Kristo v. Johnson, 091619 MNCA, A18-1762

Docket Nº:A18-1762
Opinion Judge:HOOTEN, JUDGE
Party Name:Shari Monica Kristo, Respondent, v. David R. Johnson, et al., Appellants.
Attorney:Richard L. Hendrickson, Richard L. Hendrickson, P.A., Osseo, Minnesota; and Karen R. Cole, Karen Cole Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent) David E. Krause, David E. Krause Law Office, Chtd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)
Judge Panel:Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge.
Case Date:September 16, 2019
Court:Court of Appeals of Minnesota
 
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Shari Monica Kristo, Respondent,

v.

David R. Johnson, et al., Appellants.

No. A18-1762

Court of Appeals of Minnesota

September 16, 2019

This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2018).

Hennepin County District Court File No. 27-CV-17-18771

Richard L. Hendrickson, Richard L. Hendrickson, P.A., Osseo, Minnesota; and Karen R. Cole, Karen Cole Law Office, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

David E. Krause, David E. Krause Law Office, Chtd., Minneapolis, Minnesota (for appellants)

Considered and decided by Connolly, Presiding Judge; Hooten, Judge; and Smith, John, Judge. [*]

HOOTEN, JUDGE

Appellants challenge the district court's temporary injunction preventing the cancellation of a contract for deed that they entered into with respondent. They argue that the underlying temporary restraining order (TRO) did not prevent the cancellation of the contract for deed because it did not take effect until after the 60-day statutory window to correct a default had run. Appellants also argue that the district court misinterpreted the contract for deed when it granted the temporary injunction and erred in granting injunctive relief because respondent came before the district court with unclean hands. We affirm.

FACTS

In August 2012, respondent Shari Kristo entered into a contract for deed with appellants David Johnson and Barbro Johnson. The contract was for the purchase of real property in Minneapolis that was being rented to multiple tenants. Two versions of the signed contract exist, one belonging to appellants and one belonging to respondent. Each is of the same typed form with blanks where the details of the terms can be filled in by hand. Both versions show that the sale price was $175, 000, with a $5, 000 down payment and $1, 200 monthly payments. And those numbers are written in by hand on both forms. Each version also has typed language describing a balloon payment with a blank where a date can be filled in by hand. But appellants' version includes a handwritten balloon payment date of October 1, 2017, while respondent's version of the contract had no such date because the blank was left empty. After entering into the contract, respondent took possession of the property and claims to have invested at least $30, 000 in improvements to the property.

On October 29, 2017, appellants served respondent with a notice of cancellation of the contract for deed pursuant to Minn. Stat. § 559.21, subd. 2a (2018). The notice gave respondent 60 days to pay $139, 361.72 for the balloon payment. This led to respondent filing a summons and complaint in district court on December 11, asking for declaratory judgment that she had made all required payments under the contract and was not in default. She also moved for a TRO to prevent the cancellation of the contract for deed. Appellants received service of the summons, complaint, and motion for a TRO on December 18, and the next day the district court held a hearing on the motion. Appellant David Johnson attempted to attend the hearing, but was unable to do so. On December 20, the district court issued an order granting respondent's motion for a TRO.

On January 9, 2018, appellants filed an answer to respondent's complaint and requested that the district court vacate the TRO. The district court did so on March 9, reasoning that it lacked personal jurisdiction over appellants when it granted the TRO because they had not been properly served. A few days later, respondent requested that the district court reconsider its order, and the district court granted the request. A hearing was held, and on June 15, the district court vacated its March 9 order, thereby reinstating the TRO. Among other things...

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