117 P.3d 660, 2005 WL 2000864 and K.M. v. E.G. (Aug. 22, 2005, S125643) ___ Cal.4th ___, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 117 P.3d 673, 2005 WL 2000860, to consider the parental rights and obligations, if any, of a woman with regard to a child born to her partner in a lesbian relationship.

The present action arises from a judgment stating that both Kristine H. and her lesbian partner, Lisa R., are the parents of a child born to Kristine H. The judgment was entered pursuant to a stipulation of the parties when Kristine H. was pregnant. The Court of Appeal ruled that the judgment is void but that Lisa R. still may have parental rights as a presumed parent under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

We conclude that Kristine is estopped from attacking the validity of the judgment to which she stipulated, and the Court of Appeal therefore erred in reversing the superior court judgment denying Kristine's motion to vacate the judgment.

FACTS

On or about September 1, 2000, Kristine H. as plaintiff and Lisa R. as defendant jointly filed in superior court a "Complaint to Declare Existence of Parental Rights" that alleged that Kristine was seven months pregnant and Lisa was her "partner."¹ They alleged that "[t]he hospital requires a legal judgment establishing parental rights from this Superior Court in order to properly issue the birth certificate," that the parties are "the only legally recognized parents of said child," and that Lisa "is the legal second mother/parent" of the unborn child. The parties requested a stipulated judgment declaring Kristine and Lisa "the joint intended legal parents" of the unborn child with Kristine being listed on the birth certificate "as mother" and Lisa being listed "in the space provided for `father.'"

On September 8, 2000, a judgment was filed in superior court declaring that Kristine is the "biological, genetic and legal mother/parent" of the unborn child and shall have joint custody with her "partner" Lisa, that Lisa "is the second mother/parent" of the unborn child and shall have joint custody with Kristine, and ordering that the child's birth certificate list Kristine as "mother" and that Lisa "be listed in the space provided for `father.'" The judgment states that Kristine and Lisa "are the only legally recognized parents of [the unborn child] and take full and complete legal, custodial and financial responsibility of said child."

The child was born on October 3, 2000. She was given a surname formed by hyphenating Kristine's and Lisa's surnames.

Kristine and Lisa separated in September, 2002, when the child was almost two years old.

On December 19, 2002, Kristine filed in the superior court a motion to set aside the stipulated judgment. Kristine declared in support of the motion that she and Lisa "began an intimate and caring relationship" in April, 1992. After about six years, Kristine attempted without success to bear a child, engaging the services of a fertility clinic. She later accepted the offer of a male friend to provide his semen for a fee of $500 every three months. The friend agreed in writing that he would not seek custody or visitation rights regarding any resulting child. After about a year of trying, Kristine became pregnant through artificial insemination at home using the friend's semen. Kristine asserted that the stipulated judgment was void because the superior court had lacked subject matter jurisdiction to issue the stipulated judgment because the child had not yet been born.

On December 20, 2002, Lisa filed a separate action for custody of the child.

The superior court denied the motion to vacate the stipulated judgment, ruling that a judgment determining parentage may be entered before the birth of the child. The Court of Appeal reversed on a different ground, ruling that the stipulated judgment is void because "[t]he family court could not accept the parties' stipulation as a basis for entering the judgment of parentage." The court further ruled, however, that Lisa "may be able to establish parentage under the [Uniform Parentage] Act" as a presumed parent under a gender-neutral application of Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), which provides that a man is presumed to be a father if "[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child." Holding that a child could have two parents of the same sex, the court remanded the matter to the superior court "to conduct, in accordance with the views expressed herein, such further proceedings and amendment of pleadings as are appropriate in order to resolve the issues of Lisa's parentage and her rights, if any, to visitation and/or custody."

We granted review.

DISCUSSION

The superior court denied Kristine's motion to vacate the judgment, rejecting Kristine's sole argument that the judgment was void because it had been issued prior to the birth of the child. The Court of Appeal reversed on a different ground, concluding that the judgment was void because it was based upon a stipulation of the parties, stating: "A determination of parentage cannot rest simply on the parties' agreement."

We need not decide, however, whether the stipulated judgment is valid, because we conclude that Kristine is estopped from challenging the validity of that judgment.²

Estoppel long has been utilized to prevent a party from contesting the validity of a judgment that was procured by that party. In Watson v. Watson (1952) 39 Cal.2d 305, 246 P.2d 19, for example, the plaintiff obtained a divorce decree from his first...